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Transport, Scape, Flow 
Medieval Transport Systems
James L. Smith
This volume was born in airports, those strange, seemingly-
artificial islands of commerce and activity located in remote in-
dustrial fringe zones away from the pulsing hubs of our cities. 
Filled with a contrived form of vitality by thousands of retail 
staff, businesses, support industries and engineering facilities, 
these sprawling complexes warp the social spaces that sur-
round them — displacing, yet creating. Within the gleaming 
halls of these shrines to our peregrinations, the passenger is 
neither here nor there, but in a strange state of intermediacy. 
Airports are a reconfiguration of space and time familiar to all 
air travellers — particularly to the academic — and yet redolent 
of phenomena that exist within intriguing corners of literature 
and history. It is the analogues of these strange twenty-first cen-
tury experiences, their transits, transports, scapes, and flows, 
that inspired this collection. These essays follow twisting paths 
through literature that offer a liminal vantage point on ideas in 
progress. Like all experiences of being in transit, there is beauty 
and meaning when conventional movement recedes.
To be an airline passenger in transit is to move through states 
without permanently adopting them. The very legal nature of 
a transit lounge embodies this perfectly. When one is in tran-
sit, one does not pass through immigration and enter the legal 
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boundaries of a nation-state. The strange nature of transit is best 
exemplified by its failures — the case of Mehran Karimi Nasseri, 
for example, who lived in Charles de Gaulle airport Terminal 
One for 17 years (1988–2006) after leaving Iran. Nasseri was 
separated from his refugee documentation while in the process 
of travelling to the UK to claim asylum, and found himself in 
a legal grey zone. Having legally entered the airport and being 
unable to legally leave it, his prolonged state of transit became 
famous, known to many of us through Tom Hanks’s character in 
Steven Spielberg’s 2004 film The Terminal. Arrested and enabled 
motions are lenses through which we view the complications of 
a process that is seamless when viewed post facto. Only disrup-
tion — be it Nasseri’s extreme experience or thoughtful schol-
arly reflection — reveals the artificiality of completion.
Eileen Joy and I were both drawn to transit lounges as admir-
ers, quasi-spaces so frequently encountered and yet so unusual 
when compared to other experiences of space and time. This led 
us to a mutual appreciation of intermediate motions and transi-
tions between states, the flows and conduits proposed by the 
sociologist John Urry in the articulation of his mobile sociology 
thesis. In his seminal essay, Urry proposes that
Scapes are the networks of machines, technologies, organiza-
tions, texts and actors that constitute various interconnected 
nodes along which flows can be relayed. Such scapes recon-
figure the dimensions of time and space. Once particular 
scapes have been established, then individuals and especially 
corporations within each society will normally try to become 
connected to them through being constituted as nodes with-
in that particular network.1
The appreciation of texts and transits — their establishment, 
their reconfiguring effect, their myriad reconnections — in-
spired the title of this volume and its antecedent roundtables at 




the 2014 New Chaucer Society congress in Reykjavik, Iceland. 
As medievalists at a conference focused upon the age of Chau-
cer, we and our participants reflected on the manner in which 
the strange intermediate states, transactions, motions, and emo-
tions of being in a place of transition could be applied to medie-
val literature. The result of these reflections was a focus on many 
forms of strange motion, interaction, space, time, and being. As 
the reader will apprehend from the essays within, the end prod-
uct of six scholarly wanderings in the transit, transport, scapes, 
and flows of their subject matter was a passionate engagement 
with themes of entanglement, embodiment, mobility, and the 
structures and mechanisms by which medieval literature and 
medieval minds sought to negotiate them.
The equally problematic and oft-strange complications of 
transit in a medieval context have proved to be a rich field of 
study for our contributors. The pre-modern analogue that 
framed this discussion was the notion of the thurghfare, or thor-
oughfare. In Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale the aged Egeus, learned in 
“this worldes transmutacioun,” offers stoic council to his son 
Theseus upon the death of Arcite: “This world nis but a thurgh-
fare ful of wo,” the old man advises, “and we ben pilgrimes, 
passinge to and fro.”2 In the manner of the elderly mentor, Egeus 
reminds us that our lives are ephemeral pilgrimages, and he also 
points to the idea of the world as a sort of transit system. 
The essays within this volume treat medieval texts them-
selves as transit systems in which we can glimpse the mobility of 
objects, figures, mentalities, tropes and other “matter” in vibrant 
intermediate networks. Each piece is a step on a journey, a tem-
porary caesura in the rambling poetry of literary motion, pass-
ing from corporeal to abstract, interacting and pausing — yet 
never reaching “completion.” As scholarship should be, they 
converse rather than conclude. They reflect their subject matter, 
stopping at a series of ontological sights and vistas as they jour-
ney through medieval literature, weaving in and out of familiar 
2 Chaucer, The Knight’s Tale, 2847–48, in Larry D. Benson, ed., The Riverside 
Chaucer, 3rd. ed. (Princeton: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 63.
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tropes within the age of Chaucer while also suggesting interac-
tions far beyond their scope. Within the essays, the reader will 
find seemingly disparate elements of medieval thought fusing 
together, forming temporary constructs, and dissolving back 
into endless motion. 
Christopher Roman pierces the black box of human corpore-
ality in “Bios in the Prik of Conscience: The Apophatic Body and 
the Sensuous Soul,” spilling its essence into the wider medieval 
thought-world and cosmos. Through penitential self-examina-
tion, a vibrant and highly permeable membrane emerges, ever 
in transition.
Jennie Friedrich scrutinises the estrangement of self through 
peregrinatory spiritual transactions of the heart in “Concordia 
Discors: The Traveling Heart as Foreign Object in Chaucer’s 
Troilus and Criseyde.” Her theme of harmonious discord reveals 
much of the existential mobility of internal space, transacting 
with external and alien forces, acquiring new and unfamiliar 
properties and ontologies in exchange.
Robert Stanton reveals the restless transitions of a familiar 
and yet ever-fruitful text in “Whan I schal passyn hens: Moving 
With/In The Book of Margery Kempe,” navigating the restless 
shifting of Margery through space, time, categories, commu-
nities, and expressions of authorial intent and identity. These 
roamings continue to touch and mold twenty-first-century 
scholarship and pedagogy, shaping our experience of the text.
Carolynn Van Dyke details the ceaseless mobility of the ani-
mal as a site of meaning and expression of agency in “Animal 
Vehicles: Mobility beyond Metaphor.” Her essay navigates ag-
riculture, zoology, bestiary, theology to reveal ontological and 
literary restlessness. Etymological and ecological webs defy cul-
tural homogenisation and reach beyond symbolism and meta-
phor to the shared ties of lively, ceaseless matter.
Sarah Breckenridge Wright journeys to the Blissful Martyr 
by a path less travelled in “Building Bridges to Canterbury.” 
Bridging spaces of landscape, literature, and identity, her essay 
simultaneously encounters disruptions to travel, experiencing 
the practical and abstract dimensions of medieval bridge build-
17
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ing. Through a Chaucerian lens, we see the locus of the bridge 
itself as a site of unique identity and resonance.
Thomas R. Schneider follows the motion of medieval litera-
ture and physics in “Chaucer’s Physics: Motion in The House of 
Fame,” taking the reader to a world permeated by Ockhamism 
and Aristotelianism as explained by a didactic eagle. The les-
sons marry the dynamism of natural philosophy and literature: 
motion narrated in motion, the motion of medieval rules, the 
journey of medieval literature, and the three forming a tangle of 
diverse, moving forces, literary physics in motion.
Many thanks are due to those who have contributed their 
own special touches to this volume. First of all to the contribu-
tors: their ceaseless enthusiasm for their subject matter, set into 
motion by a pre-publication sharing and synthesising of ideas 
that was inspirational to behold. To Eileen Joy, for co-chairing 
the NCS roundtables that generated this volume, for support-
ing this volume, and for all of her powerful and effective work 
at punctum books. To the punctum team: Chris Piuma for his 
wonderful cover, Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei for making it all 
come together, and Matt Ossias for his close and precise editing. 
To the NCS presenters who do not appear within these pages, 
but who helped to shape the volume through their excellent pa-
pers shared in Reykjavik: Louise Bishop, Gaelan Gilbert, Sealy 
Gilles, Katherine Koppelman, Sarah Novacich, Steele Nowlin, 
and Nicholas Perkins. Finally, a big thank you to the reader, who 





Bios in the Prik of Conscience 
The Apophatic Body and the Sensuous Soul
Christopher Roman
I.
In his 1981–82 lectures entitled The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 
Michel Foucault formulates that in the process of the self com-
ing to truth in spirituality, the subject must be “changed, trans-
formed, shifted, and, become, to some extent and up to a certain 
point, other than himself.”1 This paper thinks with the Prik of 
Conscience (c. 1400)2 as it presents the reader and penitent with 
the problem of the self as it becomes “other than” itself. This pro-
cess of becoming other than oneself is reflected in the idea of the 
penitent as a pilgrim passing through worlds. On the one hand, 
the unknown author of the Prik of Conscience is concerned with 
exploring “the more world,” or the macrocosm, and its connec-
tion with “the less world,” the microcosm. On the other hand, 
1 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de 
France, 1981–82, ed. Frederic Gross, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: 
Picador, 2001), 15.
2 All citations from the Prik of Consience, ed. James H. Morey (Kalamazoo: 
Medieval Institute Publications, 2012). The Prik of Conscience is anony-
mous, therefore I use the designation “Conscience-author” following the 




the Conscience-author is concerned with a kind of life, what the 
Greeks referred to as bios, linked with self-examination in the 
process of penitence.3 The penitential self-examination is linked 
to the relationship between macrocosm and microcosm. The 
penitent must find a way to unsay the self in order to become 
connected with these two iterations of cosmos. 
As the Conscience-author formulates, in order to know of 
God: “hymselfe he mot know withinne” (Entre, 138).4 The Prik 
of Conscience is a document outlining a “technology of self ”: 
in this case, Foucault’s formulation of an exomologesis, defined 
as “the dramatic recognition of one’s status as a penitent.”5 This 
dramatic recognition occurs in the Prik of Conscience within 
an apophaticism of the body. Unsaying the body undoes the 
“itself ” in order to see the radical incompatibility in the self ’s 
understanding of body as it works in only one aspect of the cos-
mos, the microcosm. This unsaying in turn dissolves the peni-
tent’s false relation to a concept of world sensed through a body 
conditioned by economic and social structures while rethinking 
relations with the cosmos in which they travel. The Prik of Con­
science suggests a penitential practice that finds God by explor-
ing the body’s implication in the relationships to these worlds. 
3 For an analysis of the conflation of zoē and bios see Giorgio Agamben, 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
4 For a discussion of the manuscripts evolution and importance in medi-
eval parish culture, see Robert E. Lewis and Angus McIntosh, A Descrip-
tive Guide to the Manuscripts of the Prick of Conscience (Oxford: Society for 
the Study of Medieval Language and Literature, 1982). For a lexigraphical 
interpretation of The Prick of Conscience see Maria José Carillo-Linares’s 
“Interpreting and Mapping Raw Data for Middle English Word Geography: 
The Case of The Prick of Conscience,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 11, no. 
3 (2010): 321–44. Further lexigraphical interpretation can be found in An-
gus McIntosh’s “Two Unnoticed Interpolations in Four Manuscripts of The 
Prick of Conscience,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 77 (1976): 63–78.
5 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Technologies of the Self: A 
Seminar with Michel Foucault, eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and 
Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 41.
21
bios in the prik of conscience
II.
The penitent expresses a specific kind of project of individual 
religious life in the Middle Ages. This essay seeks to think about 
penitence as a way of life that challenged concepts of being-
in-the-world6 that necessarily always eschew a singular world. 
Traditionally, the Prik of Conscience is categorized as a text in 
the contemptus mundi tradition. Yet, the Conscience-author was 
very concerned with linking the penitential body to wider and 
wider scales of the universe. It is difficult to take the Conscience-
author at face-value in terms of contempt while they are explor-
ing and, seemingly celebrating, the nature of the world, though 
they do denigrate particularly human failings in that world. The 
Conscience -author chides the penitent to do better by expand-
ing the self beyond the body. 
In order to move beyond the boundaries of the body, the 
penitent must unsay the self within two strains of discourse re-
garding Christian life. As mentioned, Michel Foucault identi-
fies one of these as exomologesis. On the one hand the penitent 
strove to continually verbalize their thinking within confes-
sion (exomologesis), what Nikolas Rose calls rendering “oneself 
truthfully into discourse.”7 The other strain is exoagouresis. Ex­
agouresis involves the role of the penitent as in exile from God. 
Thus, they also work to sacrifice that self. This purgatorial exile 
reflects what Foucault understood as the way the penitent must 
“sacrifice the self in order to discover the truth about selves, 
and have to discover the truth about selves in order to sacrifice 
selves.”8 This recursive relationship works to create a complex 
penitential identity that proves boundary-less in order to free 
itself to be more fully realized in the macrocosm.
6 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
7 Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, 2nd ed. 
(London: Fress Association, 1999), 222.
8 Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self,” in 




This recursive relationship comes to fruition within the dis-
course of confession. As Andrew Galloway has written, the Prik 
of Conscience “stands squarely in the world of real confession 
that constituted so central a cultural concern in late medieval 
England.”9 The process of real confession in the Prik of Con­
science, however, presents the reader with a language of unsay-
ing the body as a move of penitence. To confess, to account for 
oneself, undoes the self, in this case a self that enacts sin, and 
also opens the body to other possibilities. The Prik of Conscience 
enacts an apophatical penitential process by contemplating the 
material body tracing, as the Conscience-author writes, “mon” 
to “un mon” (First Part, 536–537). Apophaticism, then, muddies 
the easy divide between bios and thanatos around the body-soul 
relationship in order to re-imagine being within this text. As 
John Caputo formulates it in terms of the doctrine of the risen 
body of Christ, “it is not exactly an affirmation of the body, but 
of life, and not exactly of life but of a certain life, that is, life 
without death […] a simply impossible body.”10 Part of the Prik 
of Conscience’s appeal is the author’s ambivalent preference for 
continually returning to the tension between body and life, and 
thinking-through a bios of a sensuous soul, an impossible, po-
rous thing, rather than meditating on an “external” divinity.
The penitent, then, must see the body both as it has been 
conditioned by the anthropocentric but also how it is in rela-
tion to mico-and macroworlds. As Moira Fitzgibbons and How-
ard Chickering note, the Prik of Conscience is “unalleviatedly 
tactile.”11 This tactility is related to seeing as a sensual method, 
a technē that the Conscience-author employs for ontological un-
9 Andrew Galloway, “Gower’s Confessio Amantis, the Prick of Consience, and 
the History of the Latin Gloss in Early English Literature,” in John Gower: 
Manuscripts, Readers, Contexts, ed. Malte Urban, 39–70 (Turnout: Brepols, 
2009), 43.
10 John Caputo, “Bodies Still Unrisen, Events Still Unsaid: A Hermeneutic of 
Bodies without Flesh,” in Apophatic Bodies: Negative Theology, Incarnation, 
and Relationality, eds. Catherine Keller and Chris Boesel, 73–86 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2009), 98. 
11 Moira Fitzgibbons, “Enabled and Disabled ‘Myndes’ in ‘The Prick of Con-
science’,” in Medieval Poetics and Social Practice: Responding to the Work of 
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derstanding of that which transcends the finite self. To bring 
the body out, to “yeelde” it, this is the prick of conscience, “the 
deciphering of self.”12 This is also the shock of the sacred — that 
which resists assimilation to an everydayness.13 The scopic “pro-
cesse” (Entre, 225) leads the penitent to a new kind of seeing. 
Bodily seeing is too myopic since the human “love nought bot 
that they se” (Entre, 285). As Eugene Thacker posits, however, 
“life is not itself contained with the set that it conditions.”14 How 
to see and love life beyond this anthropomorphic conditioning? 
The Conscience-author employs “seeing” in many registers. See-
ing is understanding. Seeing is knowing. Seeing is truth — these 
are all examples of Foucault’s dramatic recognition. Mirrors, 
ironically, appear throughout the Prik of Conscience, not as 
symbols of vanity or narcissism, rather, they are used as a way 
to challenge the traditional scope of anthropomorphic seeing. 
Mirrors provide an important scopic tool in the understand-
ing of the nature of divine knowledge. For example, in the Sev-
enth Part of the Conscience discussing the joys of heaven, the 
Conscience-author writes that the penitent will see God as one 
sees in a mirror. Seeing is linked with knowledge, as the peni-
tent will learn how God is both divine and human; how the hu-
man fits with God’s divinity; and, finally, under the manner of 
being itself, “all men and thinges les and more” (Seventh Part, 
657–660). This kind of knowledge is connected to the way the 
penitent looks in the mirror and sees themselves in the mir-
ror. The perspective that the Conscience-author invites the 
penitent to entertain not only involves seeing the object of re-
flection itself — the mirror as object is agentially important in 
understanding knowledge. The penitent is to see their face and 
“lykenes” and, as well, that which is reflected besides the peni-
Penn R. Szittya, ed. Seeta Chaganti, 72–94 (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2012), 75.
12 Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, 2nd ed. 
(London: Free Association, 1999), 245. 
13 John McSweeney, “Religion in the Web of Immanence: Foucault and Think-
ing Otherwise after the Death of God,” Foucault Studies 15 (2013): 72–94.
14 Eugene Thacker, After Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 87.
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tent themselves. The mirror is not merely a reflecting tool or an 
invitation to narcissistic admiration of the self; rather, the mir-
ror becomes a figure of divine seeing. The connection between 
the penitent and the mirror allows the world that is reflected to 
become a part of the penitent’s being. The mirror’s scopic power 
arranges the penitent so that they see divinely, the reflection it-
self frees the penitent from anthropomorphic thinking into a 
wider world. The mirror is capable of “seeing” way more than 
the penitent can on their own. As well, penitential seeing mir-
rors Jesus’ judgmental gaze at the end of the world; that which 
is “inner” — the conscience, the soul, forgotten deeds — is no 
longer contained by the body, but stands before the penitent, 
making the account, the truth, undeniable. The penitent sees 
themselves at that moment as God would. It is this model of 
seeing that must be used in this world; the penitent becomes the 
image of Jesus.
As with the mirror, the Conscience-author experiments 
with non-human seeing to connect microcosm with macro-
cosm. Employing the figure of the lynx, an animal that “may 
se thorowe thicke ston walles” (First Part, 204), the Conscience-
author argues that if the penitent could see inside of their bod-
ies, or see it from below, or even take a birds-eye view of the 
body, that they would see the body as more than its “set.” As Jen-
nie Friedlich indicates in this volume, the body becomes a site 
for “openness and violability.” By dismantling anthropomorphic 
seeing, the penitent recognizes the strangeness of the body and 
how the body supercedes the macrocosm.15 To see oneself as 
truth is seeing the body as world: as the Conscience-author de-
scribes, “askes, poudur, erthe, and clay” (First Part, 55) — these 
are the matter of the body as much as they are of the world. It 
is worth noting here, as well, that the body is linked to the four 
elements (ashes: fire, powder: air; earth: earth; clay: water). The 
body is porous, mediated by elements, implicated with matter.
As the Conscience-author indicates, “this worlde is way and 
passage / wherby we make oure pilgrimage / by this way mote we 
15 Ibid., 87.
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iwis” (Second Part, 449–451). The penitent is a pilgrim carefully 
picking their way through the world-as-bridge. Love, dread, and 
humility are the terms that the penitent must balance, but it is 
important to note that the Prik of Conscience does not fit neatly 
into the penitential genre; there are no recommendations for 
penance, just that one must be penitent.16 This technē of peni-
tence is found within a love-dread-humility matrix in which the 
body must see itself for what it is: an apophatic body; a body that 
is not since it is always already undoing. 
An apophatic body, however, is also an embodied identity. 
As Catherine Keller and Chris Boesel point out, “the traditional 
apophatic gesture negated our bodied finitude only inasmuch as 
finite forms are mistaken for the divine infinite.”17 The Pseudo-
Dionysus warns against this mistake when he writes that The 
Mystical Theology is not for those who “imagine that there is 
nothing beyond instances of individual being.”18 The Conscience-
author underscores this by equating soul with life and life with 
God. Sin is one kind of dying, since “the soule sleyn withinne” 
(Third Part, 47) and God refuses to dwell there. But, penance 
can make the soul “hole within” (Third Part, 60). If the body is 
always being unsaid in order to see its finitude, the soul is con-
stantly resurrected to rethink its divine irreducibility. 
 By meditating on the body in its processes in his descriptions, 
the Conscience-author posits the body’s superabundance. The 
Conscience-author employs, as Thacker writes, an “overflowing 
negation that posits, in a contradictory way, the continuity that 
is also our own non-human limit. To exist as the world, we must 
cease existing in the world.”19 The Conscience-author directs us 
16 For a discussion of penitentials and their connection to the institutionaliza-
tion of penance see Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciple and Reasons 
of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993).
17 Catherine Keller and Chris Boesel, “Introduction,” in Apophatic Bodies: 
Negative Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality, eds. Catherine Keller and 
Chris Boesel, 1–24 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 4.
18 Pseudo-Dionysus, The Mystical Theology, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1987), 136
19 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of the Planet (Winchester: Zero, 2011), 149.
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to look at this overflowing negation: “yif a mon myght se his 
synne / in kynde a lykenesse that he is inne / for fere he shulde 
sonner it fle” (Third Part, 626–628). The scopic process undoes 
the sin from the sinner; in its external embodiment it is recog-
nized. A penitential bios returns an understanding of the body 
as cosmos by relegating sin to a being only bound to a world. Sin 
is far too human. 
The Conscience-author’s conception of cosmos is anti-crea-
tion in so far as it is connected to the merely anthropocentric. 
Despite his devotion to hundreds of lines over the doomsday 
signs and the burning of the world, so that by the end of the 
Fifth Part the judged and renewed world “shineth as clear as 
is cristalle” (2212), Books One through Four continually wres-
tle with body and world. For example, during the discussion 
of the muck that is the body, the Conscience-author celebrates 
how herbs bring forth seeds and trees bring forth fruit, while 
the human body brings forth pests: “nytes, fleen, lyus, and ver-
myn” (First Part, 274). By placing the body in this botanical tax-
onomy, the Conscience-author suggests that the body is merely 
an upside-down tree, or that instead of fruit, the human brings 
forth and is afflicted by innumerable diseases. By seeing self in 
humility as vegetable, the penitent sees themselves bound to 
the world, not apart from it. If olives bring olive oil, and grapes 
can produce wine, the human manufacturing of spit and vomit 
(First Part, 278) proves human effluvia as worthy of humilitas. 
Further, as the Conscience-author implores in his meditation on 
the heavenly bodies: “the bodyes therof in her kynde / us sh-
ewen ensaumple to have in mynde / to serve God in our kynde 
here / As they doon there in her manere” (Second Part, 93–96). 
That is to implore, why can the penitent not be more like a star? 
There is a certain beauty in this observation; seeing themselves 
as plant or cosmic matter invites penitents to see themselves as 
part of creation, rather than apart from it.
The Conscience-author, then, explores the cosmos through 
penitential seeing and suggests that the world has been under-
27
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stood only through the lens of “worldly men.”20 The Conscience-
author then asks, “what myght men by worlde undurstond / 
Yif no mon were therin wonand?” (Second Part, 141–142). The 
problem of world is that the penitent sees it through the filter of 
those who love a certain configured world too much, and the 
reader has to parse the Conscience-author further: it’s this world 
(Second Part, 155) — it’s the impersonal pronoun that defines a 
world that “worldly men” have made out of whack with a larger 
cosmography. As well, the Conscience-author indicates that “als 
this worldes vanytee / They woold noon othur world se” (Second 
Part, 666–667). Here he separates the problem of “this” world as 
not the only world; however, it is the only world the sinful is able 
to comprehend or “se.” 
It is also in this Part that the Conscience-author explains 
the problem of “the worldes mannere” (Second Part, 164). The 
Conscience-author spends over one hundred lines critiquing 
wealth and how the worldly celebrate being “over-bysy” (Sec-
ond Part, 162). The problem ultimately is that humanity renders 
themselves as slaves to a world that they have exiled themselves 
within (Second Part, 222). By posing the question of a world 
without this kind of humanity, the Conscience-author asks the 
reader to then imagine the penitential self as a self in a perpetual 
state of becoming, never static, permeating ever new modes of 
being in a shifting world. 
As Jeremy Carette writes, “the discourse of spirituality at 
least opens up the politics of continual transformation by hold-
ing up what we can be and what is not yet seen.”21 The scopic, 
for Carette, is implicit in new possibilities contained within the 
spiritual. The Conscience-author is pointing to the way the spir-
itual can unfold new possibilities, a way to unlock a new visual 
20 For a discussion of the link between rationality and mind, see Fitzgibbons, 
“Enabled and Disabled ‘Myndes’ in The Prick of Conscience”; Howell Chick-
ering, “Rhetorical Stimulus in the Prick of Conscience,” in Medieval Para-
digms: Essays in Honor of Jeremy duQuesnay Adams, ed. Stephanie Hayes-
Healy, 2 vols., 1:191–230 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
21 Jeremy Carette, “Rupture and Transformation: Foucault’s Concept of Spir-
ituality Reconsidered,” Foucault Studies 15 (2013): 52–71, at 71.
28
the passenger
spectrum and see the human body in new ways. As others have 
argued, confession is a way to reveal oneself,22 but it is also a 
way to “unfold God in our bodies […] this is an ‘I’ precisely 
not as separate or autonomous ego but us as one among all the 
creatures participating at every moment in each other.”23 What is 
remarkable about the Conscience-author’s version of Purgatory 
is how porous it is with the living, revealing how it participates 
in life. Penitence and Purgatory touch the world in ways that the 
body affects and is affected by. Purgatory is a state and a place 
that affects the soul across time and space shaping a bios of the 
living and the dead. In other words, to use Giorgio Agamben’s 
formulation of monastic exile, this is a Purgatorial world, a non-
monastic exile, shaping “a new community and a new public 
sphere.”24
As Foucault formulates it, the penitent’s confession is akin 
to “the relation to the truth [as] established in the form of a 
face-to-face relationship with God and in a human confidence 
with corresponds to the effusion of divine love” that is indica-
tive of the penitential tradition.25 In this forging of penitential 
identity, and in the demands of the face-to-face encounter, the 
Conscience-author is remapping a Christian body in terms of 
Foucault’s positive parrhēsia. In turn, Adam Kotsko argues that 
we need to think about the human differently: 
22 See Talal Asad, “Pain and Truth in Medieval Christian Ritual,” especially the 
discussion of relation between penitence and purgatory in terms of medi-
cine for the soul, 103.
23 Catherine Keller, “The Cloud of the Impossible: Embodiment and Apopha-
sis,” in Apophatic Bodies: Negative Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality, 
eds. Catherine Keller and Chris Boesel, 25–44 (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 42.
24 Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, 
trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 50.
25 Michel Foucault, “28 March 1984: Second Hour,” The Courage of Truth: The 
Government of Self and Others II, Lectures at the College de France 1983–
1984, ed. Frédéric Gross, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2011), 337.
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Humanity stands at a nodal point in the universe, at a nex-
us of rich variety of relationships. This is true at the level of 
the individual, as the patristic authors attempted to indicate 
by their rejections of a monadic soul and their insistence 
that the human being is the relationship between body and 
soul — that is, even the individual is relational ‘all the way 
down.’ But my core principal means that the body and soul 
can’t be conceived as two inert things that happen to be in 
relationship to each other. Instead, they are themselves sin-
gularities emerging from a network of relationships.26 
The Conscience-author unlocks scopic possibility in order to 
unlock Kotsko’s “network of relationships”: if we could see the 
body 
fro above and fro bynethe 
mich fylthe and stynkyng brethe. 
More stynke is non harden ny nessh 
Then the filthe of monns flesshe 
That may a mon both se and fele 
Yif he beholde hymselven wele (Book One, 238–244)
The penitent is misled by not taking account of the whole body 
and the way it works in the microcosm.27 For the Conscience-
author, the body is always framed by what the reader has been 
conditioned to see by the hermeneutic of the world’s vanities, 
not a realist ontology that reveals the greater worlds. In the case 
of the Prik of Conscience, in taking account of unsaying the 
body, the whole stinking, vermin-infested, and deconstructing 
biome leads the penitent to see the truth. 
The Conscience-author’s world reveals how the worldly have 
twisted it through not seeing it. We can see the Conscience-au-
26 Adam Kotsko, The Politics of Redemption: The Social Logic of Salvation 
(New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 189.
27 For an analysis of the corpse as a heterogeneous object, dead to itself, but 
food for others, see Karl Steel, “Abyss: Everything is Food,” postmedieval: a 
journal of medieval cultural studies 4 (2013): 93–104.
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thor’s exploration of life in the world when he critiques what we 
have made of the world. If God’s creation is “good,” and made 
for our profit, then what does profit even mean? Environments 
are twisted by the human: the sea is a symbol for changeable-
ness; the wilderness is full of animals that bite as do “tyrants and 
misdoers” (Second Part, 286); the forest is full of people who rob 
us; the field is a battle field; and the macrocosm has two hands 
holding happiness and woe, both of which are tied to wealth, 
again, which the human, in turn, has given a twisted shape. If 
the body is misunderstood then, fundamentally, so is this world. 
To die well, this kind of world must, too, be unsaid. 
Parts One and Two reveal a body in the matrix of love, hu-
mility and dread which opens the penitent to, as Keller and Bo-
esel write, “dimensions of embodiment that cannot be reduced 
to biological, sociological, or for that matter theological abstrac-
tion without again confusing the abstract with the concrete.”28 
The sinner dreads what they do not see; they do not see because 
we only see anthropomorphically. In this way, the Conscience-
author has prepared the penitent to give an account of their life. 
In giving an account, one must divide up life into categories: 
time, deeds, and behaviors are all necessary for the account-
ing. This making visible of ones’ life is clear in the Conscience-
author’s discussion of the final judgment in which those things 
that are internal, such as conscience or sins that have not been 
repented enough, stand and accuse — again, an example of 
Foucault’s dramatic recognition.29 The penitent sees themselves 
projected before their eyes. In the Conscience-author’s language 
one must “streyte acounte yelde” (Fifth Part, 1577) of various as-
pects of life. This “yeelde” is a giving over. Or, as Jean-Luc Nancy 
formulates, faith’s ability to “open the world in itself to its own 
outside.”30 The self is too insular — confession and accounting 
28 Keller and Boesel, “Introduction,” 7.
29 For a discussion of the Prik of Conscience’s influence on modern literature 
see Roy K. Bird, “Agenbite of Inwit’: Prick of Conscience, Sting of Command 
in James Joyce’s Ulysses,” North Dakota Quarterly 51, no. 4 (1983): 68–79. 
30 Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, trans. 
Bettina Bergo, Gabriel Malenant, and Michael B. Smith (New York: Ford-
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allow the human to see its exteriors which are normally hidden 
from them.
Revealing the hidden is an important aspect of accounting 
for a capacious, ultimately, and admittedly, only partial self. As 
Judith Butler writes, “my account of myself is partial, haunted 
by that for which I can devise no definitive story.”31 The ghosts 
of Purgatory haunt our account of ourselves — as in the medi-
eval Purgatory poem, Gast of Gy, what the penitent cannot, will 
not, or is unable to account for comes back to them. Purgatory 
is a haunting: it is within the earth (common) and above the 
earth someplace (special).32 The body forgets, the soul remem-
bers. The first pains of Purgatory have to do with the dread over 
the soul and body’s separation and the judgment of the soul. 
These two haunting anxieties mimic concerns over the living’s 
death. Even after one has died, the soul is still worried about 
these same problems. The Conscience-author’s worry may be 
tagged as “have I represented myself fully?” There will be res-
olution only in the final judgment. Perhaps, realizing this, the 
Conscience-author recommends methods of living that will help 
both the living and those in Purgatory. There is nothing one 
can do for those in Heaven or Hell. Prayers to those who are 
damned help lessen the numbers in Hell, and in Heaven bring 
some extra joy (maybe), but in Purgatory prayer assists those 
to proceed through their Purgatory quicker, in lessening their 
pain. The efficacy of prayer is mostly for those who are alive in 
the world and the Purgatorial appointed.
ham University Press, 2008), 2.
31 Judith Butler, Giving and Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2005), 40.
32 For an analysis of Middle English purgatorial poems focusing on the grey 
area of place and state, see Robert Easting, “Send Thine Heart Into Purga-
tory: Visionaries of the Other World,” in The Long Fifteenth Century: Essays 





The ethic that the Conscience-author is concerned with is how 
the penitent undoes the self and is ethically obligated to help the 
souls in other worlds. The soul’s body is full of affect, but there 
is a gravity to the soul, dragging it down. Penitence allows the 
penitent to levitate, to be more like stars. But, Purgatory is also 
a state, it touches the earth after all. It is a ghost of the world; 
the seventh pain of Purgatory, in fact, is being exposed to the 
wilderness. In order to circumnavigate the wilderness and the 
pain, both for oneself and for the dead, is to enact certain be-
haviors, to overcome sin: the use of holy water, alms, fasting, 
taking Communion, praying the Our Father, confession, bless-
ings by the authorities, knocking of the breast, and anointing 
of the sick. These various technai reveal the capabilities of the 
penitential body and help it disrupt venial sins, this world. This 
is making the body a body that touches the divine; it is a making 
of the body to live “in this world and equally as physically in the 
world to come.” 33
For the Conscience-author venial sin is social sin; his ac-
counting of venial sins reveal Foucault’s evolving body. Do not 
drink or eat too much, do not speak sharply to the poor, do not 
eat when one is already full and should be fasting, do not sleep 
too late and miss church, do not pray half-heartedly, do not have 
sex without intending procreation, do not, do not, do not. This 
ever-evolving penitential body will assist in skipping the pains 
of Purgatory so the accounting at the Day of Judgment will be 
more fluid. But it also suggests a way to live well — to be con-
cerned with oneself as it is stretched across multiverses.
As the Conscience-author concludes, in an overly-positive 
register considering where we have been in previous chapters, 
God will “bring hitte to that blysful place / where joy evere is 
and eke solace, / to the whiche place he is alle bryng” (Seventh 
33 Graham Ward, “The Metaphysics of the Body,” in Apophatic Bodies: Nega-
tive Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality, eds. Catherine Keller and 
Chris Boesel, 227–50 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 248.
33
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Part, 1942–1944). Considering the imagined rendering of those 
who are damned and saved, the “all” underscores the forgive-
ness which the sinner makes through the continual undoing of 
self in this ever evolving account. 
The practice of Penitence and its vibrations found in the 
touch of Purgatory, then, manage bios. The body is unsaid: it 
decays and disperses, yet its relationship with the sensuous soul 
is managed through purgatorial practice. Hell and Heaven are 
here in terms of punishment and reward, but those are less com-
plex in terms of guiding the penitence in ethical living. It is the 
Purgatorial body, the body in process that reveals life to be one 
of a duty to worlds. The enactment of various technai forces the 
penitent to acknowledge the dust of the cosmos in themselves, 
as well as the way that the inability to fully account for the self 
is a way to mark the ways that the self is part of bigger and big-
ger spheres of worlds. In Judith Butler’s phrasing “the failure to 
narrate fully may well indicate the way in which we are from 
the start, ethically implicated in the lives of others.”34 Purgatorial 
space exists as a palimpsest, a bare membrane, in which the con-
stantly unsaying body touches the sensuous soul. The penitent 
lives in fluid membranes, ever-stretching, as they work to move 
the body and soul beyond its capabilities into overflowing and 
boundless worlds. 





The Traveling Heart as Foreign Object in 
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde
Jennie Friedrich
Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors.
 — Horace, Epistles I:xii, l. 41
Interior Landscapes of the Body and their Implications
The quote from Horace’s Epistles in my epigraph succinctly ar-
ticulates the complexity of the heart’s physical movements and 
characteristics in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde: what I will dis-
cuss in this essay as a process of concordia discors, or harmoni-
ous discord. Hearts in this poem are sometimes just symbols, 
particularly in the frequent references to Troilus’s heartache.2 
In other instances, hearts are profoundly material, and even 
objectified in very specific and consistent ways throughout the 
narrative. This essay focuses on the removal and exchange of 
disembodied and objectified hearts, their profound effects on 
1 [What would and could result from the harmonious discord of things.] See 
Horace, Epistles (London: ECCO–York University, 1746). 
2 For more on the symbolic function of the hearts in Troilus and Criseyde 
more generally, see S.L. Clark and Julian N. Wasserman, “The Heart in Troi-
lus and Criseyde: The Eye of the Breast, the Mirror of the Mind, The Jewel in 
its Setting,” The Chaucer Review 18, no. 4 (1984): 316–28.
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notions of identity and ontological integrity in the poem. The 
interactions between hearts and bodies in Troilus and Criseyde 
also create a complex interplay of transits, transports, scapes,3 
and flows. Bodies move, but they are also at times transport-
ed against their will. Hearts are sometimes part of the internal 
landscapes of bodies, but at other times they are transported 
out of bodies. While the degree to which physical dynamics 
governing movement and physical integrity in works of fan-
tasy remains a subject of critical debate, I argue that Chaucer’s 
insistence on materiality — that the hearts function in material 
ways that align them with their cultural function — grants the 
traveling hearts some degree of scientific gravitas within their 
historical context.4 The dual function of the heart, as both a ves-
sel and a thing to be placed inside a vessel, makes it the ideal 
representation for the cultural conflicts of the Trojan War as 
represented in Chaucer’s poem. Themes of invasion, mobility, 
and displacement are pivotal to the plot, and encapsulated by 
the material forms and movements of the eagle’s heart and the 
heart-shaped ruby brooch in the poem. For this reason, I will 
focus on the ways in which the forms of cognitive estrangement 
present in this poem — alienation of the reader from his or her 
physical reality through cognitive organization of an alternate 
reality — engage with the physical environment of the body, its 
interior, and the organization thereof.
3  John Urry, “Mobile Sociology,” British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1 (2000): 
185–203.
4 For the original argument reserving the notion of cognitive estrangement 
for strictly science fiction texts, see Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science 
Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979). For an argument in favor of dismantling the generic 
“firewall” between science fiction and fantasy, see Mark Bould and China 
Miéville, Red Planets (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2009), 231. 
Carl Freedman argues that scientific realism is dependent on a narrative’s 
historical context. For more on this, see Critical Theory and Science Fiction 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2000), 43. Finally, Adam Charles 
Roberts argues that the affective power of the “science” in science fiction 
lies in the tension between cognition and estrangement or alienation in the 
concept of “cognitive estrangement.” See Science Fiction: the New Critical 
Idiom (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 8.
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This essay is organized according to three physical realities of 
medieval travel described by Jean Verdon:
[Travel] had so little substance that at first it was identified 
with the concrete elements that made it up: the road itself 
(via — way or journey), or the money needed to carry it out 
(viaticum). Later came the sense of movement, especially as 
carried out by pilgrims, and then by those armed pilgrims, 
the crusaders.5
The main concerns of territory, exchange, and movement de-
scribed by Verdon reveal the importance of thinking through 
the internal landscapes transformed by travel. As Verdon im-
plies, movement across vast landscapes mattered less to the me-
dieval definition of travel than the suffering and loss incurred 
by the traveler on the journey. Medieval travelers were likely to 
be robbed or killed on the roads. They had to travel through 
dense forests and uncharted landscapes, which introduces the 
threats of misdirection and disorientation into the structure 
of bodily damage in medieval travel literature. In light of this 
understanding of travel, it makes sense to talk about medieval 
travel in material and microcosmic ways. Movement across 
vast landscapes matters less to the medieval definition of travel 
than the suffering and loss incurred on the journey. Bodies are 
the primary territories in question. Finally, the financial cost of 
travel mentioned in Verdon’s description is also useful for mak-
ing sense of the exchanges in the narrative, and it too becomes 
a question of bodily movement and damage in the poem. Al-
though literal currency is not a concern in Troilus and Criseyde, 
systems of exchange involving hearts and bodies are integral to 
processes of disorientation and estrangement, particularly when 
the body or heart being exchanged is incapacitated or stripped 
of agency — and thereby objectified — or when the exchange is 
involuntary.
5 Jean Verdon, Travel in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2003), 1.
38
the passenger
Using these methods for categorizing the concrete elements 
of medieval travel, in this essay I reframe the familiar medieval 
trope of the disembodied heart in Troilus and Criseyde, employ-
ing theories of incorporation to examine how the movements 
of the hearts in this narrative actually reflect and threaten the 
unstable identities of the characters.6 In addition to the distinct 
functions of estrangement and foreignness in the poem, two 
medieval literary manifestations of the heart are also vital. The 
first is examined in Heather Webb’s study of medical and meta-
phorical conceptions of the heart in literature and culture.7 The 
second, the relationship between the heart and the “metaphor 
of the inner person or self as a kind of text,” is explored in Eric 
Jager’s The Book of the Heart.8 The power structure in Troilus 
and Criseyde is based on foreignness, allegiance, and accultura-
tion, which alters the figurative landscape. The treatment of 
hearts, bodies, and movements emphasizes the internalization 
of foreign objects. Troilus, meaning “Little Troy,” is the human 
embodiment of the city of Troy, which renders his fate inextri-
cable from that of the city. Early in Book 1, the arrogant Troilus 
mocks the pain of lovers and the “God of Love” shoots him with 
an arrow:
And with that word he gan caste up the browe,
Ascaunces, “Loo! Is this naught wisely spoken?”
At which the God of Love gan loken rowe
Right for despit, and shop for to ben wroken.
He kidde anon his bowe nas naught broken;
For sodeynly he hitte hym atte fulle — 
6 The heart reflects identity in that it is recognizable as belonging to the body, 
but it threatens the integrity of the body and its identity when it is removed 
from the body. Conversely, a heart that does not belong to the body, when 
inserted into the body, is foreign and therefore threatening.
7 Heather Webb, The Medieval Heart (New Haven and London: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2010).




And yet as proud a pekok kan he pulle. (I:204–210)9
From this point forward, Troilus begins to desire Criseyde.10 
In this tale, Criseyde’s uncle, Pandarus, acts as the mediator 
between the two lovers. Love is largely absent from the narra-
tive, except as an abstract influence on the characters. Pandarus 
makes a number of overwrought speeches to Criseyde about 
how Troilus will die if she does not love him, and finally, Crisey-
de begins to fall in love. Soon after, however, Criseyde discovers 
that her traitorous father, now living in Greece, has orchestrated 
a trade in which she will be sent to Greece in exchange for the 
imprisoned Trojan warrior Antenor. Troilus begs Criseyde to 
remain faithful to him, but Criseyde ultimately transfers her al-
legiance to Diomede:
Soone after this they spake of sondry thynges,
As fel to purpos of this aventure,
And pleyinge entrechaungeden hire rynges,
Of whiche I kan nought tellen no scripture;
But wel I woot, a broche, gold and asure,
In which a ruby was set lik an herte,
Criseyde hym yaf, and stak it on his sherte. (III:1366–1372)
According to The Aeneid, when Antenor returns to Troy, he be-
trays the Trojans by letting the Trojan horse into the city. 11
Drawing also upon Stephen Greenblatt’s theory of “es-
trangement-effect,” which states that geographical and cultural 
strangeness alienate the traveler, I argue that the figure of the 
9 Troilus and Criseyde in Larry D. Benson, ed., The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd. 
ed. (Princeton: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). Hereafter cited parenthetically by 
book and line number.
10 This allies the structure of desire here more closely with Cavalcanti than 
with Dante, but Cavalcanti’s darts are shot from the lady’s eyes through the 
lover’s eyes and into his heart, whereas Cupid simply shoots Troilus with an 
arrow here, the story giving the reader no indication of whether it reached 
Troilus’s heart.
11 A Companion to the Aeneid and Its Tradition, eds. Joseph Farrell and Mi-
chael C.J. Putnam (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 137–38.
40
the passenger
heart serves as the symbolic physical manifestation of that dis-
tance that foreignness creates between a traveler and his or her 
surroundings.12 The physical center moves out from the body 
and enters the strange new landscape. My approach seeks 
to reassign corporeality to the symbolic hearts in this text so 
that their full range of meaning in the contexts of this narra-
tive might be fully appreciated. In his brief article, Greenblatt is 
speaking of a much less traumatic estrangement than the theft 
and consumption of a lover’s heart or body, the forcible trans-
plantation of a foreign heart into a sleeping woman’s chest, or a 
widowed Trojan woman into Greek society. His definitions of 
the temporary strangeness of new surroundings and its effect 
on subjectivity, however, are also applicable to the traumatic es-
trangements in this text:
Travel’s estrangement-effect makes the external world not 
only more noticeable but more intense, just as poetry makes 
language more intense. The consequence is that the ratio of 
the self to everything that lies beyond the self changes: for a 
moment the world insists upon its own independent exis-
tence, its thingness apart from ourselves, and we are tempo-
rarily liberated from our own personal obsessions.13
Since the heart serves as the center of the essential functions 
of the body, the “thingness” of the heart estranged from itself 
makes the body more noticeable and more intense.14 It also, I 
argue, renders the heart distinct from the body, making either it 
or the body from which it has departed a part of the landscape 
12 Stephen Greenblatt, “Expectations and Estrangement,” The Threepenny Re-
view 67 (Autumn, 1996): 25–26.
13 Ibid., 25.
14 Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 (Autumn, 2001): 1–22. 
Brown explores the inescapability of things, including the body, as well as 
their capacity to interrupt the intentional processes of subject and object. 
Disconnecting the heart from the rest of the body’s systems — “circuits of 
production and distribution” — draws our attention to its status as an object 
and gets in the way of our recognition of it as part of a whole.
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rather than, or in addition to, the self. In both of these narra-
tives, either the body or the heart, in Bill Brown’s terms, “in-
sists on its own independent existence,” which makes its func-
tions much more visible in relation to its human host(s). In this 
sense, the traveling body parts become, like the bridges in Sarah 
Breckenridge Wright’s essay, the architectural manifestation of 
movement — they are vectors for elements of the self.
Given the Middle English Dictionary definition of “herte,” the 
disorientation caused by these disincorporations of the heart is 
significant. The physical heart can refer to the organ itself or to 
the entire area around the heart, including the stomach, and is 
the seat of the soul and memory.15 The MED states that the heart 
is symbolic of “the conscious self, the true self as opposed to 
the outward persona, the center of psychic and sensitive func-
tions.” Removing the heart from the body, then, decenters “the 
true self,” and sorting out the pieces of the selves becomes par-
ticularly tricky when the heart is incorporated into a foreign 
body. These extractions should not be read as surgical proce-
dures, however. Language of fear and aggression punctuates the 
removal of the heart. Maggie Kilgour uses the term concordia 
discors to describe a meeting of extremes, “although not in an 
equal relation but in an identity achieved through the subor-
dination, even annihilation, of one of the terms.” This explana-
tion is especially applicable to the hearts’ patterns of movement 
and damage.16 Both words contain the root word for heart, one 
connoting unity, the other distance and separation. Likewise, in 
Troilus and Criseyde, what is external to the body is in constant, 
often violent, contact with what is internal. The subsequent 
“estrangement-effect” of the disembodied hearts enhances the 
reflective function of the text because it objectifies and renders 
foreign the organ most central to medieval notions of identity.
15 Middle English Dictionary online, s.v. “herte.” 
16 For a brief explanation of concordia discors in the context of cannibalis-
tic power relations, see Maggie Kilgour, From Communion to Cannibalism 




Troilus and Criseyde is a retelling of Boccacio’s Il Filostrato, an 
early fourteenth-century tale about a romance between Troilus 
and Criseyde during the Trojan War. In the course of the poem, 
Troilus falls in love with the widow Criseyde, who considers 
herself unable to love, regardless of the suitor. After a dream in 
which an eagle steals her heart and transplants its own into her 
chest, Criseyde begins to warm up to Troilus. As I explained, 
Criseyde’s uncle, Pandarus, acts as the mediator between the 
two lovers, so the locus of control is external to the lovers. Pan-
darus’s impassioned speeches persuade Criseyde to fall in love 
with Troilus. As soon as she does, however, she is relocated to 
Greece against her will. The removal and objectification of the 
heart, here and elsewhere, emphasizes the external forces acting 
upon Criseyde, particularly upon her allegiances. Even Troi-
lus’s health becomes a source of external pressure, although it 
is clearly not the only deciding factor. Troilus begs Criseyde to 
remain faithful to him, but Criseyde symbolically transfers her 
allegiance to Diomede shortly after her arrival in Greece by pin-
ning the ruby brooch on him.
In keeping with this cultural upheaval, the locus of control 
in Troilus and Criseyde is variable and complex. Pandarus tries 
to maintain control over the lovers through smooth-tongued 
manipulation. Troilus tries to keep Criseyde in check by plead-
ing and bargaining, and Calchas and Diomede exercise political 
power and physical strength, respectively.17 The exception, the 
one character who asserts power by replacing an internal struc-
ture of the body, is the eagle. He comes to Criseyde in a dream, 
and the violation is described in threatening terms:
17 Robert Hanning calls Chaucer’s Criseyde a “female ‘text’” on which 
men — Troilus, Pandarus, the narrator — impose meanings that accord with 
their desires.” See “Come in Out of the Code: Interpreting the Discourse 
of Desire in Boccaccio’s Filostrato and Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde,” in 
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde: “Subgit to Alle Poesye” Essays in Criticism, 
eds. R.A. Shoaf and Catherine S. Cox, 120–37 (Binghamton: Medieval & 
Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1992), 120.
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And as she slep, anonright tho hire mette
How that an egle, fethered whit as bon,
Under hir brest his longe clawes sette,
And out hir herte he rente, and that anon,
And dide his herte into hire brest to gon — 
Of which she not agroos, ne nothyng smerte — 
And forth he fleigh, with herte left for herte. (II:925–932)
The passage emphasizes his long claws and the language, in con-
trast with the reassurance in the last line that Criseyde does not 
feel any pain or fear, is violent and abrupt. Criseyde is evidently 
mercifully asleep, but the eagle has “seized” and “rent” her heart 
from her breast before putting his own in its place.
Troilus and Criseyde is predominately concerned with for-
eignness, and in particular foreign objects being introduced to 
bodies. Criseyde’s new heart is the eagle’s heart. While it appears 
that Criseyde’s affections are altered by the eagle’s heart since she 
begins to have feelings for Troilus after her heart is exchanged, 
that effect is ultimately temporary, since she symbolically re-
places Troilus with Diomede. I would go so far as to say that the 
eagle’s heart, and its attendant affections for Troilus, are always 
foreign to Criseyde, and that she might be imagined as embody-
ing a perpetual state of disincorporation, consistently rejecting 
the transplant, which retains its object status because her body 
never incorporates it. Criseyde is, in a sense, a tourist by Green-
blatt’s definition: estrangement-effect centers on the temporary 
disorientation of the self within an unfamiliar physical environ-
ment. With regard to Criseyde’s exchange of hearts in the poem, 
the agent of disorientation is fundamentally external. After she 
is exchanged for Antenor, her disorientation is compounded. 
Finally, by pinning her heart brooch on Diomede, she recovers 
some sense of orientation, expressing her loyalty to Greece, but 
also her rejection of Troilus:
And after this the storie telleth us
That she him yaf the faire baye stede
The which he ones wan of Troilus;
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And eke a broche — and that was litel nede — 
That Troilus was, she yaf this Diomede.
And ek, she bet from sorwe hym to releve
She made hym were a pencel of hire sleve. (V:1037–1043)
This stanza makes clear that, not only did Criseyde give Diome-
de Troilus’s possessions, but that it was unnecessary for her to do 
this. Here again, the framing of the narrative indicates that Cri-
seyde’s actions connote rejection or temporariness rather than 
full incorporation. In short, I propose that Criseyde experiences 
estrangement-effects imposed by others, but she also estranges 
herself from her heart and her environment in the poem — as 
evidenced by the simultaneously romantic and political act of 
pinning the brooch on Diomede. It is possible to see Green-
blatt’s concept at play in the ways in which Criseyde reacts to 
changes in her psyche as well as in her environment. The en-
counter itself is a violation of Criseyde, as Aranye Fradenburg 
notes, calling the eagle’s theft “a simultaneous evocation and 
denial of violence, an image at once of overwhelming invasive 
power and of apparent reciprocity.”18 In much the same way that 
Criseyde acquiesces to being traded by her father, she appears 
to consent to participation in this exchange of hearts as well. 
Criseyde is involved in incorporation as a form of exchange, but 
the circumstances surrounding the event and the language used 
to describe it reinforce the idea that Criseyde is only a tourist.
Foreign Exchange
After Criseyde’s center has been replaced with a foreign object, 
and in the passages following the eagle’s invasion, she is given no 
voice with which to protest in the passages following the eagle’s 
invasion as the narrator moves on to concern himself with Troi-
lus’s return from “the scarmuch” while Criseyde sleeps (II:934). 
18 Louise O. Fradenburg, “‘Our owne wo to drynke’: Loss, Gender, and Chiv-
alry in Troilus and Criseyde,” in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, eds. Shoaf 
and Cox, 88–106, at, 99.
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In effect, Criseyde is temporarily disabled and ignored. Her role 
is ostensibly passive. This effect is reinforced by her behavior 
toward Troilus. When Criseyde sees him again, her heart re-
sponds differently to him:
And how so she hath ben here-byforn,
To God hope I, she hath now kaught a thorn,
She shal nat pulle it out this nexte wyke.
God sende mo swich thornes on to pike! (II:1271–1274)
The phrasing here indicates again, however, that the effect is 
temporary. Criseyde has “kaught a thorn,” that she shall not pull 
out next week, but the thorn clearly will not remain in its place 
permanently, since the poet asks God to send more to pull out. 
Seeing that Criseyde is responding to Troilus’s appearance, Pan-
darus begins to behave like the nightingale, stoking the fires of 
affection to keep Criseyde’s new heart warm (I:1275–1282). The 
external forces surrounding Criseyde here take care to ensure 
that the carefully orchestrated transplant will be effective, and 
Pandarus appears to be trying to reinforce the link between the 
physiology of Criseyde’s new heart and her affections, using his 
heart to stimulate hers: “I pray yow hertely.”19 The characteriza-
tion of the thorns as temporary and subject to Criseyde’s will, 
however, indicates that Pandarus’s efforts are ultimately futile. 
The bodily damage Criseyde sustains in the eagle attack is not 
insignificant, but the text appears insistent that the wounds will 
heal and Criseyde will find a way to remove the thorns’ influ-
ence.
This theme of distance is also reflected in the poem’s frequent 
descriptions of hearts, which are most often stripped of their 
“stuffness.”20 The hearts that do take material form are objecti-
fied, and thereby removed from their function as bodily organs. 
Clark and Wasserman characterize those references in spatial 
19 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “heartily, adv.”
20 Ruth Evans, “When a Body Meets a Body: Fergus and Mary in the York 
Cycle,” New Medieval Literatures 1 (1997): 193–212, at 194.
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terms, saying that the heart was either framed as a vessel or a 
thing to be placed in a vessel, like the heart in the body. They 
go on to argue that the symbolic functions of the heart merge in 
the exchanges of hearts in the poem.21 The ruby brooch contains 
a stone in the shape of a heart and the structure of exchange 
renders it “real” in much the same way as any currency becomes 
real — through the ritual of transaction. Once Criseyde reaches 
Greece, she — after a brief moment of inner conflict — transfers 
her allegiance to Diomede, pinning the ruby brooch, an ob-
jectified heart, that Troilus had given her, onto his collar. The 
heart brooch as a symbol has such a profound effect on Troi-
lus because it can be lost, and its absence is tangible in terms 
of weight, temperature, etc., in addition to its sentimental and 
symbolic value. Similarly, even in the context of a dream, the 
eagle’s heart is given shape and heft. His claws tear open Cri-
seyde’s body and invade it. Subsequent emotional changes occur 
in addition to the material alterations of the body, and the effects 
of the transplant that extend outside of the dreamscape into Cri-
seyde’s waking life substantiate the link between the dream and 
Criseyde’s reality.
In accordance with the tradition of the stilnovisti, Troilus as-
signs blame to Criseyde for his troubles rather than blaming the 
God of Love for shooting him and thus setting off this torturous 
chain of events. As we find out shortly hereafter, Criseyde gifts 
her heart to Troilus:
Soone after this they spake of sondry thynges,
As fel to purpos of this aventure,
And pleyinge entrechaungeden hire rynges,
Of whiche I kan nought tellen no scripture;
But wel I woot, a broche, gold and asure,
In which a ruby set was lik an herte,
Criseyde hym yaf, and stak it on his sherte. (III:1366–1371)
21 Clark and Wasserman, “The Heart in Troilus and Criseyde.
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In this scene, Criseyde has the power over the movement of the 
symbolic heart. In the same way that the eagle was previously 
able to remove its own heart, Criseyde is now transplanting a 
heart, and the language of “sticking” in which the act is couched 
recalls the thorn that Criseyde had previously “caught” and the 
eagle’s claws that deposited it. We might read this as Criseyde’s 
gentle distancing of her heart from herself, although this does 
not negate the exchange as a gesture of love and loyalty. It does, 
however, render the heart more external and portable, and 
make it easier to understand how Criseyde feels free to transfer 
it to Diomede. Clark and Wasserman have argued that Chau-
cer makes clear in this scene that the brooch is not Criseyde’s 
heart, but the structure of the lines do not specify where the 
uncertainty lies: “Men seyn, I not, that she yaf him hir herte” 
(V:1050). I argue that the eagle’s transplant could just as easily be 
the source of the uncertainty. Criseyde may be giving Diomede 
the heart she has — it is just not hers. If this is the case, and the 
heart was never truly hers, re-gifting it to Diomede is less of an 
act of treachery than if she were giving the center of herself to 
him. Criseyde’s objectified hearts are notably malleable in some 
way, which indicates that she is affected by external forces and 
subject to affections. They are, however, unusually distant, port-
able, and foreign, which suggests that her affections are similarly 
distant, portable, and foreign to her. This does not mean that 
she is cold or heartless, but that the heat and proximity of her 
heart have largely been manipulated by external forces, until she 
learns to manipulate them in similar ways herself.
Criseyde’s Slippery Heart: Misdirection and Disorientation
Criseyde’s “slydynge of corage” is often discussed as her heart’s 
movement, but the challenge throughout the poem appears to 
be that her suitors have difficulty clinging to it.22 Even the nar-
22 Slydynge can mean unstable or deceitful, but it can also mean elusive. See 
MED online, s.v. “slidinge, ppl.” For alternate readings, see Frieda Elaine 
Penninger, Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde and The Knight’s Tale (Lanham: 
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rator has difficulty reconciling her physical appearance with her 
age (V:826). As Sheila Delany has observed, the portraits of the 
characters are oddly located near the end of the poem, which 
she identifies as an alienating function — one of many she ex-
amines.23 Criseyde and her heart are also frequently distanced 
from each other toward the end of the poem, but she seems to 
make attempts to control the heart’s movement. She calls herself 
lost, but says her heart is true, which indicates a separation of 
her heart from her self. She even sets her heart on fire in remem-
brance of Troilus’s words, which is a divine office in Dante’s Vita 
nuova. Both Troy and Troilus slip through her heart in Book V, 
but this is attributed to their inability to stick rather than hers:
‘For which, with-outen any wordes mo,
To Troye I wol, as for conclusioun.’
But god it wot, er fully monthes two,
She was ful fer fro that entencioun.
For bothe Troilus and Troye toun
Shal knotteles through-out hir herte slyde;
For she wol take a purpos for tabyde. (V:764–770)
While Criseyde remains fixed, both Troy and Troilus slip knot-
less through her heart, which is clearly cast here as a vessel. In 
the next stanza, Diomede resorts to a hook and line in his at-
tempt to anchor himself to her slippery heart, and a few stanzas 
later, he again entreats her to let Troy and Troilus pass through 
her heart (V:911–917).24
In closing, I will examine this fixedness of Criseyde’s heart as 
a function of its objectified form. Criseyde’s declaration that her 
heart is “faste” on Troilus appears to indicate that she is faithful 
University Press of America, 1993), 71; Florence H. Ridley, “A Plea for the 
Middle Scots,” in The Learned and the Lewed: Studies in Chaucer and Me-
dieval Literature, eds. Larry Dean Benson and Bartlett Jere Whiting (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 175–96.
23 Sheila Delaney, “Techniques of Alienation in Troilus and Criseyde,” in 
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, eds. Shoaf and Cox, 29–46.
24 med online, s.v. “passen.”
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to him, but the poem repeatedly resists these simple readings. 
Given the function of the brooch throughout the narrative, I 
want to explore an alternate reading: that “faste” indicates phys-
ical fastening rather than committed love. Read this way, the 
stanza mirrors the way Criseyde “caught a thorn” as a result of 
the eagle exchanging its heart for hers:
As she that hadde hir herte on Troilus
So faste, that ther may it noon arace;
And straungely she spak, and seyde thus;
‘O Diomede, I love that ilke place
Ther I was born; and Ioves, for his grace,
Delivere it sone of al that doth it care!
God, for thy might, so leve it wel to fare! (V:953–959)
This reading gives Criseyde credit for her good intentions — she 
fastened her heart on Troilus so that no one could take it out, 
but her heart is slippery. Her real love, as she states shortly after, 
remains with her dead husband (V:974–980). It is also notewor-
thy that she spoke “straungely,” which indicates either unusual 
speech or foreign or wild language.25 In her response to Troilus’s 
subsequent impassioned pleas for her healing presence, Crisey-
de states that she has no heart or health to send (V:1590–1596). 
Following the movement of the brooch, this could be because 
she has gifted it to Diomede.
If this is the case, the symbol of the brooch works on many 
levels, since the word in Middle English could mean either an 
ornament or a weapon.26 In the midst of a lengthy discussion of 
the brooch in Book V, just after Troilus finds the brooch on Dio-
mede’s collar, he accuses Criseyde’s heart of slaying him:
‘Who shal now trowe on any othes mo?
Allas, I never wolde han wend, er this,
That ye, Criseyde, coude han chaunged so;
25 med online, s.v. “straungeli.”
26 med online, s.v. “broche.”
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Ne, but I hadde a-gilt and doon amis,
So cruel wende I not your herte, y-wis,
To slee me thus; allas, your name of trouthe
Is now for-doon, and that is al my routhe. (V:1681–1687)
The juxtaposition of Criseyde’s slippery heart and everyone’s at-
tempts to find a way to affix it or affix themselves to it seem to 
emphasize the dual function of Criseyde’s slippery heart as ves-
sel and a thing to be placed in a vessel. This brings us to the final 
relevant definition of “broche,” which is to pierce a container, 
letting the contents flow out. Emphasizing the fragility and vul-
nerability of the human body, this cluster of connotations re-
minds readers that, as Christopher Roman has noted, “[T]he 
body is porous, mediated by elements, implicated with matter.” 
In the following stanza, Troilus uses the word feffe, a word heavy 
with both territorial and financial connotations:
‘Was ther non other broche yow liste lete
To feffe with your newe love,’ quod he,
‘But thilke broche that I, with teres wete,
Yow yaf, as for a remembraunce of me?
Non other cause, allas, ne hadde ye
But for despyt, and eek for that ye mente
Al-outrely to shewen your entente! (V:1688–1694)
The narrator ends by enjoining readers to “cast all our hearts 
on heaven,” contrasting God’s love with the counterfeit loves in 
the poem. The theoretical payoff from examining this kind of 
bodily estrangement in medieval narratives is that it highlights 
the tension between the identification and abjection inherent 
in the relationship between bodies and travel. Travel is always 
an exercise in taking in what is desirable and affirming, while at 
once keeping out what is threatening and destabilizing. In the 
case of Criseyde, foreignness is initially introduced from outside 
influences, but as a result of the many transplants she undergoes 





Historical theologian Barbara Newman has explored the im-
plications of heart transplants and exchanges in medieval lit-
erature through both theological and medical lenses. Observing 
the unifying capacity of Christ’s sacrifice in mystical hagiogra-
phy, Newman contrasts the exchange of hearts with Christ in 
medieval literature with exchanges between humans.27 Whether 
spiritual or medical, however, she acknowledges that exchanges 
of hearts are often characterized by “alarming literalism.”28 Ob-
serving this intrusion of a foreign organ so often described in 
medieval literature in graphic and violent terms, Newman ech-
oes Jean-Luc Nancy in her description of heart transplant as a 
“long process of self-alienation, induced by the medically al-
tered body.”29 This process of self-alienation, I argue, overlaps in 
theoretically significant ways with the process of self-alienation 
threatened by medieval travel.
Returning to Verdon’s description of territory, exchange, and 
movement as the three physical realities of medieval travel, it 
is clear that the ontological threats posed by travel and heart 
transplant are functionally similar. Nancy refers to the trans-
planted heart as “the intruder” who does not lose his strange-
ness, and insists that as long as he remains foreign, “his com-
ing will not cease.”30 This frames the body as the territory upon 
which the foreign heart intrudes, and which is characterized by 
openness and violability. The exchange of hearts is accompa-
nied by a loss of subjectivity, and that loss is compounded by the 
battle to keep one’s own body from rejecting the foreign heart: 
27 Barbara Newman, “Iam cor meum non sit tuum: Exchanging Hearts, from 
Heloise to Helfta,” From Knowledge to Beatitude: St. Victor, Twelfth-Century 
Scholars, and Beyond (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 
281–99.
28 Barbara Newman, “Exchanging Hearts: A Medievalist Looks at Transplant 
Surgery,” Rethinking the Medieval Legacy for Contemporary Theology (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 17–41.
29 Ibid., 20.




“As soon as intrusion occurs, it multiplies, making itself known 
through its continually renewed internal differences.” The result, 
says Nancy, is disorientation: “One emerges from this adventure 
lost.” These structural similarities between travel and transplant 
have remained remarkably consistent from their representation 
in medieval literature to their psychological and cultural rami-
fications in the twenty-first century. This structural consistency 
may offer insight into modern medical and psychopharmaceu-
tical conversations as much as it gives us greater insight into the 




Whan I schal passyn hens 
Moving With/In The Book of Margery Kempe
Robert Stanton
A Protean Text: The Invention of Margery Kempe
The Book of Margery Kempe, dating from the late 1430s, bris-
tles with concurrent transits, passages, and thoroughfares in all 
sorts of modes, scales, and palettes. Most obviously, the book’s 
shifting, shifty generic status incessantly confronts the reader’s 
expectations, demands, and avenues of understanding. Unequal 
parts autobiography, confessional, saintly résumé, pilgrimage 
narrative, devotional program, and psychodrama, the text con-
tinuously provokes its medieval and modern users to ask what 
it is and what it is for. 
Almost any scene, whether a conversation with Jesus, a con-
frontation with a powerful churchman, or an anecdote about 
the travails of pilgrimage, can seem to serve the exemplary pro-
gram of one genre then, with a shriek, drop into place in another 
story altogether. Such discontinuities of expectation and recep-
tion are further complicated by the volatile, rapidly developing 
narrator, Margery, or Kempe, or Margery Kempe, who rarely 
if ever reveals a fully traceable narrative sequence, an inargu-
able didactic goal, or a wholly comprehensible psychological or 
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emotional state.1 Then there is the constant question of Kempe’s 
level of control: of her own psychological and emotional state, of 
the people and institutions who support or persecute her — and 
especially of the text itself, which may be the result of a collabo-
ration with at least two probably male scribes.2
These large questions about the status, function, and value of 
The Book of Margery Kempe remain intense objects of debate in 
the burgeoning body of scholarship and criticism on the topic. 
In this essay, I want to address several specific modes of tran-
sit within and around the Book. First, I examine the physical 
sites that generated and maintained Kempe’s geographical and 
1 Lynn Staley, in Margery Kempe’s Dissenting Fictions (University Park: Penn 
State University Press, 1994), distinguishes the book’s author, “Kempe” from 
its subject, “Margery.” Although I am not as confident as Staley about the 
presence of an authoritative, controlling author, Staley’s productive distinc-
tion has reset the conversation about the authorial presence in the text. 
While this question remains open, however, I use “Kempe” here in order 
to avoid the double standard of referring to male authors (“Chaucer”) and 
female authors (“Margery”).
2 On the scribal situation, see John C. Hirsh, “Author and Scribe in The Book 
of Margery Kempe,” Medium Ævum 44 (1975): 145–50; Staley, Margery Kem-
pe’s Dissenting Fictions, ch. 1; Nicholas Watson, “The Making of The Book 
of Margery Kempe,” in Voices in Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle 
Ages, eds. Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, 395–434 (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). On the authorial voice, see Karma 
Lochrie, Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 1991); Sarah Beckwith, “Problems of Author-
ity in Late Medieval English Mysticism: Language, Agency, and Authority 
in The Book of Margery Kempe,” Exemplaria 4 (1992): 172–99; David Law-
ton, “Voice, Authority, and Blasphemy in The Book of Margery Kempe,” in 
Margery Kempe: A Book of Essays, ed. Sandra J. McEntire, 93–115 (New York: 
Garland, 1992); Diane R. Uhlman, “The Comfort of Voice, the Solace of 
Script: Orality and Literacy in The Book of Margery Kempe,” Studies in Phi-
lology 91 (1994): 50–69; Liz Herbert McAvoy, Authority and the Female Body 
in the Writings of Julian of Norwich and Margery Kempe (Woodbridge and 
Rochester: D.S. Brewer, 2004); Felicity Riddy, “Text and Self in The Book of 
Margery Kempe,” in Voices in Dialogue, 435–53; Albrecht Classen, “Margery 
Kempe as Writer: A Woman’s Voice in the Mystical and Literary Discourse,” 
in The Power of a Woman’s Voice in Medieval and Early Modern Literatures, 
271–308 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007); and Joel Fredell, “Design and 
Authorship in The Book of Margery Kempe,” Journal of the Early Book Soci-
ety 12 (2009): 1–28.
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spiritual development, and the motion between those sites that 
conditioned the nature and effects of that development. The 
narrative privileges Kempe’s frequent journeys within England 
and throughout Europe and the Holy Land, which function not 
only as narrative arcs but also as a stimulating medium for some 
paired movements within Kempe’s experiential world: spiritual 
transformation and social development, the simultaneous en-
actment and manipulation of devotional programs, the active 
and contemplative lives, and the negotiation between the book’s 
putative exemplary agenda and Kempe’s particular psychologi-
cal and emotional landscape. Second, I examine the relationship 
between Kempe’s inner and outer devotional narratives, and the 
ways in which she consciously or unconsciously manipulates 
them in the service of a new spiritual paradigm. Third, I situ-
ate the book’s geographical and structural shifts within two net-
works of people and institutions, one supporting and advancing 
Kempe, one persecuting and hindering her, but both of them 
creating and defining her, with and without her participation. 
Finally, I move from the thoroughfares within the Book itself 
to several modes of transit outside the work that both reflect 
and condition the internal passages; namely, the shifting criti-
cal characterization of “Margery Kempe” as both author and 
subject of the book, and the pedagogical trends that are help-
ing new generations of students negotiate the troubled issues of 
voice and authority raised by the text.
Spiritual Cartography: Margery Maps Christendom
From her home base in Lynn, Kempe visits numerous places in 
Norfolk and the neighboring counties of Lincolnshire and Cam-
bridgeshire, moving west to Leicestershire, Gloucestershire, and 
Bristol, as far north as Yorkshire, and south to London and Kent, 
visiting towns, churches, abbeys, episcopal sees, and port cities 
on her way abroad to Norway, Poland, Germany, the Nether-
lands, France, Spain, Italy, and the Holy Land. The book con-
figures stasis and movement as interdependent modes: Kempe’s 
mystical experiences, including her conversations with God 
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and Jesus, tend to happen while she is located in a single place, 
whether in a church while praying or hearing a sermon, in her 
own house, at designated pilgrimage sites, or at a way station 
during her travels. But the movement between those places cre-
ates the conditions for those experiences. She loves to hear the 
word of God preached, so she must travel to where a sermon is 
being delivered; pilgrimage by its nature involves physical travel 
to approved pilgrimage sites, where she goes well beyond the 
recommended degree of affective engagement to cultivate her 
ongoing relationship with God; and she frequently visits clerics 
and holy men and women in search of approval and support. 
Such interdependence between enabling travel and place-based 
spiritual experience reflects a broader dynamic between place 
and motion: as both Schneider and Van Dyke note in this vol-
ume, the concept of place, as well as the function of individual 
places in economic and cultural systems, is dependent on the 
ability and phenomenon of moving between those places.
Thus, Kempe’s motion is continual rather than continuous: 
her devotional exercises, ecstasies, torments, and conversations 
with Christ take places in moments of relative physical stasis, 
notwithstanding the writhing and wallowing she performs, 
which I do not characterize as transit. Her spiritual journeying, 
though, cannot begin until she comes through the dramatically 
obstructive crisis that begins the book. Kempe is mentally and 
physically immobilized before and after the birth of her first 
child: by illness during pregnancy, by her labor and her fear of 
death, by her confessor’s failure to listen and give counsel, by her 
subsequent torment by demonic visions, and finally by being lit-
erally bound, “that sche mygth not have hir wylle […] that men 
wend sche schuld nevyr a skapyd ne levyd.”3 Kempe is bound, 
stuck, and stopped in every possible way: only when Jesus visits 
her for the first time can she break free of her physical and psy-
chological bonds and begin the incessant physical and spiritual 
3 All quotations are from The Book of Margery Kempe, ed. Lynn Staley (Kala-
mazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1996), 1.1.165–66. Citations are by 
book, chapter, and line number.
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transit that frames her spiritual life. Kempe’s constant physical 
displacement during her travels around England and Europe 
crucially constitute her ongoing self-fashioning, both generat-
ing and revealing an unstable identity. The book’s stated purpose 
(“a schort tretys and a comfortabyl for synful wrecchys, wherin 
thei may have gret solas and comfort to hem and undyrstondyn 
the hy and unspecabyl mercy of ower sovereyn Savyowr Cryst 
Jhesu,” 1.introduction.1.) conditions, but fails to contain, her in-
complete, experimental, and endlessly renewed self-creation.
Tracing the occurrences of the richly polysemous Middle 
English verb “passen” in the text reveals layers of spatial, tem-
poral, metaphoric, and affective movement, of people, events, 
and natural and mystical phenomena. The word occurs thirty-
five times in the Book, yielding a beautiful variety of passings: 
Margery and John Kempe passing forth in their journeyings, 
Margery desiring chastisement and rebuke because “Alle hys 
apostlys, martyres, confessorys, and virgynes and alle that evyr 
comyn to hevyn passed be the wey of tribulacyon” (1.3.287–
88), and the passing forth, passing by, and passing away of the 
sounds, smells, and images that sustain her. “Passen” occurs 
in a spatial sense only thirteen times, most of the travel being 
expressed with forms of “come” or “go.” Of the non-spatial oc-
currences, only five are temporal; the remaining seventeen us-
ages – half of the total – concern mystical transcendence, expe-
rience, endurance, or death. The sounds and melodies Kempe 
hears in her contemplation “passyd hir witte for to tellyn hem” 
(1.89.5214–15) she “passyd many perellys” (2.5.301–2) in her dan-
gerous travels in Book Two, and she expresses her own hopes 
and Christ’s promises about what will transpire at the end of 
earthly life, as she takes leave of her confessor in Rome, trusting 
to meet again “in her kendly cuntré whan thei wer passyd this 
wretchyd wordelys exile” (1.2358–59 ). In fact, fully eight occur-
rences of “passen,” often with an added phrase such as “owt of 
this world,” signify death, usually Kempe’s, as she anticipates un-
ion with God in the next world. As we shall see, the metaphori-
cal, transcendent, and eschatological passings in the book are 
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mapped onto, and expressed, by the physical journeys Kempe 
undertakes.
Kempe’s travels incorporate many of the most popular pil-
grimage sites of the late Middle Ages: Hailes Abbey in Glouces-
tershire (said to house a vial of Christ’s blood), the Brigittine 
monastery of Mt Sion in Shene, Wilsnack and Aachen in Ger-
many, and the “big three” of Santiago de Compostela in Spain, 
Rome, and Jerusalem and its environs. At these holy places, 
she continues the crying that she habitually practiced closer to 
home, notably her own church of St. Margaret’s in Lynn. On 
Mt. Calvary, she “fel down that sche mygth not stondyn ne kne-
lyn but walwyd and wrestyd wyth hir body, spredyng hir armys 
abrode, and cryed wyth a lowde voys as thow hir hert schulde a 
brostyn asundyr,” which the book’s narrator says was “the fyrst 
cry that evyr sche cryed in any contemplacyon,” carefully distin-
guishing it from her previous “wepyng,” which was brought on 
by various stimuli including her own sins, those of others, and 
the thought of Christ’s passion.
Although the pilgrimage sites, especially Santiago, Rome, 
and Jerusalem, were approved and encouraged as spiritual 
destinations, among Kempe’s trips inside and outside England 
there is a high degree of continuity between pilgrimage strictly 
defined and her journeys to seek support and advice. As David 
Wallace has noted, Kempe never appears homesick or closely 
identified with England while she is abroad. While in Norway 
on Easter Sunday, she views the raising of a cross and “had hir 
meditacyon and hir devocyon wyth wepyng and sobbyng as wel 
as yf sche had ben at hom” (2.3.246–47).4 The passage locates the 
most accustomed site of her weeping as “home,” whether this 
means Lynn or England, and establishes her devotional weeping 
as the same thing wherever it occurs. The relationship between 
Margery’s position at home and her identity as a frequent pil-
grim evinces the tension between a penitential self as an acting 
4 David Wallace, “Periodizing Women: Mary Ward (1585–1645) and the Pre-
modern Canon,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 36 (2006): 
397–453, at 412.
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subject and an apophatic, negated self that participates in a mac-
rocosmic community of penitential pilgrims (Roman, in this 
volume, discusses this double penitential identity in terms of 
the Foucauldian concept of the self realizing itself in a spiritual 
context). Kempe, however, is a limit case for this inside/outside 
movement: the idiosyncrasies of her highly personal and indi-
vidual relationship with Jesus constantly limit her full participa-
tion in the structured, institutional practices of devotional life. 
Kempe also travels frequently to see people from whom she 
needs advice, official support, verification of her pious practices, 
or simply spiritual companionship. Examples include the Arch-
bishops of Canterbury and York, the Norwich vicar Richard 
Caister, the Carmelite friar Alan of Lynn, and the anchoress Ju-
lian of Norwich. These trips share some characteristics with her 
pilgrimages proper: she is often told by God to visit a particular 
person, she frequently experiences hardships along the way, and 
her ultimate goal is to perform and demonstrate her own piety, 
whether in a Christian fellowship or as a figure of excess, dis-
ruption, and perceived heterodoxy. Sometimes her devotional 
practices even wear off on others, as when Thomas Marchale of 
Newcastle wept tears of contrition and compunction at Kempe’s 
example (1.45.2536–42). Kempe’s journeys have not one destina-
tion but many: each stop is a further stage of her self-creation 
and self-protection, and the trips themselves constitute a web of 
self-signification. But her pilgrimages, strictly defined, raise the 
stakes of this process: her enactment of the vita Christi and her 
apostolic tendencies can begin in England, but can only be fully 
developed in the Holy Land.
Inside of the Outside: Margery, Kempe, and the World
The inner and outer journeys Kempe undertakes throughout 
the book mutually constitute one another, providing one of the 
most consistent and coherent structural patterns in a text known 
for its gaps, discontinuities, and lack of temporal unity. It is im-
possible to imagine Margery Kempe remaining in a single place 
for long, and if she did, she could not have created, developed, 
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and nurtured her spiritual and emotional self. Conversely, her 
travels would not be so fraught, so laden with meaning, if she 
were less idiosyncratic and more in harmony with religious and 
political institutions and with other people. The book is in no 
way a traditional travel narrative: its subject is not the physical, 
practical aspects of traveling but Kempe’s feelings and experi-
ences, which are nonetheless inseparable from her relationships 
with people and places, whether helpful or obstructive.5
Nor is the enactment of an inner spiritual landscape by 
means of physical journeying an obvious one. Pilgrimage was 
enjoined on Christians as a spiritual duty, but the reality of trav-
el, with its loosening of social bonds, its gender mixing, and its 
remaking of the public sphere led to fears that pilgrims sought 
worldly rather than spiritual rewards. Lollard critics like Wil-
liam Thorpe were especially hard on pilgrimage: most pilgrims, 
claimed Thorpe, “despise God and all His commandments and 
Saints.”6 From the early Middle Ages onward, large numbers of 
women went on pilgrimage, although it is significant that many 
of the early (fourth- and fifth-century) female saints who went 
on pilgrimage did so dressed as men.7 The Crusades saw an in-
crease in female pilgrimage, but throughout the high and late 
Middle Ages, nuns were strongly discouraged from the practice: 
Hildegard of Bingen strongly dissuaded a fellow abbess from a 
pilgrimage that she called “the devil’s deceit.”8 The motives for 
5 Staley, Dissenting Fictions, 190; Terence N. Bowers, “Margery Kempe as 
Traveler,” Studies in Philology 97 (2000): 1–28, at 18–21; Ruth Summar Mc-
Intyre, “Margery’s ‘Mixed Life’: Place Pilgrimage and the Problem of Genre 
in The Book of Margery Kempe,” English Studies 89 (2008): 643–61, at 646–
47.
6 The Examination of Master William Thorpe, in Fifteenth Century Prose and 
Verse, ed. Alfred W. Pollard (Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co., 
1903), 140. Cited in Staley, Dissenting Fictions, 189–90.
7 Sylvia Schein, “Bridget of Sweden, Margery Kempe and Women’s Jerusalem 
Pilgrimages in the Middle Ages,” Mediterranean Historical Review 14 (1999): 
44–58, at 45.
8 Hildegard of Bingen, Epistolae, PL 197: 329–30; trans. Peter Dronke, Women 
Writers of the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
186–87. Cited in Schein, “Bridget of Sweden,” 48.
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Kempe’s own pilgrimages were intensely personal and interior: 
her enactment of a highly communal Christian duty, culmi-
nating in the imitatio Christi in Jerusalem, was essential to her 
maintenance of her highly individual relationship with Jesus 
and her self-creation as a holy woman.
The canonical framing of the inner/outer distinction in pil-
grimage terms was the dyad of the earthly and heavenly Jerusa-
lems.9 Seeking and visiting the heavenly Jerusalem was a deeply 
interior process, and the discouragement of nuns from making 
pilgrimages demonstrates that under the right conditions, the 
journeys to each Jerusalem were in fact separable: for monastics 
and nuns especially, only one Jerusalem needed to be sought: 
as Hildegard of Bingen put it, nuns are permanently “on their 
journey to the heavenly Jerusalem.”10 But Kempe’s secular status, 
and her desire for an intensely physical, affective relationship 
with Christ, made her perhaps the most enthusiastic Jerusalem 
pilgrim ever. The moment she enters Jerusalem, she stresses 
the desire for the simultaneous achievement of the earthly and 
heavenly cities: “And, whan this creatur saw Jerusalem, rydyng 
on an asse, sche thankyd God wyth al hir hert, preyng hym for 
hys mercy that lych as he had browt hir to se this erdly cyté 
Jerusalem he wold grawntyn hir grace to se the blysful cité of Je-
rusalem abovyn, the cyté of hevyn” (1.28.1552–55 ). In so quickly 
conjoining the physical and spiritual places, Kempe hews close-
ly to prescribed devotional pathways, as does her traversal, im-
mediately following in the text, of the via dolorosa where Christ 
suffered his pains; at every stop, Kempe “wept and sobbyd so 
plentyuowsly as thow sche had seyn owyr Lord wyth hir bodyly 
ey sufferyng hys Passyon at that tyme” (1.28.1569–70).
Nonetheless, the inner and outer aspects of Kempe’s journeys 
were never perfectly coterminous and never led to a clear spir-
9 On pilgrimage generally and the two Jerusalems in particular, see Dee 
Dyas, Pilgrimage in Medieval English Literature, 700–1500 (Cambridge: D.S. 
Brewer, 2001).
10 Hildegard of Bingen, Scivias 2.5.6; trans. Columba Hart and Jane Bishop, 
Hildegard of Bingen: Scivias (New York: Paulist Press, 1990). Cited in Schein, 
“Bridget of Sweden,” 49.
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itual resolution. Nicholas Watson notes that although Kempe 
seems like one of the “symple creatures” making up the imag-
ined readership of The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Christ (Nich-
olas Love’s early-fifteenth-century adaptation of the Pseudo-Bo-
naventure Meditationes Vitae Christi), and despite her eagerness 
to experience the earthly and heavenly Jerusalems together, she 
ignores “all the calls to ascend to contemplation of the heavenly 
city or God in his essence enunciated by texts like [Walter Hil-
ton’s] The Scale of Perfection.”11 Furthermore, as Terence Bowers 
has noted, by the standard of almost all pilgrimage narratives, 
the text’s narration of Kempe’s journey home is unusual: “Since 
the Jerusalem pilgrimage metaphorically enacts the journey of 
life, it ends in Jerusalem just as one’s life should ideally end in 
the heavenly Jerusalem.” As is the case with many places in the 
text that anchor Kempe firmly in the social world of creatures 
and institutions, her pilgrimage practices do not bring her fully 
into a heavenly world that transcends the earthly one. In fact, 
as pilgrimage became increasingly focused on saints and on 
well-worn prescribed routes in the later Middle Ages, it became 
much more difficult for it to serve a transformative spiritual 
function: as Dee Dyas puts it, “The rising profile of saints as in-
termediaries between a holy God and sinful human beings was 
paralleled by a danger that pilgrimage to an earthly goal could 
obscure or even undermine the longer-term goal of reaching the 
heavenly Jerusalem.”12
Kempe’s specific practices while on pilgrimage further com-
plicate the relationship between her inner spiritual journey and 
her ongoing physical and social movements. At God’s request, 
she wears white clothes, remaking herself as a virgin and incur-
ring the wrath and scorn of her fellow-pilgrims. Most obviously, 
her continual weeping and writhing, even more abroad than in 
England, exposes her to harsh criticism from her fellow pilgrims. 
Hope Phyllis Weissman notes Kempe’s close identification with 
the Virgin Mary’s violent weeping on Calvary, as established in 
11 Watson, “The Making,” 416.
12 Dyas, Pilgrimage, 65.
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the apocryphal Gesta Pilati and Robert Manning’s paraphrase 
of the Meditationes Vitae Christi. Kempe’s own behavior closely 
echoes those texts: “than sche fel down and cryed wyth lowde 
voys, wondyrfully turnyng and wrestyng hir body on every 
syde, spredyng hir armys abrode as yyf sche schulde a deyd, 
and not cowde kepyn hir fro crying” (1.28.1621–23).13 Weissman 
goes further to claim that the phrase “wondyrfully turning and 
wrestyng” suggests the pain of labor; while not everyone will be 
convinced by the evidence of the passage alone, Weissman goes 
on to note that the first time Kempe weeps and writhes together 
is just after she has borne her last child, and Jesus tells her not to 
have any more, as if “her compassionate weeping is being con-
ceived as an alternative, spiritual childbirth.”14
Comparing Kempe’s extravagant behavior to labor pains 
finds further confirmation in the reaction of Margery’s male 
contemporary, the German Dominican friar Felix Fabri, to fe-
male weeping in Jerusalem: “Super omnes autem mulieres per-
egrinae sociae nostrae et sorores quasi parturientes clamabant, 
ullulabant et flebant.” (“Above all, however, the female pilgrims, 
our companions and sisters, as if giving birth, cried out, wailed 
and wept.”)15 Kempe is consciously or unconsciously manipulat-
ing both devotional programs and contemporary expectations 
to perform a new kind of piety, modeled on existing modes but 
focused much more intensely on a performing individual. Some 
critics have seen in Margery Kempe a canny performance artist 
who turns herself, the devotional observer, into the subject of at-
13 Hope Phyllis Weissman, “Margery Kempe in Jerusalem: Hysterica Com-
passio in the Late Middle Ages,” in Acts of Interpretation: The Text and its 
Contexts 700–1600, eds. Mary J. Carruthers and Elizabeth D. Kirk (Nor-
man: Pilgrim Books, 1992), 209–15. See also Naöe Kukita Yoshikawa, “The 
Jerusalem Pilgrimage: The Centre of the Structure of The Book of Margery 
Kempe,” English Studies 86 (2005): 193–2015, at 200.
14 Weissman, “Margery Kempe in Jerusalem,” 212–13.
15 Fratris Felicis Fabri, Evagatorum in Terrae Sanctae, Arabiae et Egypti Per-
egrinationem, ed. Conrad D. Hassler (Stuttgart: Bibliothek des Literarischen 
Vereins, 2, 1843), 1.239 (my translation). Cited in Weissman, “Margery Kem-
pe in Jerusalem,” 215.
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tention: she performs, as it were, the role of a pious holy woman, 
at home and abroad.16
Exaltation and Revilement: Margery as Public Battlefield
Whatever degree of conscious performativity we want to attrib-
ute to Kempe, there is no doubt that she could not have achieved 
the effect she did without the participation of other people and 
institutions. All the book’s movements need to be assessed, 
traced, and mapped on, around, and within the meaning-gen-
erating networks within the text. The most palpable network, 
and the one that gives the narrative much of its forward move-
ment, is a human one organized around a dramatic opposition. 
On the one hand are Kempe’s supporters, a community whose 
integrity (in the narrator’s eyes) is strengthened not only by its 
geographical span but by the extended vertical social axis along 
which they range, from poor lay people in England and Europe 
through religious of all shapes and sizes and the merchant and 
gentry classes to aristocrats, bishops, and archbishops. We could 
visualize this community as an axis on a graph of economic, 
social, and religious importance; as a long cosmological line be-
tween the wicked earth and the joys of heaven; the mast of a 
tall ship bearing the heroine and her fellow-travelers on their 
sea-travels; or perhaps a prodigiously long pilgrim staff carried 
by Margery herself. These people construct her as a holy woman 
with access to the divine, support her physically and emotion-
ally, and enable her movements in space.
16 For Kempe as performer, see Nanda Hopenwasser, “Margery Kempe as 
Comic Performer,” Magistra 5 (1999): 69–77; Bowers, “Margery Kempe as 
Traveler,” 2, 24–26; Susan Signe Morrison, Women Pilgrims in Late Medi-
eval England: Private Piety as Public Performance (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 128–41; Clare Bradford, “Mother, Maiden, Child: Gender 
as Performance in The Book of Margery Kempe,” in Feminist Poetics of the 
Sacred, eds. Frances Devlin-Glass and Lyn McCredden (Oxford: Oxford 
Univerity Press, 2001), 165–81; Sheila Christie, “‘Thei stodyn upon stolys for 
to beheldyn hir’: Margery Kempe and the Power of Performance,” Studia 
Anglica Posnaniensa 38 (2002): 93–103.
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The matching and opposing human community consists of 
the antagonists who menace, harass, and damage Kempe in 
manifold ways: by threatening physical and sexual violence, 
by social ostracism, by spreading fear of her influence on other 
pious lay people, by accusing her of heresy, and by materially 
depriving her of food, clothing, and transport. This network 
bears almost the same social and religious range as the support 
network, although the very poor and the very powerful are less 
virulent than in the positive case; but in any case, the detractors 
also possess a vigor drawn from their geographical spread and 
social range, which is important for the discourse of revilement 
that crucially fuels Margery’s spiritual identity. The two human 
networks are mutually sustaining, since veneration/apprecia-
tion and persecution/revilement are mutually constitutive, not 
only in a conceptual way but in the narrative’s own terms (atten-
tion is repeatedly called to the contrast between supporters and 
detractors, and temporal shifts from one to the other are repeat-
edly highlighted as pivots in the drama).
The second network consists of stimuli, specifically physical 
sites and temporal occasions that both evoke and process Kem-
pe’s most acute spiritual responses, whether accompanied or not 
by the psychosomatic processes of crying, roaring, and wallow-
ing. The physical sites include her home base of St Margaret’s 
Church in Lynn, her own bedroom, open fields in the neighbor-
hood, the abodes of holy people (Julian of Norwich, for exam-
ple), and many pilgrimage sites, which themselves constitute a 
known, understood, and frequently negotiated social/religious 
network. The occasions include conversations with the deity 
(which are themselves in a dialogic relationship with events in 
her earthly life), listening to sermons, associational stimuli such 
as handsome men and boys, human and animal violence (all 
of which remind her of Jesus and his passion), and conscious 
participation in devotional exercises such as the Meditationes 
Vitae Christi.
All the significant crises and passings in the Book consist of 
relatively rapid transitions and transactions between the inter-
dependent networks of support and revilement, as the narra-
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tive modulates between them within a chapter, a paragraph, or 
a sentence. The result is a main character always becoming and 
never being: as Margery ages and travels more frenetically in 
Book Two, even as she continues to nimbly negotiate the mu-
tually reinforcing networks, her age raises the possibility of an 
endpoint preventing physical movement before her own death 
and apotheosis, a threat realized when she is forced to care for 
her injured and incapacitated husband. Both parts of the Book 
contain recognizable scapes and flows as defined by John Urry 
(“Scapes are the networks of machines, technologies, organiza-
tions, texts and actors that constitute various interconnected 
nodes along which flows can be relayed”), but their configura-
tions are quite different. The much longer Book One features 
many episodes of contemplation and action underlying the 
incessant travel in England, Europe, and the Holy Land; the 
scapes, including the actors and institutions who defend and 
obstruct Kempe, are well-known and established entities by the 
start of Book Two, which is almost all travel. The main difference 
in the second book’s scape is Kempe’s age: she constantly fears 
for her own physical and sexual safety, clearly wonders whether 
she can continue to achieve the levels of bliss she wants, and at 
what cost, and longs ever more for death and transcendence.17 
In this respect, Kempe’s travels reflect the key role, highlighted 
by Friedrich in this volume, of suffering and loss as constitutive 
properties of medieval travel. “Bodies,” she notes, “are the pri-
mary territories in question”; Kempe’s body functions as both 
the stakes of her spiritual venture (as she increasingly experi-
ences physical danger and fear) and its reward (as her affective, 
physical relationship with Christ ripens into ever deeper iden-
tification).
17 John Urry, “Mobile Sociology,” British Journal of Sociology 51 (2000): 185–
203, at 193.
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All Roads Lead from Lynn: Margery, the Critics, and the 
Students 
I want to conclude by moving from the thoroughfares within 
the Book itself to several modes of transit outside the work that 
relate to the internal passages. The first is critical, the second 
pedagogical. As the secondary work on Margery Kempe has 
grown on a steepening curve, critics and groups of critics have 
blazed paths that often intersect but all too frequently proceed 
in relative isolation from one another. But one clear dichotomy 
has emerged: between viewing Margery Kempe as a constructed 
late-medieval devotional subject and viewing her as an indi-
vidual actor with a unique psyche and mental constructs not 
wholly explicable by existing discourses outside the Book. The 
pendulum has swung back and forth a couple of times now, 
from early works describing her as a “hysteric” to scholarly loca-
tion of her within textual and devotional traditions to locating a 
female voice or discourse within a pattern of oppression to ever 
more insistent claims that she is a pattern, or close to a pattern, 
of a specific or general late-medieval devotional practice.
Reading recent work on Margery produces the impression of 
a pendulum oscillating ever more rapidly. Many recent studies 
apply to Margery’s narrative moves adverbs such as “shrewdly,” 
“cannily,” and “astutely,” risking an elision of her unique mental 
structures, including her sexual drives and traumatic reactions, 
while the fear of psychological explanation continues una-
bated; one recent study sternly warns against “pathologizing” 
Kempe and invokes the specter of American college students 
“donning the white coat,” diagnosing her with ADHD, and pre-
scribing Ritalin and Prozac; such warnings generally construct 
a straw-woman criticism in which any attempt to understand 
her individual mind is necessarily a project to isolate, silence, 
stifle, and dismiss her.18 The best work, of course, grapples with 
18 David Wallace, “Anchoritic Damsel: Margery Kempe of Lynn, c. 1373–c. 
1440,” Strong Women: Life, Text, and Territory 1347–1645 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 79–80 and n. 51.
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the combination of available discourse and individual mind; 
any understanding of the author and character based on one 
segment of that spectrum requires simultaneous awareness of, 
and negotiation with, the corresponding segment on the other 
side.19 Institutional structures of knowledge and behavior (such 
as liturgy, devotional exercise, or pilgrimage) purporting to be 
stable, enforceable, and exemplified by Margery, are in fact oc-
casions for self-created individual experience.
Pedagogically, the Book presents difficult problems of generic 
categorization, as it comprises elements of biography, perhaps 
autobiography, devotional treatise, and exemplum. Its generic 
instability is complicated by the range of options for teaching it. 
In a survey, probably via the excerpts in the Norton Anthology 
of English Literature, it falls implicitly within an English literary 
tradition; in a women’s writing course, within a female tradition 
and raises contestable criteria such as “subversion” and “voice”; 
in a course on mystics, the very idea of a “tradition” risks im-
posing a stability that belies Margery’s perpetual self-creation. 
Anyone teaching the Book needs to work with a virtual map, on 
which any locus opens up to multiple networks (narrative struc-
19 Scholarship on Kempe from 1934–2004 is usefully reviewed by Marea 
Mitchell, The Book of Margery Kempe: Scholarship, Community, and Criti-
cism (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 73–93; early works that explicitly pathol-
ogized Kempe in heavy-handed and ideologically driven ways are surveyed 
by Wallace, Strong Women, 75–79. Mary Hardiman Farley, “Her Own Crea-
ture: Religion, Feminist Criticism, and the Functional Eccentricity of Mar-
gery Kempe,” Exemplaria 11 (1999): 1–21, is perhaps the most fully worked-
out attempt to pathologize Margery Kempe. Unfortunately, the author is 
not a medieval scholar and takes no account of devotional paradigms or 
historical context. Raymond Powell, “Margery Kempe: An Exemplar of Late 
Medieval English Piety,” Catholic Historical Review 89 (2003): 1–23, as its 
title implies, is perhaps the most extreme attempt to make Kempe an utterly 
normalized product of devotional discourse. M.K. Johnson, “‘No Bananas, 
Giraffes, or Elephants’: Margery Kempe’s Text of Bliss,” Women’s Studies 21 
(1992): 185–96 and Weissman, “Margery Kempe in Jerusalem” historicize 
hysteria, reveal its ideological underpinnings, and recuperate potentially 
progressive uses of the concept. Nancy Partner, “Reading The Book of Mar-
gery Kempe,” Exemplaria 3 (1991): 29–66, remains the most balanced treat-
ment, proposing a powerful combination of available religious discourse, 
psychological landscape, and literary composition.
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tures, devotional programs, patterns of compulsion and repeti-
tion, transhistorical communities of holy women, and so on). 
Digital humanities offers exciting possibilities for traversing 
the networks and thoroughfares within and around the Book. 
The Mapping Margery Kempe project at Holy Cross was a very 
early example of a digital medievalism, and though it has not 
been updated for some years, it remains a model of its kind, in-
cluding a hyperlinked glossary of names, places, and concepts.20 
The manuscript of the Book has now been fully digitized and 
made available online through the British Library,21 and Joel 
Fredell’s Book of Margery Kempe project at Southeastern Loui-
siana University displays the digitized manuscript alongside a 
diplomatic transcription and promises a new reader’s edition 
and interactive commentary by scholars and researchers.22 Da-
vid Wallace’s project Europe: A Literary History 1348–1418 is 
organized around “transnational sequences of interconnected 
places,” and Gail McMurray Gibson and Theresa Coletti’s seg-
ment “Norwich-Walshingham-Lynn” promises to incorporate 
Margery Kempe’s movement within and outside England as an 
instance of textual, intellectual, and trade movements, includ-
ing the heavily determined network of the Hanseatic League.23 
A similar editorial orientation could potentially do justice to the 
flows and scapes of the Book of Margery Kempe and its world, 
with important implications for pedagogy. The “flows” in the 
text are flows because they are both structured and dynamic, 
and the “scapes” are scapes because they are both perceivable in 
relation to other structures and negotiable by other actors. The 
beauty, and the utility, of the book lies in their interaction.
20 University of the Holy Cross, “Mapping Margery Kempe: A Guide to Late 
Medieval Material and Spiritual Life,” last modified March 13, 2009, http://
college.holycross.edu/projects/kempe/.
21 British Library, “Digitised Manuscripts: Add MS 61823,” http://www.bl.uk/
manuscripts/FullDisplay.aspx?ref=Add_MS_61823.
22 Southeastern Louisiana University, “The Book of Margery Kempe,” http://
english.selu.edu/humanitiesonline/kempe/index.php.









In the book that inspired this one, John Urry redefines not 
just social structures but also the social agent. “[O]f course,” 
he writes, “agents are not just humans but will be a variety of 
human and non-human actants that constitute the typical mo-
bile, roaming hybrids.”1 Out of context, “non-human actants” 
would probably mean nonhuman animals; “roaming hybrids” 
might be peripatetic centaurs or cyborgs. In fact, however, the 
nonhuman actants that Urry discusses are principally objects, 
and his “hybrids” are “assemblages of humans, machines, and 
technologies.”2 Animals play only a passive role in his “mobile 
sociology,” as the potential recipients of rights and “citizenship.”3 
Animals play a major role, however, in Urry’s rhetoric. The 
last chapter of his Sociology beyond Societies centers on Zygmunt 
Bauman’s contrast between two sociopolitical orders: “the gar-
dening state,” which “presumes exceptional concern with pat-
tern, regularity and ordering, with what is growing and what 
should be weeded out;” and the “gamekeeper state,” “concerned 
1 John Urry, Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury (New York: Routledge, 2000), 207.




with regulating mobilities, with ensuring that there was suffi-
cient stock for hunting in a particular site but not with the de-
tailed cultivation of each animal in each particular place.”4 In 
Bauman’s view, the former has replaced the latter: like garden-
ers, modern legislators and social scientists determine how to 
produce social order. In contrast, Urry sees a reversion to the 
gamekeeper model, in which “[a]nimals roamed around and 
beyond the estate, like the roaming hybrids that currently roam 
in and across national borders.”5 What interests me more than 
Urry’s argument is the analogy that he deploys. Absent from the 
state’s actual “roaming hybrids,” animals serve as their meta-
phoric vehicle. 
Urry makes clear in the second chapter of Sociology beyond 
Societies, titled “Metaphor,” that he does not use figurative lan-
guage carelessly, and his animal analogy is certainly apt. Nor is 
he unusual in referring to nonhuman animals only to clarify his 
sociological argument. Academic writing shares with imagina-
tive literature and common speech the assumption that humans 
are fundamentally different from all other animals; any asser-
tions of resemblance across that divide can only be metaphori-
cal.6 But classical and medieval thinkers might have regarded 
the vehicle of Urry’s metaphor as singularly appropriate: to 
them, mobility defines animals. “In Latin,” writes Isidore of Se-
ville, “they are called animals (animal) or ‘animate beings’ (ani­
mans), because they are animated (animare) by life and moved 
4 Ibid., 188, 189; citing Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Mo-
dernity, Post-Modernity, and Intellectuals (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987).
5 Urry, Sociology beyond Societies, 189.
6 On humanity’s ongoing attempts to establish this discontinuity, see, for in-
stance, Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 12 –16, 29, 38; Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The 
Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 3; Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well, Or the Calcula-
tion of the Subject,” in Points…Interviews, 1974–1994, trans. Peggy Kamuf, 
ed. Elisabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 89; and Roy 
G. Willis, Signifying Animals (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 7.
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by spirit.”7 John of Trevisa, translating Bartholomaeus Anglicus, 
writes that the “vertu [power] of moeuynge and of feelynge” is 
“in alle bestes,” a category that includes “men and bestes wilde 
and tame.”8 Similarly, at least one modern dictionary groups hu-
mans with other species on the basis of their common motility. 
According to the online Merriam­Webster dictinary an animal is 
simply a life form with “the capacity for spontaneous movement 
and rapid motor responses to stimulation.” The definition goes 
on to distinguish the “lower animals” from “human beings” but 
cites no differentiae.9 
In light of those definitions, mobility is the capacity that 
collapses the human tenor and animal vehicles of Urry’s meta-
phors. In being provisioned for hunting but able to cross na-
tional boundaries, game animals are not like the human and 
institutional “hybrids” of the modern state; they are among 
those roaming agents. So too, the cultivated stock of a “garden-
ing state” includes nonhuman animals (and hybrids). I propose, 
therefore, that we reformulate Urry’s “mobile sociology” to in-
clude a fuller range of living actors. In this chapter, I will argue 
that animals were crucial in medieval mobilities, both material 
and textual.
Power of Moving and Feeling: Material Mobility
In the prehistory of interspecies mobility, nonhuman animals 
made the first moves. Terry O’Connor writes that early in the 
British postglacial period, perhaps 10,000 years ago, a “mix of 
temperate large vertebrates” may have established “clearings and 
‘trails’ by grazing and browsing pressure alone. Into this envi-
ronment, too, came people, drawn by [among other resources] 
7 The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, trans. Stephen A. Barney et al. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), XII.i.3.
8 John of Trevisa, On the Properties of Things: John Trevisa’s Translation of 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus De Proprietatibus Rerum, A Critical Text, gen. ed. 
Maurice Charles Seymour, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975–1988), 
XVIII.pro (pp. 1092–93).
9 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “animal.”
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the herds of large prey.”10 That is, large animals created paths 
across a landscape into which they attracted human beings. The 
new arrivals immediately exerted “predation pressure” on their 
predecessors, however, and produced new paths and networks. 
Human control over the movements of other animals in-
creased and ramified during the British Middle Ages, but the 
resulting scapes and flows (to use Urry’s terminology) were 
always coproduced. In the following pages, I will sketch three 
large multispecies movements: importation, management, and 
collaboration.
Importation: Trafficked Beasts
In the first of those movements, animals were objects to be re-
located, often for purposes of display. The postglacial landscape 
into which the “temperate large vertebrates” attracted Homo sa­
piens lacked many species now regarded as endemic.11 Two that 
now seem particularly British — rabbits and fallow deer — were 
imported during the Middle Ages for rather surprising rea-
sons. Naomi Sykes and Julie Curl, two British archaeologists, 
conclude from “the historical, iconographic, zooarcheological 
and landscape evidence” that “modern [rabbit] populations de-
scend […] from individuals brought to Britain” beginning in the 
twelfth century “as part of a fully-fledged and pan European ‘co-
ney culture,’” maintained at great expense by elite households.12 
So too, the motives for transferring fallow deer from the eastern 
Mediterranean were cultural rather than pragmatic. According 
to Sykes, “a series of repeated importations” seems to have be-
gun when wealthy Roman colonizers brought small numbers of 
10 Terry P. O’Connor, “Introduction — The British Fauna in a Changing 
World,” in Extinctions and Invasions: A Social History of British Fauna, 
eds. Terry P. O’Connor and Naomi Jane Sykes, 1–9 (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 
2010), 3.
11 “It has long been known,” writes Anthony J. Legge, “that South-west Asia is 
the region of origin for many of our [British] domestic plants and animals” 
(Anthony J. Legge, “The Aurochs and Domestic Cattle,” in O’Connor and 
Sykes (eds), Extinctions and Invasions, 26–35, at 30).
12 Naomi Sykes and Julie Curl, “The Rabbit,” in O’Connor and Sykes, eds., 
Extinctions and Invasions, 116–26, at 125.
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fallow deer into parks inhabited also by other “exotic” animals, 
seeking to entertain or impress their guests.13 Likewise, if Anglo-
Saxon rulers imported a few fallow deer, they did so through 
“peaceful cultural exchange and political negotiation,” perhaps 
“to cement political relationships.”14 Then the Normans did 
something similar on a larger scale. At the time of the Conquest, 
deer were still not endemic in Normandy, but they were in Nor-
man Sicily; from there, Norman barons borrowed the “concepts 
of animal parks,” stocking those enclosures with fallow deer and 
other exotic animals, some of which foreign kings donated to 
Henry I.15 Sykes argues that Henry’s collection “was a metaphor 
for the Norman Empire, a statement that the Norman kings had 
power not only over the wild creatures in their possession but 
also over the countries from which the animals derived.”16 
Management: Droves and Enclosures
As Jennie Friedrich and Sarah Breckenridge Wright point out in 
essays for this volume, travel can entail both movement and em-
placement. That was pre-eminently true for animals trafficked 
through human cultural and social networks, but a similar bi-
nary characterizes their subsequent use. Once imported, many 
animals were subject to a second kind of control over their 
mobility: management of independent movement. With rab-
bits and deer, that management did not mean close restriction. 
13 Naomi Sykes, “European Fallow Deer,” in O’Connor and Sykes, eds., Extinc-
tions and Invasions, 51–58, at 52.
14 Ibid., 56.
15 Ibid., 57, citing Willene B. Clark, introd., A Medieval Book of Beasts (Wood-
bridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2006), 18–19. Similarly, Vernon N. Kisling, “An-
cient Collections and Menageries,” in Zoo and Aquarium History: Ancient 
Animal Collections to Zoological Gardens, ed. Vernon N. Kisling, 1–48 (Boca 
Raton: CRC Press, 2001), 22.
16 Sykes, “European Fallow Deer,” 57. In Zoo: A History of Zoological Gardens 
in the West (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), Eric Baratay and Elisabeth 
Hardouin-Fugier note that for the pre-modern European aristocracy, as for 
Roman emperors, wild animals “were considered to be prestigious, luxury 




On the contrary, such animals were valued for their rapid and 
agile movement, exercised in warrens and parks. Within those 
bounds, rabbits and deer were cultivated, while their nonhuman 
predators were excluded to the extent possible: the aristocratic 
hunt was a chief objective of non-metaphoric gamekeeping. 
The management of other species involved tighter control. 
Animals that naturally herd together had been managed at least 
since the late Bronze Age through pastoralism, which provides 
relatively free but guided movement in search of water and graz-
ing.17 Indeed, cattle and sheep had long been induced to move 
substantial distances. Transhumance — seasonal migration be-
tween ecological zones — served the welfare of both the animals 
and their owners; it might be done in stages, with stops for rest 
and grazing, and it often involved a communal effort.18 
But two medieval developments changed herd animals’ mo-
bility, in opposing ways. The first is evident in a small morpho-
logical change: by the late fourteenth century, “drover” joined 
“driver” as a term for one who “force[s] (living beings) to move 
on or away.”19 The distinction concerned distance and destina-
tion: the “drover” drives herds of cattle “esp. to distant markets.”20 
As Hannah Velten writes, large numbers of cattle were brought 
“along drovers’ tracks which criss-crossed [Britain], traveling at 
about 2 mph for 12 hours a day — the trip from Wales would 
take 20 to 25 days […]. After such a tremendous journey, the 
cattle arrived emaciated and were fattened up outside London.” 
Sheep might be driven from as far as Devon (over 200 miles).21 
17 Martyn Allen, “Agriculture and Pastoralism in the Roman West Midlands,” 
Rural Settlement in Britain Project, University of Reading, n.d., https://
www.reading.ac.uk/web/FILES/archaeology/West_Midlands_seminar_ag-
riculture_MGA.pdf.
18 See, for instance, M. L. Ryder, “Late Medieval Transhumance in Western 
Europe,” in Atlas of Medieval Europe, eds. Angus Mackay and David Ditch-
burn (London: Routledge, 1997), 219–21.
19 oed s.v. “drive,” v. I.iii.a.
20 oed s.v. “drover,” n.1.a.; similarly, med s.vv. “driver(e)” (n.) and “drover(e)” 
(n.). 
21 Hannah Velten, Beastly London: A History of Animals in the City (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2013), 15.
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Droves expanded with increasing urbanization; those ending at 
London’s Smithfield Market continued through the nineteenth 
century, when they were singled out for contributing to the 
suffering of animals awaiting slaughter.22 Shirley Toulson sug-
gests that many paths established between Roman times and 
the eighteenth century were created for and by pack animals 
and were maintained primarily for drovers;23 thus constraint in 
conjunction with movement helped to determine the “scape” of 
modern Britain. 
The mobility of herding animals was controlled also in a sec-
ond and contrasting way: their grazing ranges were bounded 
when private and public land-holdings developed. Esther Pas-
cua draws on the “extraordinary sources [that] are available for 
England for the period 1089–1300” to set forth the changes in 
animal mobility caused by “the so-called manorial or seigneu-
rial system.”24 Before that period, Pascua explains, domesticated 
animals in Europe were “roaming property,” kept “between the 
farm and the forest” in forests and natural pastures.25 By the 
thirteenth century, however, an “astonishing expansion of ar-
able land” limited the space for animals to roam and graze. Pas-
cua suggests that the resulting “neglect of livestock” may explain 
why “cows, oxen, pigs, and sheep failed to grow larger during 
the central centuries of the Middle Ages,” otherwise a period of 
economic growth.26 The enclosure of fields and the increase in 
agricultural territory seem to have affected sheep in particular. 
As Pascua observes, “the manorial shepherd moved his master’s 
fold from place to place within the desmesne” on “the stubble 
of uncultivated fields after harvest,” in order “to fertilize the ex-
22 See Diana Donald, “Beastly Sights: The Treatment of Animals as a Moral 
Theme in Representations of London, c. 1820–1850,” Art History 22, no. 4 
(November 1999): 514–44, at 533 and 539.
23 Shirley Toulson, The Drovers (Aylesbury: Shire, 2005), 5 6.
24 Esther Pascua, “From Forest to Farm and Town: Domestic Animals from ca. 
1000 to ca. 1450,” in A Cultural History of Animals: The Medieval Age, vol. 2, 
ed. Brigitte Resl, 81–102 (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 89. 




panding fields.”27 In a 2009 essay, Lisa J. Kiser reads the fifteenth-
century Townley “shepherd plays” in light of these changes.28 
Originally tenant farmers with their own sheep, the main char-
acters in those plays have become shepherds who manage their 
employer’s sheep day and night. In the winter, they move the 
flocks into “the most far-flung corners of the estate” and feed 
them manually to supplement inadequate grazing.29 Enclosure, 
a massive but complex determinant of both human and non-
human mobility, has visibly transformed the English landscape; 
one of its components — the management of grazing rights for 
sheep — is still subject to dispute.30
Collaboration: Horsepower
Robin Bendrey points out that animals were involved in land 
management as both subjects and agents. From early in the first 
millennium, Bendrey writes, “Horses offered the means of man-
aging territory, cattle and people […], and were therefore the 
means of controlling wealth and exercising power.”31
Horses “were present in Early Mesolithic Britain,” according 
to Bendrey, but “became increasingly scarce in the following 
millennia.”32 When humans re-introduced them, probably from 
the Continent after Britain had been cut off, horses do not seem 
to have served mostly as sources of food. Their importation was 
similar in that respect to that of rabbits and deer. In contrast to 
those creatures, however, horses functioned not as cultural or 
symbolic goods; rather, they were co-agents in work and war-
27 Ibid., 89–90.
28 Lisa J. Kiser, “‘Mak’s Heirs’: Sheep and Humans in the Pastoral Ecology of 
the Townley First and Second Shepherds’ Plays,” jegp 108, no. 3 (July 2009): 
336–59.
29 Ibid., 349–50.
30 For current discussion of grazing rights in Britain, see for instance the Web 
site of the Foundation for Common Land (www.foundationforcommon-
land.org.uk). 
31 Robin Bendrey, “The Horse,” in O’Connor and Sykes, eds., Extinctions and 
Invasions, 10–16, at 16.
32 Ibid., 10. 
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fare.33 In both domains their role has been transformative; they 
have, in Bendrey’s words, “revolutionised transport, warfare, 
and trade.”34 In a major recent study, Pita Kelekna argues that 
we have underestimated the role of horses in geopolitical and 
cultural history. “Within anthropology,” Kelekna writes,
cultural advance has traditionally been viewed in the con-
text of the sedentary agricultural state […]. Analysis of man’s 
symbiosis with the domesticated horse necessarily takes the 
reader to regions remote from the urban center and pays 
special attention to mobile elements of nomadic society, too 
often deemed marginal or transitory […]. Tribes of [a] vast 
peripheral area [from Hungary to the borders of China] were 
notoriously responsible for the depredations and invasions 
that over millennia threatened the heartlands of civilization 
to the west, south, and east. […] [I]t is also true that their far-
ranging routes … afforded rapid transport of distant trade 
goods, both essential and exotic. With trade went cultural 
exchange […].35
Kelekna’s research demonstrates that horses have co-produced 
the most consequential developments in human culture. 
In particular ways, horses were crucial in medieval England. 
As is commonly remarked, etymology renders the so-called 
Age of Chivalry the “era of the horse”; Middle English chevalrīe, 
meaning interchangeably “host of mounted warriors” and “chiv-
alry” or its “ethical code,” descends via Old French from Latin 
cabellārius “horseman.”36 In daily life, long-distance transport 
and communication depended on horses; so, increasingly, did 
agriculture among peasants as well as the elite.37 Roads and even 
33 Ibid., 10–13.
34 Ibid., 10.
35 Pita Kelekna, The Horse in Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 1.
36 med s.v. “chevalrīe”; oed s.vv. “chivalry” (n.) and “cavalry” (n.).
37 John Langdon, “A Quiet Revolution – The Horse in Agriculture, 1100–1500,” 
History Today (July 1989): 32–37.
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city streets were designed for horse traffic: London’s first mayor 
“decreed that the overhanging projections or jetties on the up-
per floors of houses had to be at least high enough for a man on 
horseback to pass under.”38 Chaucer’s pilgrims — even the mal-
adept Shipman — take horseback travel for granted. To a large 
extent, human mobility in the English Middle Ages was equine 
mobility. 
Across its medieval functions, what Kelekna aptly calls 
“man’s symbiosis with the domesticated horse” was neither sim-
ple nor uniform. Studies by Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Susan 
Crane present contrasting models for the aristocratic version 
of that symbiosis. For Cohen, the relationship between knight 
and horse in chivalric literature is intimate but dehumanizing: 
“The horse, its rider, the bridle and saddle and armor together 
form the Deleuzian circuit or assemblage, a network of mean-
ing that decomposes human bodies and intercuts them with the 
inanimate, the inhuman.”39 In contrast, Crane emphasizes the 
representation of horses “as resourceful allies, bold and fearless 
like their knights.”40 She acknowledges, with Cohen, that the re-
lationship “enmesh[es]” the knight “in a prosthetic assemblage” 
whose technological aspect “threatens [him] with objectification 
as just so much equipment,” but she insists that it also “carries 
the knight into a zone of consciousness and an ethical aware-
ness that are not exclusively human.”41 Perhaps both extremes 
obtained — and not only in aristocratic culture: the plowman 
and carter, like the knight, probably viewed horses sometimes 
as transport mechanisms (like themselves) and sometimes as 
sentient beings (like themselves). Both partners to the “symbio-
sis” were independent agents powerful enough to exert some 
control over their mutual mobility.
38 Velten, Beastly London, 45.
39 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Medieval Identity Machines (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003), 76. 
40 Susan Crane, Animal Encounters: Contacts and Concepts in Medieval Britain 




Admittedly, the balance of control rested more often with the 
human mover, and the symbiosis lasted only until the human 
partners found stronger and more biddable forms of “horse 
power.” Medieval rabbits and deer challenged hunters only by 
human sufferance, and increasing numbers of species were en-
closed and managed. Esther Pascua ends her chapter on me-
dieval domestic animals with a summary that applies also to 
other large mammals. “As the Middle Ages drew to a close,” she 
writes, “working animals were more confined to specific spaces 
than before, their lives controlled more tightly by human beings. 
Their fate was determined by the profitability of their activities 
and products.”42 But at least in medieval England, the patterns 
of human control and movement — in Urry’s terminology, the 
configurations of “complex interlocking networks” and “nodes” 
along which “people, money, capital, information, ideas and im-
ages are seen to ‘flow’”43 — were the work of many species. 
Live Metaphors: Textual Mobility
Like other new paradigms, John Urry’s “mobile sociology” 
can itself be mobilized in various disciplines. Inspired by Ur-
ry’s work, Eileen Joy and James L. Smith have proposed that 
we “consider literary texts themselves […] as transit systems 
in which we can glimpse the manifold mobilities of objects, 
figures, mentalities, tropes and other ‘matter’ in vibrant inter-
mediate networks.”44 I take that to mean that elements such as 
metaphors and represented objects exert affective or semiotic 
force within individual texts and form significant connections 
beyond those texts. Robert Stanton demonstrates in his essay 
for this volume that Margery Kempe enacts both kinds of force 
within and beyond her Book, disrupting expectations for nar-
42 Pascua, “From Forest to Farm and Town,” 102. Clinton H. Keeling follows 
the growing list of species in British zoos: “Zoological Gardens of Great 
Britain” in Zoo and Aquarium History, ed. Kisling, 49–74.
43 Urry, Sociology Beyond Societies, 12 and 35.
44 Eileen Joy and James L. Smith, “This World Is But a Thurghfare: Transit, 
Transport, Scapes, and Flows,” session proposal, 2014 New Chaucer Society 
Congress Call for Papers, www.newchaucersociety.org.
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rative continuity and genre. In what remains of this chapter, I 
will argue that nonhuman animals function in a similar way. In-
deed, they are particularly “vibrant” objects — and agents — in 
the “transit systems” of medieval texts.
That proposition might seem untenable, especially because 
I choose to support it with reference to a genre notorious for 
representing animals without natural vitality: the medieval 
beast book, said to be the most widely disseminated form of 
secular literature from the late classical period through the fif-
teenth century.45 Animals are in a sense the co-agents of some 
modern animal stories — long-haired border collies are among 
the sources of Lassie Come­Home — but medieval animals can-
not be regarded as having shaped the bestiary in the same way. 
Many bestiary creatures are imaginary, for one thing, and some 
highly improbable behaviors are ascribed to the real ones. Re-
peated from one bestiary to another, framed by moralizations, 
the accounts of the animals are more intertextual than zoologi-
cal. Many commentators argue that bestiary creatures are in fact 
over-determined, their characteristics dictated contingently by 
prior texts and ultimately by Christian teleology. Like John Urry 
when he employs game animals as metaphors, the bestiarists 
were not really writing about animals, according to this view. 
Originating from unitary doctrine rather than from observa-
tion, confined in a rigid semiotic structure, little changed across 
innumerable instantiations, the creatures of the texts that we 
still homogenize as “the bestiary” would seem to have brought 
their literary transit system to a dead halt.
But that is not the impression conveyed by bestiary manu-
scripts. A great many scribes and artists illustrated their sub-
jects, and their images are anything but static.46 A frame usu-
ally surrounds the creature, just as a verbal moralization might 
45 Guy R. Mermier, “The Phoenix: Its Nature and Its Place in the Tradition of 
the Physiologus,” in Beasts and Birds of the Middle Ages: The Bestiary and Its 
Legacy, eds. Willene B. Clark and Meradith T. McMunn, 69–87 (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 70.
46 Florence McCulloch, Mediaeval Latin and French Bestiaries (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 70.
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enclose a description, but a tail, horn, paw, or beak typically 
protrudes into or beyond the visual boundary. Sometimes the 
protrusion substantially invades the text; in British Harley MS 
3244 (59r), for instance, the long, slender dragon inside a stag-
gered rectilinear frame stretches from near the top right of the 
page to the bottom left, interrupting many lines of text.47 Com-
menting particularly on the Ashmole bestiary, Debra Hassig 
describes the effect of this technique: “figures crossing or break-
ing out of the frame appear more active, as if the frame cannot 
hold them back.” Alternatively, the frame “can encroach upon 
and effectively hamper the movement of a figure.” Hassig sees 
the latter encroachments as opposing the “breaking out” effect, 
but in both cases the frame “heighten[s] a sense of movement”: 
escaping or confined, the animal is in motion.48 Even when not 
interacting with frames, most bestiary creatures are depicted in 
motion. “The essential quality of these pictures,” observes Beryl 
Rowland, “is their animation. The animals are presented with 
such vivacity and vigor that they are oddly compelling, pulsat-
ing with life even when grotesque.”49 
Additionally compelling are the creatures’ facial expressions. 
The lion in the Ashmole bestiary looks intent but calm as it con-
sumes a small ape; in another panel, the lion’s brows contract as 
if in anguish as it spares a prostrate man; in a third, it bows to 
the ground, its mouth half opened, as if in fear of a small cock 
that wears an improbably haughty expression.50 Elsewhere, an 
ape kisses the offspring that she carries before her, her eyes and 
47 The image is visible in the online Medieval Bestiary, http://bestiary.ca/
beasts/beast262.htm.
48 Debra Hassig, “Beauty in the Beasts: A Study of Medieval Aesthetics,” res: 
Anthropology and Aesthetics 19/20 (1990): 137–61, at 148–49.
49 Beryl Rowland, “The Art of Memory and the Bestiary,” in Clark and Mc-
Munn (eds), Beasts and Birds of the Middle Ages, 12–25, at 17. In that passage, 
Rowland refers initially to one manuscript (Brussels MS 10066–7) but then 
generalizes her observation to the sketches that Florence McCulloch made 
from some two dozen manuscripts (citing McCulloch, Medieval Latin and 
French Bestiaries, 191–212).




brow suggesting tenderness. And Christoper De Hamel is right 
that at least one of the two kids that “[turn] their heads back-
ward to nibble the leaves at the top of a tree” do so “playfully.”51 
Perhaps the illustrations’ vitality served a mnemonic function, 
as Rowland maintains, but they strike the viewer first as lively, 
intentional creatures, not as signposts to particular moraliza-
tions.
In that respect, the verbal descriptions match the illustra-
tions: if the creatures described in most beast books are sign-
points to moralizations, they are animated, internally motivated 
ones. Following a scent in the mountains, the lion detects the 
odor of a hunter, so he covers his tracks with his tail. The au­
tolops (antelope? oryx? self-wolf?) is so exceedingly alert that 
the hunter cannot reach him until he tangles his horns in a spiny 
shrub. When the serra (saw-fish?) sees a sailing ship, he raises 
his wings in imitation, but he can match the ship’s pace for only 
thirty or forty stadia. Even the igneous rocks are self-moving 
as well as gendered: they do not ignite unless the male one ap-
proaches the female.52 
Nor do the descriptions themselves stay within a hermeneu-
tic frame. Of the serpent, for instance, we learn that “when he 
grows old, his eyes become dim and, if he wants to become new 
again, he abstains and fasts for forty days until his skin becomes 
loosened from his flesh. And […] he goes and finds a narrow 
crack in the rock.” The corporeal details in that mini-narrative 
have no place in the moralization, in which good Christians 
“throw off for Christ the old man.”53 Moreover, the moral va-
51 Christopher De Hamel, ed., Book of Beasts: A Facsimile of MS Bodley 764 
(Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2008), fol. 16v; fol. 36r; p. 29, note to plate 41.
52 Physiologus Latinus: Éditions Préliminaires, Versio B, ed. Francis James 
Carmody (Paris: Librairie E. Droz, 1939), 12–14; my paraphrase is based on 
Michael J. Curley, trans., Physiologus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009), 1–6. The spelling of “autolops” varies considerably, indicating uncer-
tainty about the creature so designated (McCulloch, Mediaeval Latin and 
French Bestiaries, 85).
53 Physiologus, trans. Curley, 16. Curley’s base text is a manuscript from the 
stemma known as Versio y (see Curley, xxxiii). My summaries here include 
his interpolations from the elaborations in Versio b, which is said to be 
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lences of some figurations are surprising: we expect poisonous 
serpents to represent something evil, for instance, not the good 
Christian. Often a creature’s moral valence shifts polarity, as the 
author acknowledges after declaring that the caladrius “stands 
for the person of our Savior.” “Perhaps you say that the caladrius 
is unclean according to the law,” he writes, but so too the unclean 
serpent was exalted by Moses just as “the son of man should be 
exalted” (alluding to John 3:14); indeed, “there are many other 
things in creatures that have two meanings; some are indeed to 
be praised, others to be blamed.”54 
Thus both parts of the description/signification pair are in-
ternally complex. Indeed, the two-fold semiotic structure is less 
a general rule than a ground for variation. In some beast books, 
many chapters have no moralization at all.55 More commonly, 
significations abound, intertwining with the descriptions that 
generate them. An extreme instance of such chaining is the self-
similar explication of the oyster and pearl that comes midway 
through Versio y of the Physiologus as translated by Michael J. 
Curley. We learn first of the agate-stone that divers use to find 
pearls. Without pausing for moralization, the author moves to 
the pearl itself, born when the “stone in the sea called oyster” 
(sostoros) swallows the light and dew of celestial bodies. The 
agate, we are told, corresponds to St. John, who showed “that 
the intelligible pearl is Jesus Christ our Lord,” who is brought 
up from the sea of the world by “holy doctors.” And although 
sinners/divers carry the pearl back down, the Savior is “found 
intelligibly receiving food […] in the middle of the shell” — that 
is, between the Old and New Testaments.56 The “stone which is 
“particularly well represented by English MSS of the thirteenth century” 
(Eden, ed. and trans., Theobaldi “Physiologus,” 3). The serpent is not in Ver-
sio b but appears in Versio y and in the early, versified “Physiologus” attrib-
uted to one Theobaldus and believed to have been used as a school text; see 
Physiologus, trans. Curley, 103. 
54 Physiologus Latinus, ed. Carmody, 15–16 (my translation).
55 Clark, Introduction to Medieval Book of Beasts, 115; McCulloch, Mediaeval 
Latin and French Bestiaries, 35.
56 The segment of the oyster/pearl passage summarized after this point is ab-
sent from Versio y and from Carmody’s edition of Versio b; Curley trans-
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called the conch” is (also?) a figure for Holy Mary, who rose, 
like the stone from the sea, out of her father’s house to receive 
the dew of Gabriel’s annunciation, foreshadowed in Genesis 
27:28 — “May God give you of the dew of heaven”; the “open-
ing of the mouth of the conch” indicates Mary’s receptive reply 
to the Angel, in Luke 1:38. Two scriptural elaborations of the 
Incarnation follow before we move to the “pearl of great price” 
(Matthew 13:46), itself explicated through ten additional Bible 
passages that confirm the value of the figurative pearl. At this 
point, after four full pages (in the translated version), the writer 
would seem to have lost sight of his first metaphoric vehicle. But 
he brings us back to the adamant-stone with a short chapter on 
its other “nature,” the imperviousness that confers power on its 
owners. And this time, the significatio is brief and direct, closing 
the circumlocution: “My Lord is adamant-rock. If you possess 
him, no evil will befall you.”57 
If the animals in such texts are fundamentally “vehicle[s] for 
understanding religious truth,” as Joyce Salisbury claims,58 the 
oyster and pearl are rather inefficient ones, linked as they are to 
multiple biblical passages whose meanings are already explicit. 
It makes better sense to see them as semiotic engines. The scrip-
tural and didactic significations that they generate outweigh 
them in authority, but rhetorical agency belongs to the creatures 
that call them forth. The relationship is beautifully figured in 
two illustrations that Hugh of Fouilloy designed for his De avi­
bus.59 In one, a dove is encircled by a segmented ring and a rec-
tangle containing small circles. Those circles, the segments, and 
lates it from a fragment designated as B1, published in an 1888 article by 
Max Friedrich Mann, “Der Bestiaire Divin des Guillaume le Clerc” (avail-
able through Google at https://ia802503.us.archive.org/33/items/DerBesti-
aireDivinMann/Der_Bestiaire_Divin_Mann.pdf). My information about 
the pearl, agate-stone, and oyster in Versio y is from McCulloch, Mediaeval 
Latin and French Bestiaries, 154–55.
57 Physiologus, trans. Curley, 34–38.
58 Joyce E. Salisbury, The Beast Within: Animals in the Middle Ages (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 110.
59 Willene B. Clark, “The Illustrated Medieval Aviary and the Lay-Brother-
hood,” Gesta 21, no. 1 (1982): 63–74, at 64. Clark argues that Hugh designed 
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a space between two borders all contain phrases from Hugh’s 
scriptural and homiletic explication of the dove. A falcon oc-
cupies the center of the other illustration, enclosed by a double-
lined rectangle with double-lined arms that quadrisect the outer 
area; the inner spaces and outer segments contain text with “a 
few essential ideas” concerning the falcon.60 The diagrams re-
verse the usual relationship between central text and marginal 
image in medieval manuscripts: here, discourse emanates in 
various directions from the animal at its center.
The dove recurs in many beast books, seldom generating ex-
actly the same significations. The authors draw on a large stock 
of features and behaviors, some with Biblical warrant, some de-
rived from Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies or Alexander Neck-
am’s De naturis rerum, and a few attested by observation: “I have 
found no written reference to the colour of the dove’s wings, but 
it can be attributed by analogy with the material dove (ex simili­
tudine materialis columbe).”61 Through many variations, includ-
ing its material form, the creature being described remains the 
same — the dove, subject to interpretation but not completely 
knowable. 
The generative power of bestiary creatures extends beyond 
the bestiaries. Predictably, bestiary descriptions and significa-
tions appear in sermons, but they also migrate to beast epics, 
fables, debate poems, travel narratives, and even romances.62 
the diagrams himself. She reproduces them, from BN MS lat. 2495 and 
Douai, Bibl. Mun. MS 370, on p. 65.
60 Clark, “Illustrated Medieval Aviary,” 69.
61 “Transcription and Translation,” Aberdeen Bestiary, 28v; similarly, Hugh of 
Fouilloy in Clark, “Illustrated Medieval Aviary,” ch. 7 (131).
62 For overlap between the bestiary and the beast epic, see Elaine C. Block 
and Kenneth Varty, “Choir-Stall Carvings of Reynard and Other Foxes,” 
in Reynard the Fox: Social Engagement and Cultural Metamorphoses in the 
Beast Epic from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. Varty, 125–62 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2000), 150–51. Thomas Honegger connects the fables of 
Robert Henryson and (briefly) John Lydgate with bestiaries in “Legacy of 
the Bestiaries,” 53–65. Several commentators see bestiary echoes in The Owl 
and the Nightingale — for instance, Jill Mann, From Aesop to Reynard: Beast 
Literature in Medieval Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
156–60. Anthony Paul Bale points out many bestiary parallels in the intro-
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Those reappearances demonstrate the influence of the bestiary, 
but I would argue that they also exemplify the mobility of the 
creatures themselves. For literary animals do not merely migrate 
across genre barriers; they trample them. At least three scholars 
observe that readers often ignore or misidentify the genres of 
texts that center on animals. Clark writes that modern commen-
tators exaggerate the popularity of bestiaries because they use 
the term ‘bestiary’ “for any animal lore in text or art.”63 Jill Mann 
makes a similar observation, though for her the overused term 
isn’t “bestiary” but “fable”; thus Mann opens her masterful book 
on beast literature in medieval Britain with a remedial lesson on 
genre distinctions.64 And the tendencies deplored by Clark and 
Mann are generalized in a trenchant observation at the begin-
ning of Jan Ziolkowski’s study of medieval Latin beast poetry. 
“When authors or readers are confronted with an animal pro-
tagonist,” writes Ziolkowski, “they are inclined automatically to 
think of other types of literature about animals, regardless of 
whether those other types are in the same genre. The moral of 
the story is that beasts override genre.”65 
If they can do that, literary animals share a power possessed 
by entities at the opposite end of the ontological scale — that 
is, by sin, virtue, the trinity, and other elements of Christian 
doctrine. For many readers, allusions to those theological re-
alities dominate any lyric, epic, fable, or narrative in which 
they emerge, pulling the text into a supercategory that some 
call “allegory.” Like allegory, the supergenre that we might call 
“beast literature” is established not simply by a shared theme or 
subject-matter but by a particular rhetorical stance toward its 
duction and notes to his edition and translation of “Mandeville’s travels”: 
The Book of Marvels and Travel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). For 
connections with romances, see Meradith T. McMunn, “Bestiary Influences 
in Two Thirteenth-Century Romances,” in Beasts and Birds of the Middle 
Ages, 134–50.
63 Clark, Introduction to Medieval Book of Beasts, 13.
64 Mann, From Aesop to Reynard, 1.
65 Jan M. Ziolkowski, Talking Animals: Medieval Latin Beast Poetry, 750–1150, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 1.
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shared subject-matter. Fables, bestiary entries, beast epics, avian 
debate poems, and modern animal fiction all present their ani-
mal agents as members of real species — a rooster, the serpent, 
the dove, my dog. As signifieds, both beasts and the sacred are 
existentially real but beyond full human comprehension. Thus 
they act as semiotic magnets. They produce what Urry might 
call “flows,” attracting and resignifying figures and themes with-
in individual texts and among texts that are otherwise diverse. 
Inevitably, of course, readers recognize that the representation 
of a species in a particular text falls short of mimesis, produc-
ing what might be called animal nominalism. Genres differ in 
their characteristic strategies for subverting and acknowledging 
that shortfall; texts (and readings of texts) differ in their fluc-
tuating distances from the animal real. But if we ignore that 
movement — by, for instance, defining the action in fables and 
the descriptions in bestiaries as expendable fabrication — we 
de-animate the texts.
Conclusion: Our Move
As I read about “mobile sociology,” I thought of Stephen 
Glosecki’s essay on early Germanic animal imagery. “Strik-
ing creatures stare across the centuries at us,” writes Glosecki, 
“blankly indifferent to our urge to understand […]. Literally, 
many were movable goods back then; figuratively, they cross 
historical boundaries, too, with whispers of ways forgotten.”66 
Indeed, medieval animals were literally — that is, materi-
ally — movable objects, but as Glosecki’s rhetoric implies, they 
were also moved and moving agents. The “ways” that they both 
followed and produced have left traces on the British landscape, 
from half-vanished drovers’ roads to the invisible plot lines of 
medieval deer parks within which wild fallow deer still live.67 
66 Stephen O. Glosecki, “Movable Beasts: The Manifold Implications of Early 
Germanic Animal Imagery,” in Animals in the Middle Ages: A Book of Es-
says, ed. Nona C. Flores, 3–23 (New York: Garland, 1996), 15 and 17.
67 Naomi Sykes writes that although deer parks “fell into disrepair” early in the 
twentieth century, the “current distribution” of fallow deer “is remarkably 
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And co-mobility itself is by no means an historical artifact. Hu-
man mobility today relocates far more living things than the ex-
otic mammals trafficked by our distant ancestors. Elizabeth Kol-
bert reports that some “ten thousand different species are being 
moved around the world just in ballast water” during any twen-
ty-four-hour period, for instance, and that in one summer, tour-
ists and researchers to Antarctica “brought with them more than 
seventy thousand seeds from other continents.”68 Organisms of 
all kinds have invaded territories where they were not previ-
ously known, often producing competition, genetic change, and 
occasional extinction. “We are,” writes Kolbert, “in effect, reas-
sembling the world into one enormous supercontinent — what 
biologists sometimes refer to as the New Pangaea.”69 The effects 
on particular species are under widespread investigation, but 
“biotic homogenization” inevitably involves all creatures, in-
cluding homo sapiens, in a network of change.70 
If a parallel “cultural homogenization” is taking place, as 
some maintain, the figurative beasts of the Middle Ages may be 
among the most successful invading species.71 Modern bestiar-
ies abound: as of March, 2015, Barnes & Noble offers 379 prod-
ucts titled “bestiary,” including collections of modern and con-
temporary poems (by Guillaume Apollinaire, Ted Hughes, Elise 
Paschen, and many others), music albums (a dozen of them, the 
most recent from the “left-field hip-hop supergroup ‘Hail Mary 
similar to Rackham’s […] plot of medieval parks” (Sykes, “European Fal-
low Deer,” 52, citing O. Rackham, The History of the Countryside [London: 
Phoenix, 1997], 124).
68 Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History (New York: 
Henry Holt, 2014), 198 and 207.
69 Ibid., 208. 
70 “The anthropogenic reshuffling of the earth’s biota has resulted in taxo-
nomic homogenization, irrespective of taxonomic group and spatial scale” 
(B. Baiser et al., “Pattern and Process of Biotic Homogenization in the New 
Pangaea,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 279, no. 1748 
[December 7, 2012]: 4772–77).
71 “Cultural homogenization” seems to be used freely without attribution, but 
scholars associate the phrase and concept with the work of Ernest Gellner, 
Jürgen Habermas, and Wolfgang Welsch.
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Mallon’”), an “artist’s guide to creating mythical creatures” (Wil-
liam O’Connor’s Dracopedia: The Bestiary), a self-published cul-
tural commentary (Rori O’Keeffe’s My Little Blue Bestiary, with 
chapters on “The Fire-Breathing Lesbian” and “The Long-Nosed 
Neighbor”), and serious studies of animals in a particular cul-
ture (Thailand, Siam, or J. R. R. Tolkien’s Middle-earth). There is 
even a charming Punctuation Bestiary (by Kiran Spees) featur-
ing the Exclamatore and the Punctuation Rabbits. Few of those 
products appear to be about animals; if they allude to medieval 
bestiaries at all, they do so under the assumption that those too 
had little to do with actual beasts. Of course, that assumption is 
shared by scholars who argue that the existential reality of besti-
ary animals did not matter: the animals’ role “was to provide 
metaphors or symbols for a variety of Christian mandates and 
beliefs.”72 If that were true, bestiary animals would always have 
been homogenized by the cultural systems that they invade, 
perhaps so thoroughly that they would bear little resemblance 
to biological conspecifics. 
I do not know how true that is of the denizens of modern 
bestiaries. But I can attest that their medieval precursors derive 
one crucial feature from what can be called the Animal Real: 
locomotion. Illustrated in action, gesturing through painted 
borders, bestiary creatures carry diverse significations into mul-
tiple texts without regard to genre. As centers of metaphoric 
interpretation, they precede metaphor and remain demonstra-
bly apart from it. As Lesley Kordecki points out, variant figurae 
produce “indeterminacy […] that arises out of the knowledge 
of the verbal game afoot at the very core of the bestiary.”73 Like 
72 Pamela Gravestock, “Did Imaginary Animals Exist?,” in The Mark of the 
Beast: The Medieval Bestiary in Art, Life, and Literature, ed. Debra Hassig, 
119–39 (New York: Garland, 1999), 130. Similarly, Ron Baxter, Bestiaries and 
Their Users in the Middle Ages (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), 72, and Mann, From 
Aesop to Reynard, 161. Gravestock goes on to qualify the statement that I 
quote above, writing that some of the imaginary creatures are not moralized 
(130–31).
73 Lesley Kordecki, “Making Animals Mean: Speciest Hermeneutics in the 
Physiologus of Theobaldus,” in Animals in the Middle Ages, 85–101, at 94.
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Glosecki’s intersubjective zoomorphs, literary beasts participate 
in semiotic networks, but they also pull us out of interpreta-




Building Bridges to Canterbury
Sarah Breckenridge Wright
In 2015, the word listicle was added to OxfordDictionaries.com, 
defined as “an article on the Internet presented in the form of a 
numbered or bullet-pointed list.”1 By consulting a listicle, one 
can learn “16 Snapchats Only Hipsters Would Send” (all deeply 
ironic) and “25 Things You Should Learn To Do Before Turning 
25” (including “say no sometimes” and “invert the color on your 
phone for reading at night”).2 While the listicle is a relatively 
new phenomenon, it belies humankind’s longstanding desire to 
classify and categorize the world around it. The hipsters, steam-
punks, and rockabillies of the twenty-first century were born of 
the same categorizing impulse that generated the beasts, birds, 
and serpents of the medieval bestiary. While this impulse os-
tensibly helps us understand the world, it too often leads to di-
chotomies that fail to capture the dynamism of humankind and 
the world we inhabit.3
1 Oxford Dictionaries Online, s.v. “listicle, n.,” http://www.oxforddictionaries.
com.
2 This medievalist, enamored by the materiality of books, takes issue with the 
latter.
3 One might recall the categorizing impulse that leads John Urry to render 
animals metaphoric vehicles rather than social agents in Sociology beyond 
Societies, discussed in Carolynn Van Dyke’s “Animal Vehicles: Mobility be-
yond Metaphor” in the present collection.
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The current essay seeks to explore two dichotomies inimi-
cal to the fields of cultural geography and ecocriticism: nature 
vs. culture, and mobility vs. stasis. Specifically, I will present the 
medieval bridge as an icon of hybridity: a cultural artifact that 
commingles human/animal movement, architectural stasis, and 
the natural world (blood, stone, and water), and in so doing 
bears witness to the profound hybridity of the Middle Ages. I 
will then briefly explore how the underlying presence of medie-
val bridges in the frame narrative of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales 
suggests an emerging category of geographically-determined 
identity in the fourteenth century, one that lies somewhere be-
tween the early medieval dependence on the physical landscape 
and early modernity.4 These explorations will, I hope, serve as 
models for identifying hybrid spaces and identities — at once 
human and nonhuman, mobile and static — in literatures and 
landscapes in and beyond the medieval.
The first of the two dichotomies this essay explores — nature 
vs. culture — has long been the subject of ecocritical conversa-
tions. In its inception, ecocriticism sought to reclaim nature as 
something more than the backdrop for human action. Once re-
served for texts explicitly about the nonhuman (e.g. nature writ-
ing), the field has begun to consider literature that is not con-
sciously about nature, combining principles of literary theory 
and ecology to critique anthropocentric narratives. Michael Mc-
Dowell observes that Bakhtinian dialogics, for example, “[help] 
first by placing an emphasis on contradictory voices, rather than 
focusing mainly upon the authoritative monologic voice of the 
narrator. We begin to hear characters and elements of the land-
4 See Clare A. Lees and Gillian R. Overing, eds., A Place to Believe in: Locating 
Medieval Landscapes (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2006); Scott Smith, Land and Book: Literature and Land Tenure in Anglo-
Saxon England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). I also explore 
this phenomenon in “The Soil’s Holy Bodies: The Art of Chorography in 
William of Malmesbury’s Gesta Pontificum Anglorum,” Studies in Philology 
111, no. 4 (2014): 652–79.
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scape that have been marginalized.”5 Though McDowell speaks 
in large part of nature writing, Rebecca M. Douglass notes that 
his observations help us “imagine a dialogics that might recover 
the still more silent voice of the land in other texts as well.”6 Such 
imaginings have produced a plethora of helpful questions we 
can ask of the “other,” moving ecocriticism from the purview of 
Barbara Kingsolver to Henry James, modern to medieval.7
Scholars of the Middle Ages in particular have made great 
strides in asking and answering such questions, moving ecocrit-
icism beyond contemporary nature writing by considering how 
the field offers a new lens on medieval literature and culture.8 In 
his foundational essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis,” Lynn White Jr. suggests that the seventh-century scratch 
plow fundamentally changed humankind’s relationship to the 
earth, observing that “the distribution of land was based no 
longer on the needs of a family but, rather, on the capacity of 
5 Michael McDowell, “The Bakhtinian Road to Ecological Insight,” in The 
Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology, eds. Cheryll Glotfelty 
and Harold Fromm (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 373.
6 Rebecca M. Douglass, “Ecocriticism and Middle English Literature,” Studies 
in Medievalism 10 (1998): 136–63, at 141. Emphasis mine.
7 On ecocriticism and Henry James, see Kathleen R. Wallace and Karla Arm-
bruster’s introduction to Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the Boundaries 
of Ecocriticism (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001).
8 See, for example: Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis” in The Ecocriticism Reader, 3–14; Lisa J. Kiser, “Chaucer and the Poli-
tics of Nature,” in Beyond Nature Writing, 41–56 (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 2001); Sarah Stanbury, “Ecochaucer: Green Ethics and 
Medieval Nature,” The Chaucer Review 39, no. 1 (2004): 1–16; Gillian Rudd, 
Greenery: Ecocritical Readings of Late Medieval English Literature (Manches-
ter: Manchester University Press, 2010); Alfred K. Siewers, Strange Beauty: 
Ecocritical Approaches to Early Medieval Landscape (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009); Karl Steel, How To Make a Human: Animals and Violence 
in the Middle Ages (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2011); Jeffrey Je-
rome Cohen, Stone: An Ecology of the Inhuman (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2015). See also Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s edited collections: 
Animal, Mineral, Vegetable: Ethics and Objects (Brooklyn: punctum books, 
2012), Prismatic Ecology: Ecotheory beyond Green (Mineapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2013), and Lowell Duckert, “Ecomaterialisms,” special 
issue of postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies 4, no. 1 (2013).
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a power machine to till the earth […]. Formerly man had been 
part of nature; now he was the exploiter of nature.”9 This obser-
vation justified and made necessary medieval ecocritique, locat-
ing the origin story of our ecological crisis in the Middle Ages, 
and tacitly encouraging literary critics to look for evidence of 
this crisis in the period’s literature. Douglass responded by pro-
viding a veritable “medieval ecocritic’s tool belt,” rethinking 
ecocritical terminology in the Middle Ages (“nature,” for ex-
ample), and listing questions one might ask of a medieval text, 
while Lisa J. Kiser and Sarah Stanbury pose such questions of 
Chaucer, whose Canterbury Tales serves as the literary model of 
hybridity in the present essay. Each examination in its own way 
suggests that ecocriticism no longer belongs exclusively to the 
Muirs and Whitmans of our world.10
In all cases, medieval and modern, the challenge is to not 
ignore culture in the same way that ecocritics suggest extant 
criticism ignores nature; in other words, to not perpetuate the 
nature-culture dichotomy. This danger is acknowledged by 
Kathleen R. Wallace and Karla Ambruster in their collection Be­
yond Nature Writing, where they write, “we believe that a contin-
ued focus on nature and wilderness writing within ecocriticism 
might reinforce this same nature-culture dualism while, this 
time, privileging nature over culture.”11 Sven Birkirts echoes this 
sentiment, writing, “Nature and its preservation is what occu-
pies most of the ecocritics. And this imposes a kind of program-
matic simplicity upon the whole movement […] . How much 
more interesting and controversial would be an ecocriticism 
pledging itself to the more inclusive idea of ‘environment.’”12 So, 
reading anthropocentric narrative through an ecocritical lens is 
certainly a step in the right direction, but we might also rethink 
9 White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” 3.
10 This is said, of course, with nothing but love for Muir and Whitman.
11 Wallace and Armbruster, “Introduction: Why Go Beyond Nature Writing 
and Where To?” 4.
12 Sven Birkert, “Only God Can Make a Tree: The Joys and Sorrows of Eco-
criticism,” Boston Book Review 3, no. 1 (1996), n.p., http://www.asle.org/wp-
content/uploads/ASLE_Primer_Birkerts.pdf.
97
building bridges to canterbury
the terminology and theory that drives ecocriticism, adopting 
more holistic vocabulary and exploring systems/networks that 
more accurately represent our hybrid world. Even when re-
claiming the nonhuman landscape’s marginalized voice in mon-
ologic narrative, the ecocritic must be careful not to disallow 
the presence and impact of human culture. As William Howarth 
writes, “although we cast nature and culture as opposites, in fact 
they constantly mingle, like water and soil in a flowing stream.”13 
The current essay seeks to demonstrate the aptness of How-
arth’s stream simile by turning to the structures that traverse 
and are embedded in streams: the inclusive ‘environments’ of 
medieval bridges. And while all bridges warrant ecocritique, I 
turn to those of the Middle Ages because the period’s hybridity 
reinforces the need to escape binaristic thought. In the late four-
teenth century, conflicts of church and state, and demographic 
and economic flux destabilized national and regional identities 
defined by geographical fixity.14 The period is remarkable instead 
for its mobility. Faith, disease, and bourgeoning commercial ex-
ploits propelled bodies across the world, and literature recorded 
this movement, with Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales serving as an 
exemplary model of how medieval texts contended with hybrid 
understandings of space and identity. Like John and Aleyn in 
the Reeve’s Tale, who pass “a brook, and over that a brigge” in 
search of fruitful economic (and sexual) exchange (1.3922), real 
and imagined medieval bodies yielded to the ebbs and flows of 
13 William Howarth, “Some Principles of Ecocriticism,” in The Ecocriticism 
Reader, 69–91, at 69. As Vin Narduzzi notes in his review essay on medi-
eval ecocriticism, Karl Steel advocates for this escape from binarism in his 
epilogue, wherein he suggests humans must “abandon themselves to rela-
tionships unavailable to mere animals or, for that matter, to mere humans, 
whether medieval or modern” (Steel, quoted in Vin Narduzzi, “Medieval 
ecocriticism,” postmedieval 4, no. 1 [2013]: 112–23, at 120).
14 One may recall that the fourteenth century saw the Hundred Years’ War, 
political strife that led to the War of the Roses, the Papal Schism, and the 
Black Death. As Paul Strohm notes in Chaucer’s Tale: 1386 and the Road to 
Canterbury (New York: Viking, 2014), Chaucer’s refrain — “to maken virtue 
of necessitee” — was very likely a reaction to blows of fate that rendered his 
life/times a series of “crises.”
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an increasingly mobile world, encountering bridges en route 
that were shaped in and from the natural world that they, in 
turn, transformed.15 
Bridging Liquid Landscapes
Bridges themselves, before we consider the more inclusive envi-
ronment of which they are a part, are emblematic of hybridity, 
representing both site and transition. As such, they deconstruct 
the familiar geographical dichotomy that sets mobility against 
stasis, the second of two dichotomies that this essay explores. 
Since the introduction of the “new mobilities paradigm,” geog-
raphers have discussed mobility in opposition to sedentarism. 
Mimi Sheller and John Urry observe, “The emergent mobilities 
paradigm […] undermines sedentarist theories present in many 
studies in geography, anthropology, and sociology. Sedentarism 
treats as normal stability, meaning, and place, and treats as ab-
normal distance, change, and placelessness.”16 Movement is set 
against stasis, place against placelessness, and, in some criti-
cism, illusion against reality (where “the stationary state is only 
fiction”).17 Book-length considerations of mobility focus largely 
on transport or the socio-political implications of and impact on 
moving bodies/things, and the built environment (like “nature” 
in the nature-culture dichotomy) is rendered “backdrop.”18 Ulf 
15 All quotations taken from The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd 
ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Quotations will be cited 
by fragment and line number.
16 See Mimi Sheller and John Urry, “The New Mobilities Paradigm,” Environ-
ment and Planning 38 (2006): 207–26 at 208.
17 Walter Christaller, Central Places in Southern Germany (London: Prentice-
Hall, 1966), 84. On the reality/fiction of movement/stasis, see also Henri 
Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Macmillan, 1950).
18 Some of the best studies on the subject include: Tim Cresswell, On the 
Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World (New York: Routledge, 2006); 
Mobilities, Networks, Geographies, eds. Jonas Larsen, John Urry, and Kay 
Axhausen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Peter Adey, Mobility (New York: 
Routledge, 2010); Margaret Grieco and John Urry, eds., Mobilities: New 
Perspectives on Transport and Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011); and Tim 
Cresswell and Peter Merriman, eds., Geographies of Mobilities: Practices, 
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Strohmayer observes of existing mobility studies, “architecture 
forms at best an assumed and largely stable set of geographical 
nodes into which […] mobilities are thrust” (119).19 The problem 
that emerges is a consequent association of architecture with de-
termination and mobility with personal agency, which renders 
the former adverse to a society that celebrates free will, and un-
attractive to scholars more excited by the enigmatic.
Yet there may be room for a geographical reality that is both 
stable and changing, especially in a period when geographically 
constructed identities were only just evolving from place-based 
understandings (i.e. the Middle Ages). Peter Adey allows for 
this possibility in his discussion of airport vectors. Rather than 
accepting airports as fixed entities or nodes through which bod-
ies/things move, he argues that airports are made from lines of 
mobility.20 He writes, “Passenger mobilities are treated indivis-
ibly. They are imagined as flows and rivers and, thus, modeled 
as vectors that eventually become real in the ‘real’ material en-
vironment of the terminal. Lines and flows materialise into the 
tube like structures of gates, tunnels, and corridors — the mate-
rialisation of what [Gilles] Deleuze and [Félix] Guattari would 
know as hydraulic science.”21 In this way, vectors are material-
ized, allowing for the physical manifestation of mobility in the 
Spaces, Subjects (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013). Though I present a call for hy-
brid understanding here, I in no way mean to denigrate the very important 
work of these scholars.
19 Ulf Strohmayer, “Bridges: Different Conditions of Mobile Possibilities,” in 
Geographies of Mobilities: Practices, Spaces, Subjects, eds. Tim Cresswell and 
Peter Merriman, 119–35 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013), 119. Stroh mayer follows 
this observation with a list of scholars who are taking steps toward theoreti-
cal and empirical appraisals of the built environment, including Peter Kraftl 
and Loretta Lees.
20 On airports as fixed and/or nodes, see Peter Adey, “Airports and Air-Mind-
edness: Spacing, Timing, and Using Liverpool Airport 1929–39,” Social and 
Cultural Geography 7 (2006): 343–63; M. Crang, “Between Places: Produc-
ing Hubs, Flows, and Networks,” Environment and Planning A 34 (2002): 
569–74.
21 Peter Adey, “Airports: Terminal/Vector,” in Geographies of Mobilities, eds. 
Cresswell and Merriman, 140. (This is one of many essays in which Adey 
discusses the results of his research at Liverpool Airport.)
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“real” landscape. Architecture becomes capricious, bending to 
the networks that move through and across it.
Because the construction of bridges is both literally and figu-
ratively a consequence of hydraulics, we might think of bridges 
as vectors, “inseparable from flows […] and heterogen[eous], as 
opposed to the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant.”22 
They are the architectural manifestation of movement, engen-
dering and engendered by mobile practice. Indeed, bridges are 
more likely to fall into disrepair and collapse when bodies cease 
to move across them, and the temporary absence of a bridge 
that makes movement possible can be a remarkably disruptive 
event in the urban history of a city.23 
The hybridity of the structure itself, at once static and mo-
bile, is echoed by the bodies that occupy it. When standing on 
a bridge, one is “there” (i.e., emplaced) primarily because one 
is between places. This dynamism becomes particularly acute 
when we consider the living bridges of the Middle Ages. A body 
can loiter on a road, but it can live on a medieval bridge.24 In 1281 
a royal writ concerning London Bridge mentions “almost innu-
merable people dwelling thereon,” and a rental survey of Bridge 
House properties in 1358 shows that there were 62 shops on the 
east side of the roadway and 69 on the west side.25 The bridge 
was therefore far more than a determining structure, facilitat-
ing or impeding river crossings; it was a place of residence and 
economic exchange, a microcosm of the city suspended over the 
22 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1987), 361.
23 As a resident of Pittsburgh — the “City of Bridges” — the latter strikes espe-
cially close to home. 
24 On medieval roads (which provide a productive comparison to medieval 
bridges), see Valerie Allen, “Roads,” postmedieval 4, no. 1 (2013): 18–29.
25 Calendar of Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, 65 vols. 
(London: 1291–1509, 1547–63, 1893–1948); C. Welch, History of Tower Bridge 
(London: 1894), 258–59. Quoted in Bruce Watson, Trevor Brigham, and 
Tony Dyson, London Bridge: 2000 Years of a River Crossing (London: Mu-
seum of London Archeology Service, 2001), 97–98.
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Thames.26 Beyond the momentous historical events played out 
thereupon (the Peasants’ Revolt, for example), daily life would 
have consisted of innumerable micro and macro movements: 
blood flowing in veins and in streets as fish were butchered, 
money being exchanged for goods, estranged hearts being ex-
changed to signify shifting allegiances,27 and bodies flocking 
toward the chapel of St Thomas the Martyr or a tableau vivant 
at the Southwark Bridge foot. In sum, the medieval bridge is a 
picture of post-modern consumption, a vector of mobility-sup-
porting networks, producing and presupposing extensive new 
mobilities.28 Both the built structure and the bodies occupying 
it are therefore fundamentally hybrid: mobile and stable, em-
placed and between places.
The way medieval bridges were built compounds their fail-
ure to preserve binary opposition. Extant records suggest that 
as early as the Anglo-Saxon period, bridge construction and 
maintenance was a common burden.29 This burden — originally 
one of Alfred’s trinoda necessitas — improved defense and com-
munication, making bridges central to enabling (and disabling, 
in the case of invasion) the movement of bodies and ideas, the 
latter including a burgeoning sense of nationalism that came 
from early defensive efforts against the Vikings. In this way, the 
act of bridge construction united people across space and estate 
in a shared architectural project that enabled collective routines 
including trade, pilgrimage, and the performance of civic du-
ties. In so doing, bridges produced and came to represent new 
itinerant identities, uprooting “Englishness” from the soil and 
locating it instead in mobile categories.
26 London Bridge as both connection and barrier (the latter as a consequence 
of the gates thereon: the Stonegate and the Drawbridge Gate), reveals yet 
another sense in which medieval bridges can be read as hybrid.
27 See Jennie Friedrich’s “Concordia Discors: The Traveling Heart as Foreign 
Object in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde” in the present collection.
28 On bridges as spaces of post-modern consumption, see David Harrison, 
The Bridges of Medieval England: Transport and Society 400–1800 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004); Alan Cooper, Bridges, Law, and Power in Medieval 
England, 700–1400 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2006).
29 See Cooper, Bridges, Law, and Power in Medieval England, ch. 2.
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The Rochester Bridge was one of the most important bridge 
projects in all of England, carrying Watling Street over the Med-
way, and thereby linking London to both Canterbury and the 
Continent. After the original medieval bridge (constructed ca. 
960 ce) succumbed to the force of ice melts in 1381, Sir Robert 
Knolles, Sir John Cobham, and architect Henry Yevele spear-
headed the construction of a second bridge.30 The importance of 
this bridge to Rochester, and Southeast England, cannot be over-
stated. From its beginning, Rochester was defined by its proxim-
ity to and contention with the Medway, its Roman name being 
Durobrivis: a compound of two Celtic words meaning “walled 
town by the bridge.” The construction of the 560-foot 1391 
bridge reinforced this link, serving as the most frequently used 
Medway crossing for nearly 500 years.31 Upon its completion, it 
was called “sumptuoissimus” (most magnificent) by Thomas of 
Walsingham, and as late as the eighteenth century, it was praised 
by Daniel Defoe as “the largest, highest, and the strongest built 
of all bridges in England, except London Bridge.”32 Throughout 
its literary record, the bridge’s place in southeast England was 
secured by superlatives.
Nonetheless, the Rochester Bridge, more than most pieces of 
architecture, was itself a body in motion. This essay has already 
explored the theoretical hybridity of bridges as vectors, and the 
extension of this hybridity to the bodies that occupy them, but a 
material turn reveals that bridges are anything but static archi-
tectural structures. This is in large part due to the rivers in which 
30 The author of the Westminister Chronicle writes, “About the feast of the Pu-
rification of the Blessed Virgin this year a great part of Rochester Bridge was 
destroyed. Ice had formed in vast quantities, and when it broke up, with the 
onset of milder weather, the massive pressure of the flores [sic] which had 
composed it wrecked the bridge” (The Westminister Chronicle, 1381–1394, 
eds. L.C. Hector and B.F. Harvey [Oxford: Oxford Medieval Texts, 1982], 
2–3).
31 It was replaced in 1856 with a bridge that better accommodated modern 
river traffic.
32 Thomas Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls ser., vol. 2 
(London: 1863–4), 277; Daniel Defoe, Tour Thro’ the Whole Island of Great 
Britain (London: 1724), 20.
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they are embedded and the raw materials with which they are 
made: a reminder that an understanding of bridges is incom-
plete without an analysis of the natural world, bringing Birkirt’s 
notion of inclusive environments to the fore and colliding the 
mobility-stasis and nature-culture dichotomies. In the case of 
Rochester Bridge, nature was commingled with culture from 
the bridge’s inception. Keeping the original medieval bridge’s 
collapse in mind, planners chose to locate the 1391 bridge one 
hundred feet further upriver, “both for the fastnes of the soile 
and for the breaking of the swiftness of the streame.”33 Already 
soil and water were implicated in Rochester Bridge’s construc-
tion: more secure soil would better hold the pilings, and a slower 
current would lessen the force of water on stone. Humankind’s 
capacity to impose its will on the natural world was therefore 
ruthlessly tempered by that world. A failure to accommodate 
environmental imperatives would almost certainly result in the 
catastrophic collapse of a cultural emblem.
Nature and culture also both impacted the construction 
itself. Wood, stone, chalk, and iron were molded by engineer-
ing principles and art to produce a bridge that stood for half a 
millennium. The process would have started with the construc-
tion of staddles.34 First, iron-tipped elm piles were driven into 
the riverbed, establishing a base about 45 feet long by 25 feet 
wide that was pointed at each end, allowing tides to run in and 
out with minimal resistance.35 The tops of these piles were then 
sawed off at the low-water mark and surrounded by a protective 
33 William Lambarde, A Perambulation of Kent (London: 1576), 303.
34 In the Rochester Bridge accounts, the starling and staddle are referred to 
as one whole structure, though there is a functional difference between the 
two. Starlings are constructed to resist the force of a river, and staddles are 
built to bear the weight of the bridge. I choose to maintain the medieval ter-
minology (“staddle” for the whole structure at the foot of each pier: starling 
and staddle) here. 
35 These steps were determined by a firm of contractors who removed the 
foundations of the medieval bridge after its demolition. See R.H. Britnell, 
“Rochester Bridge, 1381–1530,” in Traffic and Politics: The Construction and 
Management of Rochester Bridge, ad 43–1993, eds. Nigel Yates and James M. 
Gibson, 43–59 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1994).
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barrier made of additional tied piles, like modern cofferdams. 
In Rochester, the resulting cavity was packed with chalk — an 
abundant commodity in Kent that substituted for loose stones 
and rubble — and finally, the top and sides of each staddle were 
boarded over with elm planks. In total, twelve of these staddles 
were built for the Rochester Bridge, resulting in eleven open-
ings, all arched save the seventh opening from the Rochester 
bank, which was crossed by the royal drawbridge.36 The roadway 
and the piers built atop these staddles were then constructed 
with ragstone, much of it recycled from the previous bridge.
This alone was a feat of civil engineering, but the work was 
far from over. Maintenance following a “completed” bridge 
project was constant. As R.H. Britnell notes, “medieval bridges 
were vulnerable structures, especially when they were large and 
built over a tidal river, and Rochester Bridge must have been 
one of the most difficult in England to maintain.”37 In the ten 
years following the Rochester Bridge’s construction, an average 
of £25 per year was spent on maintenance work, including rein-
forcing the elm piles, repairing or renewing the wooden fram-
ing of the staddles, and packing hundreds of tons of chalk into 
eroded staddles and the riverbed itself. Careful records report 
the amount of money spent on bridgework, warden’s salaries, 
administration, upkeep of bridge trust property, rents and taxes, 
the bridge chapel (“newly erected” in January 1393), and other 
necessary expenses.38 All of this suggests a state of perpetual 
motion, deemed more natural than stasis by fourteenth-century 
philosopher William of Ockham in his Opera philosophica.39 
Beyond being a product of human and hydraulic vectors, and 
bearing the weight of countless feet in motion (emplaced and 
between places), the bridge itself transformed in response to the 
Medway: chalk eroded, ragstone receded, and elm rotted. Most 
36 Janet Becker, Rochester Bridge, 1387–1856: A History of its Early Years (Lon-
don: Constable & Co., 1930), 9–10.
37 Britnell, “Rochester Bridge, 1381–1530,” 47.
38 Becker, Rochester Bridge, 13.
39 See Thomas R. Schneider’s “Chaucer’s Physics: Motion in the House of 
Fame” in the present collection.
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man-made structures deteriorate over time, of course, but the 
micro-movements of bridges are immediately and intermina-
bly sensed. Travelers can see foam building around the staddles, 
hear rushing water, and feel the spray of water on their faces, 
providing kinesthetic proof that a seemingly static bridge is per-
haps better understood to be kinetic in place.
The spaces around Rochester Bridge also transformed as a 
consequence of construction and maintenance. The impact 
of both on the Kentish landscape was immense, affecting wa-
ter, wood, and chalk in particular. The effect on the Medway 
was seen in the forceful current that rushed beneath the rag-
stone arches, a result of the staddles having substantially de-
creasing the width of the waterway, which — like at London 
Bridge — made “shooting the bridge” a favored activity among 
the daring (some would say reckless) youth. The need for wood, 
to fabricate piles and the planks that surrounded them, resulted 
in the deforestation of the downlands’ steep, forested slopes. 
When construction began, Richard II granted bridge contrac-
tors carte blanche to take any timber they required from all but 
the church’s land, resulting the felling of thousands of trees in 
the vicinity of the bridge. In fact, because local reserves were ex-
hausted by the initial construction, wood for replacement piles 
and planks was shipped from areas as far upriver as Maidstone, 
with records from the early fifteenth century reporting as many 
as 200 elms used in a single year.40 
Chalk, too, was mined at will, with around 100,000 tons of 
chalk consumed during the first 100 years of bridge mainte-
nance, and as much as 2500 tons of chalk used in a single year.41 
This reallocation of chalk supplies would have affected countless 
other vocations, including the growth of cherries, an important 
Kentish export that thrived on chalky soil. So, while the space 
of a bridge offers an escape from binarism, and therefore meets 
40 Britnell, “Rochester Bridge, 1381–1530,” 63. This statistic reflects the number 
of elms used in 1444–45; exact information exists only for the years 1436–46.
41 Ibid., 65–66. In 1415 the commonality of the bridge acquired a quarry at 
Walshes to meet their demand.
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the demands of a growing ecocritical field (one that is beginning 
to look beyond nature to the inclusive environments that more 
accurately represent our hybrid world), we would be remiss to 
ignore the impact that such a structure has on the ecosystem. 
It does function as one of the few architectural structures that 
exists coequal with — and not superior to — its immediate envi-
ronment (i.e., the river), but it does not do so without affecting 
the surrounding, nonhuman ecosystem.
The effects of bridge construction were also felt by the hands, 
hooves, and bodies that worked the construction site. The man-
power demanded by such a difficult project was extraordinary; 
hundreds of laborers would have to contend with the Medway’s 
current, men and their tools submerged in what must have at 
times seemed a futile attempt to harness the floods. A fifteenth-
century poem appended by Thomas Hearne to his edition of Le-
land’s Itinerary narrates this venture for us, with direct reference 
to the construction of late medieval starling (staddle) bridges in 
the lowlands. The anonymous poet writes, 
Then the strengthe of the streme astoned hem stronge,
In labor and lavyng moche money was lore.
Ther loved hem a ladde was a water man longe, 
He helpe stop the streme til the werke were afore. (39–42)42
In this passage, instability reigns: the world is defined by a tu-
mult of water, bodies, and money. Even the efforts of the water 
man are mitigated. Though he is praised for his work, he can 
only “helpe” stop the stream, and the poet’s use of the ambigu-
ous “afore” reinforces the uncertain nature of the service the 
“ladde” provides. Is the work behind him, as the preposition 
“til” implies? Or is it still ahead of him, as the aforementioned 
records of costly bridge maintenance suggest?43 The latter is 
42 The Itinerary of John Leland the Antiquary, ed. Thomas Hearne, 9 vols., 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: 1744–45). Quoted in Harrison, The Bridges of Medieval Eng-
land, 134–35.
43 The med allows for both readings. See Middle English Dictionary Online, s.v. 
“afore, adv., prep., conj.,” http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/med/.
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more likely, given that the poet takes pains to remind his reader, 
“Thus they were cesed and set all in oon assent / That all the 
brekynges of the brige the towne bere schulde” (81–2). It is ac-
cording to Parliamentary procedure, in fact, that the town will 
be responsible for repairs: “This was preved acte also in the Per-
lement” (83). Such lines lead a reader to believe that the water 
man works to “stop the streme” only to have to do so again and 
again, evoking an infinite regression of pilings, and in so doing 
reinforcing an understanding of bridges — like their environ-
ments and the bodies that bring them into being — as hybrid. 
Money, labor, raw materials, and rivers circulate in perpetuity, 
while the bridge itself projects architectural stability.
This poem also advances our thinking about the nature-cul-
ture dialectic. The laborers are identified not simply as working-
men, but as “water men.” It is as though their skin is permeated 
by the water in which they are submerged, natural and human 
fluids comingling to produce a hybrid species that warrants 
distinction from “land men.” One can imagine children on the 
banks of the Medway marveling at men plunging into the river 
to tie planks around pilings, breathing as though through gills. 
A similar appellation occurring regularly in extant records is 
“tide men,” so called because they were paid not by the day, but 
by the tide. These men worked the gin and the ram to drive piles 
into the riverbed, work that was restricted to certain states of the 
tide. Perhaps even more than Hearne’s water men, the tide men 
worked to the rhythms of tidal rivers, their culturally-ingrained 
patterns of labor forced into alignment with nature’s patterns, 
dictated by the moon rather than the sun.
These processes and the phenomena they engender reveal 
the degree to which matter and humankind intermingle in the 
construction of a bridge. The properties and availability of natu-
ral resources defined Rochester Bridge’s structure, and carefully 
engineered plans ultimately gave way to natural anomalies. Ir-
regularities in the Medway riverbed, for example, rendered the 
arches and piers asymmetrical, and the Medway’s heavy tides 
prevented the construction of buildings atop the bridge. Moreo-
ver, unlike the spaces surrounding extant transport systems, the 
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fields bordering roads, for example, rivers could not be easily 
developed. On a bridge, therefore, culture could not fully do-
mesticate and obscure the natural world in/out of which it is 
built. Yet bridges are always fundamentally cultural, standing in 
place for centuries as testimony to humankind’s manipulation 
of the landscape. Such concessions — humankind to nature and 
nature to humankind — render Rochester Bridge fundamen-
tally hybrid, built from and embedded in a natural world that 
reminds passersby of its presence in the sound of water rushing 
against man-made staddle and cultivated stone. 
Bridging Literary Landscapes
As for the place of Rochester Bridge in the Canterbury pilgrim-
age, we might begin by considering Architect Henry Yevele, who 
designed Rochester Bridge, the nave of Canterbury Cathedral, 
and the nave of Westminster, while also serving as the warden 
of London Bridge and caretaker of its chapel. As a consequence 
of this one man’s work, London, Rochester, and Canterbury 
become an amalgam of architectural continuity: Westminster’s 
nave resembles the arches of Rochester Bridge, which in turn 
resemble Canterbury Cathedral’s nave. Church, state, and civic-
mindedness also converge, each manifest in the hybrid struc-
ture of the bridge, which mobilized religious, monarchical, and 
local endeavors alike. These movements were not without regu-
lation, though. As James Smith observes, unregulated move-
ment — characterized by “fluidity” in his work — was a source 
of anxiety for many medieval writers.44 Bernard of Cluny, for 
example, wrote in De Contemptu Mundi, “[the world’s] position 
is unfixed, its status is unstable. It goes and it returns, like the 
sea, now bad and tomorrow even worse.”45 Instability, repre-
44 James Smith, “Fluid: A Temporal Ecology,” presentation, 47th International 
Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, MI, May 10–13, 2012. See also 
James Smith, “Fluid,” in Inhuman Nature, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, 115–31 
(Washington, DC: Oliphaunt Books, 2014).
45 Ronald E. Pepin, trans., Scorn for the World: Bernard of Cluny’s De Con-
temptu Mundi: The Latin Text with English Translation and an Introduction 
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sented here by going and returning, threatened human exist-
ence by gesturing toward an apocalyptic chaos, but the mobility 
played out across Rochester Bridge was not apocalyptic. Instead, 
mimicking its own simultaneity — representing both nature and 
culture, movement and stasis — the Rochester Bridge presup-
posed only regulated mobilities, containing what was tradition-
ally understood to be unrestrained kinesis. Indeed, unlike the 
ferries that could traverse rivers in a multitude of ways, bridges 
offered mobile bodies only one option.46 As a consequence, they 
helped to standardize routes, distilling variable movement to-
ward a given destination into routinized itineraries, and thereby 
producing a mobile practice best characterized as structured 
mobility: a fettered qualification of a traditionally unfettered 
term. Such mobilities came to define England and its people, 
locating medieval identities (like the bridges across which they 
were played out) in a hybrid category that at once represented 
humankind’s freedom to move, and the strictures placed upon 
that movement.47
In the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer depicts one of the most 
popular structured mobilities of the Middle Ages: pilgrimage. 
He celebrates the movement of medieval bodies while dem-
onstrating how their perceived “instability” (per Bernard of 
Cluny) can be regulated by human systems and the built envi-
ronments in which they take place. In so doing, he finds a mid-
dle ground between spatial fixity and the placeless potential of 
mobility, represented by the spaces between the pilgrims’ points 
of departure and destination. First, Chaucer removes London 
and Canterbury from the Canterbury Tales: the pilgrims begin 
in Southwark, and they never arrive at their destination. This 
(East Lansing: Colleagues Press, 1991), 1.71. 
46 Unless, of course, those bodies were blown off of the bridge and forced to 
swim to the nearest refuge, an event not unheard of in the Middle Ages. 
See James M. Gibson, The Rochester Bridge Trust (Rochester, Kent: Anti-
doteFM, 2005)
47 This conceit also evokes Urry’s “gamekeeper state,” explored by Van Dyke in 
the present collection, and thereby implicates animal movement as well in a 
discussion of England’s mobilities.
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suspends the pilgrims in a state of perpetual motion, and erases 
religio-political centers and landscape features that would un-
questionably ground the text. Thomas Becket’s tomb, in par-
ticular, would have stabilized the pilgrims’ journey, its static 
permanence overshadowing the pilgrims’ rich movement. By 
removing this locus from his frame, Chaucer renders tombs and 
destinations inconsequential, making the Canterbury Tales pil-
grimage one that exists almost entirely on the road: an interim 
space defined by mobility.
He then structures this mobility by locating the pilgrims 
in Rochester, Sittingbourne, and Harbledown (at 7.1924–6, 
3.844–9, and 9.1–4 respectively) — waypoints for travelers in 
South East England with economies that flourished as a con-
sequence of movement toward Canterbury. Beyond being a 
religious vocation, pilgrimage was travel, and as such became 
intertwined with economic systems that anticipated today’s 
tourism industry. Many pilgrims purchased ampullae filled with 
well water from holy places (a practice that linked England’s 
liquid landscape with structured mobilities), and relics/souve-
nirs multiplied as travelers demanded physical evidence of their 
successful journeys.48 Markets grew to accommodate the sale 
of these souvenirs, and hostels were built to house the weary 
travelers purchasing them. Pilgrimage thus became a market of 
sorts, with the loci of circulation and exchange being towns like 
Rochester: places “by the weye” that grew to accommodate the 
movement of bodies and material goods. In the frame of the 
Canterbury Tales, it is these places that are prioritized, rendering 
Southeast England a space defined not by the Tower of London 
or the Canterbury Cathedral, but by mobile bodies practicing 
routinized movements in environments defined by (often eco-
nomically motivated) vectors. Chaucer may not say much about 
the landscapes through which his pilgrims move, but what he 
48 See Rosalind and Christopher Brooke, Popular Religion in the Middle 
Ages: Western Europe 1000–1300 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1984), and 
Patrick Geary, Furta Sacra: The Theft of Relics in the Central Middle Ages 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
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does say reveals his interest in hybrid categories: meaning is 
found in a mobile middle.
This macrocosmic structuring of movement in the Canter­
bury Tales — which stipulates that bodies pass through Roch-
ester, Sittingbourne, and Harbledown en route to Canter-
bury — would then be replicated within each of the three towns 
Chaucer mentions. Movement through Rochester, for example, 
would be syphoned across Rochester Bridge: the one available 
route over the Medway. Given the 1381 collapse of the old me-
dieval bridge, this river crossing could not have been far from 
Chaucer’s mind, especially given his work as Clerk of the King’s 
Works, a job that made him responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of royal buildings (including bridges). He writes, 
in the voice of the Host, “‘My lord, the Monk […] be myrie of 
cheere, / For ye shul telle a tale trewely. / Loo Rochestre stant 
heer faste by!’” (7.1924–6). Here Chaucer offers Rochester as a 
defining locale in the pilgrims’ journey, yet his language unsur-
prisingly complicates an otherwise straightforward statement, 
directing our attention beyond the city itself to the more inclu-
sive environment that defines it. Rochester “stands,” but more 
than that, it “stands fast.” This suggests stasis, like the (albeit il-
lusory) stasis of the stone bridge that carried pilgrims to Roch-
ester’s bank.49 At the same time, though, “faste” evokes an image 
of speed, like the rush of the Medway between the bridge’s stad-
dles.50 Chaucer’s use of such a multivalent word therefore directs 
readers to consider both the static city and the movement that 
defines it, the latter manifest in both the built and liquid land-
scapes (i.e., the bridge and the river). After drawing his readers’ 
attention to an interim space, he foregrounds the hybridity of 
this space as both static and mobile, “faste” and “faste.”
His embrace of such dynamism extends to the nature-culture 
dialectic represented by bridges’ inclusive environments. We 
needn’t look far to see that Chaucer was intrigued by the world 
around him. Parliament of Fowls describes a meeting between 
49 Middle English Dictionary Online, s.v. “faste, adv.” def. 2.
50 Middle English Dictionary Online, s.v. “faste, adv.” def. 10.
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birds, and the Nun’s Priest’s Tale challenges the boundaries that 
distinguish animal from human.51 He also dedicates space to a 
discussion of deforestation in the Knight’s Tale, and meditates 
on the sometimes-unpredictable liquid landscape of the Frank­
lin’s Tale.52 These literary moments have been explored in ex-
tant scholarship, and there is certainly more to say about how 
the pilgrims’ tales embrace amalgams of nature and culture. A 
glance at the frame alone, though, reveals Chaucer’s attention to 
the natural environment, perhaps most readily in the familiar 
opening lines of the General Prologue:
Whan that Aprill with his shoures soote
The droghte of March hath perced to the roote,
And bathed every veyne in swich licour
Of which vertu engendred is the flour;
Whan Zephirus eek with his sweete breeth
Inspired hath in every holt and heath
The tendre croppes, and the yonge soone
Hath in the Ram his half cours yronne,
And smale foweles maken melodye,
That slepen al the nyght with open ye
(So Priketh hem Nature in hir corages),
Thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages. (1.1–12)
Here both nature and Nature are shown to influence human-
kind. The wind and rain, personified as Nature in line 11, each 
inspire “folk” to go on pilgrimage. As Sarah Stanbury writes, 
“Nature is extrinsic but becomes instrinsic, a force out there 
in the world as well as within the body; similar to Aristotelian 
and Platonic concepts of nature, its essence is movement.”53 Like 
water permeating the skin of water men, Nature permeates 
(“pricks”) humankind’s heart, moving us to move. By beginning 
51 For an ecocritical reading of Parliament of Fowls, see Kiser’s “Chaucer and 
the Politics of Nature.”
52 On the latter, see Rudd, Greenery, 139–48.
53 Stanbury, “Ecochaucer: Green Ethics and Medieval Nature,” 11.
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the Tales with this musing, Chaucer prepares his readers for a 
hybrid understanding of space that is compounded by the ab-
sence of London and Canterbury, and celebrated in the cities he 
calls to mind. The world represented in the frame of the Canter­
bury Tales is finally both human and nonhuman (with categori-
cal distinctions between the two collapsing from the very start), 
moving in structured ways to accommodate built environments 
and natural rhythms alike.
Conclusion: Confluences of Liquid and Literary Landscapes
To close, we might think of the frame as a poetic bridge. It is a 
space occupied by bodies practicing routinized movement in an 
environment that is equally natural, “bathed [...] in swich licour 
/ Of which vertu engendred is the flour” (1.3–4), and built, like 
the “[wyde] chambres and stables” of the Tabard (1.28). But it is 
also itself hybrid, bridging the poetry of Chaucer’s pen (as au-
thor), Chaucer’s voice (as pilgrim), and the voices of Chaucer’s 
characters. This polyvocality alerts us to how easily categorical 
distinctions collapse. Yet far from destroying the integrity of 
Chaucer’s project, the collapse of Chaucerian voices produces 
a harmony that sounds long after a new pilgrim’s tale begins. 
The space of the frame also manifests the building and breaking 
of metaphorical bridges. Characters erect (albeit often unstable) 
bridges between disparate genres and themes, and reconcile col-
lapsing collegiality (one may recall the knight who famously in-
structs the Host to “kisse the Pardoner” [6.965]). In all cases, the 
interstitial spaces that connect human to inhuman, movement 
to stasis, and pen to polyphony bear meaning, amplified by the 
hybrid forms they assume.
Like the bridges it implicitly evokes, then, the frame insists 
on and celebrates dialectical understanding. The pilgrims them-
selves are implicated in multiplicities of meaning, and upon 
reaching Rochester they and the horses on which they ride are 
both emplaced and between places, producing and presuppos-
ing networks of movement and exchange by their being in tran­
sit. Moreover, they move through and across spaces that cannot 
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be clearly delineated as either architectural (cultural) or natural; 
each environment, and especially that of Rochester Bridge, is 
both. Like the world it represents, then, Chaucer’s Canterbury 
Tales is fundamentally hybrid, exemplified by the literal and 
metaphorical bridges that define it. In the end, these bridges 
disintegrate categories and enrich our understanding of worlds 
current and past, lived and literary. We stand to benefit from 
seeking such bridges in real and imagined landscapes, and em-




Motion in The House of Fame
Thomas R. Schneider
Geoffrey Chaucer’s House of Fame is preoccupied with multiple 
vectors of chaotic, incessant movement. It is a poem of constant 
spatial motion, but three moments in particular are strikingly 
unusual and deserving of unpacking in relation to Chaucer’s 
engagement with the concept of movement. The first is, un-
surprisingly, the description of the cage-like wooden structure, 
sixty miles in diameter, in the valley beyond the House of Fame: 
perhaps his most potent and strange image of motion. This laby-
rinthine, multicolored structure is in constant circular motion:
And ever mo, as swifte as thoughte,
This queynte hous aboute wente,
That never mo hyt stille stent.1
We know how this House relates to Chaucer’s vision for ver-
nacular poetry thanks to dozens of Chaucerians — Steven Kru-
ger, Robert J. Allen, Robert O. Payne, P. M. Kean, Jorg O. Fichte, 
and others — but in the following pages I am most interested in 
the link it makes between motion, writing, and thought. Ap-
1 Geoffrey Chaucer, The House of Fame, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry 
D. Benson, 347–374, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 1924–26.
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pearing at the climax of the poem, it suggests a broader literary 
relevance for the work’s ceaseless spatial motion.
The second passage is the eagle’s speech during the flight 
through space, a moment unique for its simultaneous enactment 
of physical motion (what the fourteenth-century English phi-
losopher William of Ockham would call motu localus or motu 
ad ubi) and the overt theorization of motion. Even as “Geffrey” is 
looking beneath him at the “ayerrissh bestes, / Cloudes, mystes, 
and tempestes,  / Snowes, hayles, reynes, wyndes, […] Alle the 
wey thurgh which [he] cam” (964–69), the eagle is spouting nat-
ural philosophy: specifically, physics. First, he presents a lecture 
on “kyndely enclyning,” a medieval principle similar to the law 
of gravity:
Geffrey, thou wost right wel this,
That every kyndely thing that is
Hath a kyndely stede ther he
May best in hyt conserved be;
Unto which place every thing
Thorgh his kyndely enclynying
Moveth for to come to
Whan that hyt is awey therfro;
As thus: loo, thou maist alday se
That any thing that hevy be,
As stone, or led, or thyng of wighte,
And bere hyt never so hye on highte,
Lat goo thyn hand, hit falleth doun.
Ryght so seye I be fyr or soun,
Or smoke or othe thynges lyghte;
Alwey they seke upward on highte. (729–44)
And the eagle continues speaking, further proposing, specifi-
cally citing Plato and Aristotle, that “speech is soun” [speech is 
sound], that “soun is noghte but eyr ybroken” [sound is broken 
air], that it therefore desires to travel upward in rings through 
the air like a pond into which a stone has been thrown, and that 
it is therefore possible for all sounds in the world to eventually 
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reach a single place: the chaotic nest that gathers all news.2 The 
key to this theory is that sound “moveth first an ayr aboute,  / 
And of this movynge, oute of doute,  / Another eyr anoon ys 
meved” (811–13). This lengthy philosophizing tends to seem 
odd to us in such a kinetic context. The words themselves mir-
ror Ockham’s words about projectile motion in the Expositio 
in libros physicorum aristotelis: “and therefore one part moved 
with a natural motion pushes the other, and if the other suc-
ceeds, because of that the other moves violently, which moved 
it moves the other either to its proper place more quickly than 
it is moved by itself, to another place.”3 The natural inclining of 
light and heavy things, or levia and gravia, is also a recurring 
topic in Ockham’s writings. This section of poetry argues, in a 
scientifically informed way, that speech, including the reading 
of The House of Fame itself, is motion.
The third moment in the poem is from still earlier, when the 
eagle comes hurtling out of the sky and tears Geffrey out of his 
wandering on the plain:
This egle, of which I have yow told,
That shon with fethres as of gold,
Which that so hye gan to sore,
I gan beholde more and more
To se the beaute and the wonder;
But never was ther dynt of thonder,
Ne that thing that men calle fouder,
That smot sometyme a tour to powder
And in his swifte comynge brende, 
That so swithe gan descende
2 Ibid., 762, 765, 785–821.
3 “Et ideo una pars mota motu naturali aliam impellit, et si succedit alia, 
propter quod alia violenter movetur, quae mota movet aliam vel ad locum 
proprium velocius quam moveretur ex se, vel ad alium locum […]” (Wil-
liam of Ockham, Opera philosophica, vol. V: Expositio in libros physicorum 




As this foule, when hyt beheld
That I a-roume was in the field. (529–40)
These lines together communicate a multi-layered flash of 
speed, violence, beauty, and wonder. The eagle’s descent is over-
laid with images of a flame, a percussion of thunder, and a light-
ning bolt reducing a stone tower to dust. In sharp contrast to the 
stillness emphasized by the “ymages” and “portreytures” of the 
Temple of Glass, words of movement and speed dominate these 
lines: “sore,” “smot,” “swifte,” “comynge,” “swithe,” “descend,” “a-
roume.” In these three passages, we see a picture of movement 
that is insistently present, aesthetically powerful, and above all 
a complex blend of order and chaos — exemplified by “kyndely 
enclyning” and the Whirling Wicker.
Because of the nature of this representation of movement, I 
contend that we should pay attention to Ockham’s physics as it 
relates to motion in this poem, especially sections of his Brevis 
summa libri physicorum and his Expositio in libros physicorum 
aristotelis (both written in the early 1320s)— in part because 
there is reason to believe that Chaucer may have. 
Ockham’s Physics
Chaucer’s understanding of motion was inflected by his knowl-
edge of the philosophical and scientific discourses of his time. 
The extent to which he was a “scholar” has long been the sub-
ject of debate, but there is widespread consensus that he was a 
well-read and educated writer.4 We know from Chaucer’s allu-
4 Kathryn Lynch provides an excellent summary of this debate, beginning 
with Caxton and other early writers who imagined Chaucer as a philoso-
pher, including the poet’s first (inaccurate) biographer John Leland, who 
described him as a profound scholar in the fields of logic, oratory, poetry, 
philosophy, and mathematics. Derek Pearsall proposes that Chaucer “was 
widely read, and used his reading intelligently, but he was not a scholar,” and 
Kathryn Lynch welcomes this caution but emphasizes Chaucer’s scholarly 
expertise. Kathryn L. Lynch, Chaucer’s Philosophical Visions (Woodbridge: 
D.S. Brewer, 2000), 16–17. Derek Pearsall, The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer: A 
Critical Biography (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 32.
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sions that he was familiar with some Scholastic philosophy and, 
importantly for this study, physics. In the fourteenth century, 
physics — including prominently the physics of motion — was 
studied within the category of natural philosophy, and such 
studies were predominantly commentaries on Aristotle. In this 
context, the importance of the thought and writing of William 
of Ockham is almost undisputed.5 As Paul Vincent Spade ob-
serves, “standard histories have long recognized that the three 
most important figures in the philosophy of the High Middle 
Ages were Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–74), John Duns Scotus (c. 
1266–1308), and William of Ockham (c. 1288–1347).6 Ockham’s 
school of thought, nominalism, is understood as having been 
dominant, or at least “widely discussed,” for around fifty years 
in the mid- to late-fourteenth century in the intellectual cent-
ers of Oxford, Avignon, Paris, and Munich.7 These centers con-
trolled the philosophical climate of much of Western Europe, 
and Ockham, an Englishman, was particularly influential in 
England, where he experienced his most prolific period of writ-
ing (1321–1324) including his works of physics.8 Although he is 
often known for his theology and later political writings (while 
in Avignon and Munich), this subject was of significant interest 
to him, his ideas were well known to the educated readership 
in late fourteenth-century England, and, in comparison to Sco-
tus or Aquinas, his contributions to physics were particularly 
groundbreaking.
5 William J. Courtenay has claimed that “Ockham is better seen not as the 
leader or center of movement but as one of many contemporary authors 
whose opinions were widely discussed, sometimes accepted, and sometimes 
rejected” (William J. Courtenay, “The Academic and Intellectual Worlds 
of Ockham,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent 
Spade, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 28). Despite this 
appropriate caution, Courtenay still treats Ockham’s writings as important 
and “widely discussed,” and most scholars still see Ockham as more of a 






Aristotle’s physics were the standard at the time, and Ock-
ham supports some of these theories while radically revising 
others. One element that he maintains is the critical importance 
of motion to the understanding of existence. He engages with 
and confirms one of Aristotle’s prominent conclusions: “for if 
we are ignorant of what a motion is, we are of necessity ignorant 
of what nature is.”9 The subjects of projectile motion (the mo-
tion of a thrown object, for example), planetary/heavenly move-
ment, and self-propelled/willed motion dominate his physics, 
falling under the category motu localis or motu ad ubi (“local 
motion,” or movement through space). He begins to depart 
from Aristotle, however, in the details that control and describe 
these motions. Three related and unique aspects of his physics 
of motion are of particular relevance to Chaucer’s poetry: his 
description of space, his argument about the complex forces 
that cause movement, and his explanation of continued, poten-
tially perpetual, yet irregular motion.
First, like Henri Lefebvre and other postmodern theorists 
who characterize space as substantive and produced by move-
ments, like the post-Einsteinian physics of space-time, Ockham 
rejects the idea that space is a void.10 For Ockham, however, it 
is not real as a substance, either. The concept of place (locus) 
appears frequently in his writing, but almost always subordi-
nated to motion. The primary function of locus as a concept is 
to differentiate movements. If place exists — for Ockham, it is 
a conceptual framework but not a substance — it is because it 
is possible to move from place to place.11 The primary defini-
tion of local motion found in Ockham’s writings — representa-
9 William of Ockham, Opera philosophica, vol. VI: Brevis summa libri physi-
corum, Summula philosophiae naturalis, et Quaestiones in libros physicorum 
aristotelis (St. Bonaventure: Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. 
Bonaventurae, 1974), 39; William of Ockham, Ockham on Aristotle’s Physics: 
A Translation of Ockham’s Brevis summa libri physicorum, trans. Julian A. 
Davies (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure Univer-
sity, 1989), 39.
10 André Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 203.
11 William of Ockham, Ockham on Aristotle’s Physics, 55; Goddu, The Physics 
of William of Ockham, 215–16.
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tive of his nominalism — is the condition in which an object 
exists partially in one place and partially in another.12 Ockham 
determines that to understand the cosmos, we should look to 
motion rather than space or place, although place is a criti-
cal concept. Place, such as it appears in Ockham, is not only 
colored or characterized by motion, but its very existence as a 
concept is only necessitated because of the existence of motion. 
The intertwining of space and motion is further emphasized as 
Ockham discusses the shape of space; specifically, he mentions 
that motion through a winding space (spatium tortuosam) is 
irregular.13 In regard to this concept of (ir)regularity, he claims 
that “motus regularis est magis unus quam motus irregularis” [a 
regular motion is more one than an irregular motion], but also, 
notably, that “regularitas et irregularitas […] convenient omni 
specie motus” [regularity and irregularity belong to every spe-
cies of motion.]14 This is one of many hints at motion as plural 
in Ockham, in contrast to the unity and relative simplicity of the 
Aristotelian system: Ockham resists defining motion in a single 
category or as produced by a single cause.
Second, in relation to one ancient question — why does an 
object continue to move after it has left the hand that threw 
it? — Ockham introduced more complex forces than had been 
previously considered. A number of explanations for continued 
projectile motion were in circulation at the time, including the 
idea, supported by Aristotle and Averroës, that the “throwing 
hand” moves air, and that this air moves the projectile. Ockham’s 
response is not to directly refute this theory, but to complicate 
it, demonstrating that “violent” and “natural” motions, as well 
as intrinsic and extrinsic forces, are all involved. The following 
is a longer selection from the passage in his Expositio in libros 
physicorum aristotelis, mirrored strikingly by Chaucer’s eagle:






To this it can be said that air moves the projected not as if one 
moving uniformly with one motion, but because air is easily 
divisible, air is divided in many parts, one of which is moved 
more quickly than another actual cause. And therefore one 
part moved with a natural motion pushes the other, and if the 
other succeeds, because of that the other is moved violently, 
which moved it moves the other either to its proper place 
more quickly than it is moved by itself, or to another place. 
And so diverse parts of diverse moved things by themselves 
move the projected. And then when it is asked of that mov-
ing whether it is moved from itself or from another, I say 
that something moving is moved from itself and something 
from the other, and therefore the state obtains not with re-
spect to many things moved from themselves. And therefore, 
although the projected is moved by an extrinsic thing and 
violently, nevertheless there are diverse moving things there, 
which are moved of themselves and not by something ex-
trinsic.15
No one force is responsible for the continued motion of the pro-
jectile: its motion seems to be caused by its natural tendency to 
move to its proper place (for a heavy object, downward), the 
diverse and irregular divisions that appear in the air, the initial 
hand that threw the object, and a mysterious internal impulse 
to continue moving. This last force is particularly noteworthy: 
15 “Ad hoc dici potest quod aer movet proiectum non quasi unum movens 
uniforme uno motu, sed quia aer est faciliter divisibilis, aer in multas partes 
dividitur, quarum una velocius movetur quam alia ex alia cause actuali. Et 
ideo una pars mota motu naturali aliam impellit, et si succedit alia, propter 
quod alia violenter movetur, quae mota movet aliam vel ad locum proprium 
velocius quam moveretur ex se, vel ad alium locum, et sic diversae partes di-
versae motae a seipsis movent proiectum, et tunc quando quaereritur illud 
movens, aut movetur ex se aut ex alio, dico quod aliquod movens movetur 
ex se et aliquid ex altero, et ideo est status non ad primum proiiciens sed 
ad aliam partem aeris pulsem a proiiciente, et postea ex se motam vel forte 
perveniendum est ad talia multa mota ex se, et ideo quamvis proiectum 
moveatur ab extrinseco et violenter, tamen diversa sunt ibi moventia quae 
ex se moventur et non ab extrinseco” (ibid., V:626).
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as he writes elsewhere, “corpora simplicia et universaliter omnia 
gravia et levia possunt moveri ex se quia principium effectivum 
motus eorum est aliquid in eis subiective existens” [simple bodies, 
and all heavy and light bodies, can move on their own because 
they have that which is the principle or source of their motion 
within themselves]16 This impulse, combined with the various 
forces of projector and the diverse separations in the air (em-
phatically not uniform, regular, or singular) comprise a medi-
eval theory of motion that was unparalleled at the time for its 
nuance and complexity.
Finally, and relatedly, part of Ockham’s contribution to the 
understanding of motion is his apparent preoccupation with its 
persistence. Motion, in Ockham’s estimation, is a more funda-
mental state to existence than rest — a fact that he emphasizes 
more than his predecessors. For example, although he con-
cludes, as mentioned above, that all objects contain the princi-
ple of motion in themselves, they do not contain the principle 
of rest: the ability to stop on their own.17 Although he concedes 
that “animal potest moveri per aliquod spatium est potest etiam 
quiescere” [an animate thing can move through a space and can 
also stop],18 moving remains, in his analysis, more natural and 
less “violent” than stopping. This internally-generated motion 
is critical to his critique of Aristotle’s principle, expressed by 
Ockham as “in omnia tali motu movens propinquum et motum 
sunt simul” [in every such thing moved, the nearest moving and 
moved are together], meaning that, when an object is projected 
it needs the movement of the projector to be transferred onto 
it in some way to continue moving. Instead, Ockham argued 
that an object in motion can continue to move of itself, without 
an external mover, because all things contain this potential mo-
tion and tend toward motion.19 In fact, departing from Aristotle, 
Ockham determined that continued, perpetual motion requires 
16 Ibid., V:371.
17 Ibid., V:186, 371. 
18 Ibid.
19 Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, 203.
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no explanation or cause.20 The only explanation truly needed for 
motion is the distance from one place to another; for Ockham, if 
there is distance, it is natural for an object to cross that distance. 
In summary, Ockham refuted and built on Aristotelian phys-
ics by claiming that: (1) the concept of space/place is necessitat-
ed and shaped by motion; (2) motion is a network of more com-
plex and diverse forces than had been previously believed; and 
(3) motion is an impulse internal to all (even inanimate) things, 
potentially infinite and continuous, and the tendency to cross an 
intervening space is more natural than to remain in stasis.
Motion in Chaucer’s Poem
When we turn back to the moments in The House of Fame men-
tioned above, we see these principles embodied in poetry. This 
embodiment can be understood to begin even before the ea-
gle’s decent, however, in the dreamer’s rejection of the Temple 
of Venus. As soon as Geffrey — said to be as exhausted as one 
who had just taken a pilgrimage — falls asleep, we as readers 
arrive at this temple, “ymad of glass” (120).21 Once inside, the 
narrative slows to a crawl, losing action in favor of description. 
The dreamer lists what he sees there in a tone of wonder: “moo 
ymages / Of gold, stondynge in sondry stages, / And moo ry-
che tabernacles,  / And with perre moo pynacles,  / And moo 
curiouse portrytures, / And queynte maner of figures / Of olde 
werk, than I saugh ever” (121–27). The repetition of words for 
“pictures”: “ymages,” “portrytures,” and “figures,” emphasize the 
stillness of the place. Rather than a living Venus, as we see in The 
Parliament of the Fowls, this place is only identified as her tem-
ple by her “portreyture” on a wall (131). Not only are these im-
ages static, they are specifically referred to as “olde werk,” build-
ing on the developing image of a resplendent, yet abandoned, 
museum. The dreamer’s response to this place, considering what 
20 Ibid., 228.
21 “And file on slepe wonder sone, / As he that wery was forgo / On pilgrimage 
myles two / To the corseynt Leonard.” Chaucer, The House of Fame, 116–17.
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we know of him from the poem’s opening, makes perfect sense: 
he reads, at great length. A striking portion of the poem (some 
316 lines) are devoted to the story of Dido and Aeneas, a part of 
which is present in still images on the walls of the temple. This 
story is the slowest moment in a rapidly-paced poem; narrative 
action is replaced here with hundreds of lines of reflection and 
digression while the dreamer lingers.
Line 476, “but now wol I goo out and see,” marks the turn of 
this dream vision; from this point forward, Chaucer’s narrative 
will stand in sharp contrast to what we see in Venus’ Temple of 
Glass: motion replaces stillness, newness replaces “old werke,” 
and fierce, sharp moments of beauty replace lingering medita-
tion. The narrator’s progress here, as Chaucer turns away from 
old stories, is reminiscent of Ockham’s complication and revi-
talization of the Aristotelian theoretical system of motion. The 
dreamer’s exit “at the wiket” breathes life into the poem and, at 
this point, a powerful embodiment of the connection between 
motion and aesthetics explodes into the vision as Jove’s eagle 
screams toward Geffrey where he wanders in the empty plain 
surrounding the temple.
The trajectory of The House of Fame brings the dreamer, car-
ried by his eagle guide, to the labyrinthine structure that gives 
the poem its name “right even in myddes of the weye / Betwix-
en hevene and erthe and see” (714–15), a crossroads in space, 
where the conflation of language and movement, already theo-
rized, is depicted as a physical place. This third and final book 
of the poem, introduced through an invocation to Apollo, “god 
of science and lyght” (1091), is characterized by truly chaotic 
movement. The eagle having departed, the dreamer is forced to 
climb “with alle payne” (1118) up a sheer cliff-face of ice. Im-
ages of thunder and tempest return to Chaucer’s poetic line as 
Geffrey approaches what are revealed to be two buildings: the 
sound he hears is “lyk betynge of the see […] ayen the roches 
holowe, / Whan tempest doth the shippes swalowe” (1034–36) 
or “lyk the last humblynge / After the clappe of a thundringe” 
(1039–40). The climactic spectacle is characterized by deafen-
ing noise, which, as this poem has taken great pains to inform 
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us, is to be understood as spatial motion — physical movement, 
even breaking, of the air. The scene inside the House of Fame is 
everything that the Temple of Glass was not: swarms of people 
coming and going, every kind of entertainer imaginable in late 
medieval English society performing, the great horn blowing ei-
ther good or bad fame across the face of the earth. But the most 
stunning image of motion in this poem is the source of the noise 
originally heard: the House positioned in a valley under the 
castle, “that Domus Dedaly, / That Laboryntus cleped ys, / Nas 
mad so wonderlych, ywis, / Ne half so queyntelych ywrought” 
(1920–23).
The multiple layers of images of movement embodied in this 
place unroll as it is described. The first worth noting is the initial 
comparison used to describe it: it is like the Labyrinth, or “Do-
mus Dedaly.” The labyrinth, as a structure, is built for movement 
alone; its twists, turns, corners, and dead ends exist to facilitate 
unpredictable, wandering, and confused movement. It is the 
physical embodiment, or a kind of physical mapping or writing 
on the land “in a scrawling hand,” as theorist Henri Lefebvre 
might note, of a kind of intensely irregular motion.22 Donald 
Howard, in relation to this image in Chaucer’s poem, reminds us 
that the domus Dedali was a kind of design painted on or carved 
into medieval church walls and floors in the shape of a laby-
rinth, used for penance. Those seeking to do penance for their 
sins would either trace the path of their movement through the 
labyrinth with their fingers or crawl upon the image on the floor 
as a substitute for pilgrimage.23 The domus Dedali, then, can be 
22 “Traversed now by pathways and patterned by networks, natural space 
changes: one might say that practical activity writes upon nature, albeit in 
a scrawling hand, and that this writing implies a particular representation 
of space. Places are marked, noted, named. […] Paths are more important 
than the traffic they bear, because they are what endures in the form of 
the reticular patterns […]. Could it be called a text, or a message?” (Henri 
Lefeb vre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith [Malden: 
Blackwell, 1991], 117). 
23 Donald R. Howard, “Flying through Space: Chaucer and Milton,” in Milton 
and the Line of Vision, ed. Joseph Anthony Wittreich, Jr.,  (Madison: Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1975), 13–14.
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understood as a static image that also embodies and facilitates 
movement, literally and insofar as it figures travel abroad. 
The motion of this place, as mentioned above, is also far 
more obviously literal than the roaring of its noise and its as-
sociation with the labyrinth. This massive building, referred to 
as “the Whirling Whicker” by Pierro Boitani, perpetually spins 
in place.24 The description of this place embodies pluralism and 
complex motion. In terms of its construction, while the walls 
in the Temple of Glass were starkly polished and ordered, this 
“house” is like an enormous nest — an image of seemingly dis-
ordered construction through a natural, earthy, and random 
process. To augment this image of plurality, the twigs of which 
it is built are wildly multicolored — “and al thys hous of which 
y rede, / Was mad of twigges, falwe, rede, / And grene eke, and 
somme weren white” (1935–37). Doorways are controllers of 
movement through an architectural space — as Chaucer, living 
over one of the “principle” gates of London, would have been 
more aware than most — and this place seems to be construct-
ed more of doorways and holes than of walls.25 This multitude 
of doors defines it as a space of multi-directional and chaotic 
movement, in opposition to the one or two doors of the Temple 
of Glass, even without the constant spinning motion of the en-
tire structure. Finally, the crowd of people inside are also those 
characterized by their travel over land and sea: “shipmen and 
pilgrims” (2122).
Generations of Chaucer scholars have recognized the links 
between this house of twigs and Chaucer’s ideas about poetry, 
especially in relation to issues of poetic authority, form, the ver-
nacular, and the eventual creation of the Canterbury Tales.26 This 
24 Piero Boitani, “Chaucer’s Labyrinth: Fourteenth-Century Literature and 
Language,” The Chaucer Review 17, no. 3 (1983): 197–220.
25 Chaucer, The House of Fame, 1945–46.
26 Steven Kruger, one of many such examples, writes: “As has been widely rec-
ognized, the House of Fame forcefully and explicitly calls attention to its 
own poetic status,” and that “it also examines the processes of transmission 
and transformation by which authoritative traditions may be questioned 
and finished poems themselves unmade and reinvented.” Steven F. Kruger, 
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place embodies, in dramatic contrast to the Temple of Glass and 
its static images of classical stories, a shift from the authority 
of classical sources to that of the words of the present moment, 
and words spoken by all people, a profoundly important move 
in relation to his later poetry and the development of English 
vernacular literature. Most importantly for this study, however, 
the words of all people, as the eagle has told us, are formed of 
physically moving air rippling toward this place, arriving in spo-
ken fragments as a cacophony of sound. This motion is wildly 
complicated, eternal, physical, and consistently favored in the 
narrative over stasis and order. The connections between this 
poetic expression of motion and Ockham’s revisions of Aristo-
telian physics are striking.
Closing Thoughts
In recent scholarship, Chaucer has been linked to Ockham and 
Ockhamism, and the poet’s knowledge of at least some of the 
philosopher’s works and ideas has been established. Helen Ruth 
Andretta has related Troilus and Criseyde to Ockhamism, and, 
“Imagination and the Complex Movement of Chaucer’s House of Fame,” 
The Chaucer Review 28, no. 2 (1993): 117–34, at 118. Other studies that call 
attention to The House of Fame, not only as a poem about poetry but about 
authority and poetic transmission include: Robert J. Allen, “A Recurring 
Motif in Chaucer’s ‘House of Fame,’” The Journal of English and Germanic 
Philology 55, no. 3 (1956): ; Robert O. Payne, The Key of Remembrance, a 
Study of Chaucer’s Poetics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); J.A.W. 
Bennett, Chaucer’s ‘Book of Fame’: An Exposition of ‘the House of Fame,’ (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1968); P.M. Kean, Chaucer and the Making of English 
Poetry (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972); Jorg O. Fichte, Chaucer’s ‘Art 
Poetical’: A Study in Chaucerian Poetics (Tübingen: Narr Tübingen, 1980); 
Karla Taylor, Chaucer Reads “The Divine Comedy” (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1989); Martin Irvine, “Medieval Grammatical Theory and 
Chaucer’s House of Fame,” Speculum 60 (1985): 850–76; Delany, Chaucer’s 
House of Fame: The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism (Gainesville: The University 
Press of Florida, 1994); Jacqueline T. Miller, “The Writing on the Wall: Au-
thority and Authorship in Chaucer’s House of Fame,” The Chaucer Review 
17, no.2 (1982): 95–115; Katherine Zieman, “Chaucer’s Voys,” Representations 
60 (1997): 70–91. William S. Wilson, “Scholastic Logic in Chaucer’s House 
of Fame,” The Chaucer Review 1, no. 3 (1967): 181–84. 
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although Kathryn L. Lynch focuses on specific philosophical 
doctrines and denies Chaucer’s affiliation with any single phi-
losopher, she argues extensively for seeing Chaucer as a kind 
of nominalist, (the school in which Ockham was the primary 
figure and innovator) and influenced by several of Ockham’s, as 
well as other contemporary philosophers’, ideas.27 A.J. Minnis, 
in his representation of Chaucer’s philosophical climate, gives 
Ockham a prominent place.28 The relationship between Ock-
ham’s physics and Chaucer’s poetry, however, has received lit-
tle attention. The dominance of Ockham’s thinking in England 
while Chaucer was writing in 1374 and Chaucer’s surprisingly 
complex interaction with Aristotelian/Ockhamist concepts of 
motion make it likely that the poet was at least aware of these 
ideas in circulation, and we know that he was working directly 
with the Aristotelian texts with which Ockham was also engag-
ing — quite probably via Ockham’s commentaries, considering 
manuscript circulation. It is likely that Chaucer was influenced 
by Ockham’s physics when he wrote The House of Fame, but at 
very least he was doing something analogous in poetry to what 
Ockham was doing in physics. Chaucer’s poem is preoccupied 
with motion as a fundamental state, and he is a “complicator” 
of ideas about motion. His dream vision is truly one in which, 
in Ockham’s words, “diversa sunt ibi moventia” [diverse moving 
things are there].29 From his position surrounded by movement 
in his rooms above Aldgate, Chaucer created a kinetic vision of 
plurality and resistance to stasis. Although the road to Canter-
bury may continue to be Chaucer’s most famous image of move-
ment, the flash of the eagle’s appearance and what follows reveal, 
in this early work, Chaucer’s philosophically nuanced creation 
of motion through poetry.
27 Lynch, Chaucer’s Philosophical Visions, 15. Helen Ruth Andretta, Chaucer’s 
Troilus and Creseyde: A Poet’s Response to Ockhamism (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1997).
28 A. J. Minnis, Chaucer and Pagan Antiquity (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1982).
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